Keota Fields, Ph.D. asks, "Why Read Philosophy by Problematic Philosophers?"

With sincere thanks to donors Elaine Plaisance and Kenny Chin, the Department of Philosophy is delighted to announce a public talk with Keota Fields, Ph.D. (UMass, Dartmouth), as part of the Chin-Plaisance Philosophy Colloquia Series.

The presentation will be followed by a Q&A, then a reception. All are welcome to attend.

"Why Read Philosophy by Problematic Philosophers?"

Abstract: My figures in the history of philosophy – most notably, Kant – have expressed or defended problematic views. A Problematic View is incompatible with a conviction in the moral and rational equality, dignity, and intrinsic value, of all persons. One might legitimately wonder what intellectual benefits are gained by reading who I call Problematic Philosophers. I reject explanations for why we should read Problematic Philosophers that are grounded in their historical context; that advocate cherry-picking aProblematic Philosopher’s ‘good’ writings while omitting their problematic writings; and that are grounded in a philosopher’s freedom to express problematic views. I argue instead for what I call sober readings of Problematic Philosophers – readings that acknowledge a problematic philosopher’s intellectual failures. Using Kant as an example, I argue that the strategy to “bracket” Kant’s dehumanizing views from his philosophy, and the strategy of showing that the former are consistent with the latter, both inadvertently transform Kant into a superhuman intellectual exemplar in ways that undermine intellectual virtue and promote a pervasive form of epistemic injustice. If that is correct, a sober reading of Kant and other Problematic Philosophers might look roughly like how we read Thomas Jefferson today. Jefferson's work is still widely read, and he is regarded as both important and deeply problematic. Yet Jefferson is no longer upheld as a superhuman exemplar in quite the way he once was. Similarly sober readings of Problematic Philosophers have the potential to (i) promote intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy; (ii) undermine a certain form of epistemic injustice; and (iii) yield hermeneutical benefits for understanding ourselves and our historical position.