The Chin-Plaisance Philosophy Colloquia Series

With sincere thanks to donors Elaine Plaisance and Kenny Chin, the Department of Philosophy is delighted to announce two talks with Keota Fields, Ph.D. (UMass, Dartmouth). Prof. Fields will give a department talk THIS Thursday, November 7 at 2 p.m. in Humanities 391 and a public talk THIS Friday, November 8th at 3 p.m. in Humanities 587.

Both presentations will be followed by a Q&A, then a reception.

All are welcome to attend both talks. Please join us and bring your friends!

Abstracts:

Department Talk (Thursday at 2 p.m. in HUM 391)

Locke on Reduction and Compositional Powers

Are secondary qualities dispositions, or something else? I reject traditional interpretations of Locke, according to which secondary qualities are dispositions that reduce to an object’s primary qualities. In their place, I defend a reading of secondary qualities as simple and complex relations governed by natural laws. The resulting interpretation overcomes a variety of objections to previous readings of secondary qualities as relations, while also accommodating Locke’s claim that secondary qualities reduce to primary qualities.

Public Talk (Friday at 3 p.m. in HUM 587)

Why Read Philosophy by Problematic Philosophers?

My figures in the history of philosophy – most notably, Kant – have expressed or defended problematic views. A Problematic View is incompatible with a conviction in the moral and rational equality, dignity, and intrinsic value, of all persons. One might legitimately wonder what intellectual benefits are gained by reading who I call Problematic Philosophers. I reject explanations for why we should read Problematic Philosophers that are grounded in their historical context; that advocate cherry-picking aProblematic Philosopher’s ‘good’ writings while omitting their problematic writings; and that are grounded in a philosopher’s freedom to express problematic views. I argue instead for what I call sober readings of Problematic Philosophers – readings that acknowledge a problematic philosopher’s intellectual failures. Using Kant as an example, I argue that the strategy to “bracket” Kant’s dehumanizing views from his philosophy, and the strategy of showing that the former are consistent with the latter, both inadvertently transform Kant into a superhuman intellectual exemplar in ways that undermine intellectual virtue and promote a pervasive form of epistemic injustice. If that is correct, a sober reading of Kant and other Problematic Philosophers might look roughly like how we read Thomas Jefferson today. Jefferson's work is still widely read, and he is regarded as both important and deeply problematic. Yet Jefferson is no longer upheld as a superhuman exemplar in quite the way he once was. Similarly sober readings of Problematic Philosophers have the potential to (i) promote intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy; (ii) undermine a certain form of epistemic injustice; and (iii) yield hermeneutical benefits for understanding ourselves and our historical position.