M.A.G.I.C Affinity Circle meeting

Landy: Hume argues that we have no idea of a self as a single subject of experience persisting through time. Not only does Kant hold that we do have such an idea, but also that it is analytic that we each are such a thing. How can he justify that outrageous claim?! On the grounds that it is a necessary presupposition of practical reasoning, and therefore of the demand for justification! I.e. our idea of the subject of experience is just the idea of that which is subject to norms of practical reason.

Azadpur: Kant argues that Aristotle account of the unity of the categories, as the various ways “being” is said, is “rhapsodic” and that Kant’s ground of them in the faculty of judgment and in reference to the transcendental subject, the “I think” that accompanies my representations, is far less “haphazard” (A81=B106-07). In this presentations, I put forward a quick sketch of the Aristotelian substance ontology, the account that privileges primary substances as the original ground and meaning of “being". I will briefly contrast it with the aforementioned Kantian subject ontology and then I evoke the Sartrean proclamation that "consciousness and the world are given at one stroke” to ask whether an ontological balance between the self and the world is possible.