

Stipulating and Conceiving ‘Natural’ Kind Concepts

A. K. Bierman

*Quaer playce Twynn Urth, whair Wasser aynt watter.
--Fanebius Perlying*

PART I Water

In this essay, I show how we can and sometimes do connect conceiving afresh to naming by stipulation. My account of concepts and conceiving is unfamiliar to most, although it accords with our lexical practices when we adopt nominalistic constraints on our methodology for studying concepts, which I urge you all to do. I rely throughout on what I call a **conceptual or coherence logic** that serves us better in formulating a theory of concepts than any variance of truth and alethic modal logics do. If you want to acquaint yourself with conceptual logic before reading this tract proper, check out the summary, informal introduction to its present, young, mid-stage development in PART II, beginning at page 24. There is a more, spare, formal skeleton—its symbols, grammar (well formed expressions), inference schemes, and modalities in “Your Appendix, Tom”, forthcoming. The alternative is to rely on intuitively acquiring some of it while reading this tract, which may be all you need to understand why I think you should and can free yourself from an essentialist, alethic account of natural kind terms and hurry you toward a promising coherence logic alternative, rising as bright Helios on the Eastern rim of our tiny orb.¹

Natural kind concepts are the game I stalk. Water as H₂O serves as an example of how conceptual logic as a supplement to alethic logic, if judiciously used, alters the semantic/logical landscape where the unabated, incestuous behavior of ‘analytic’ philos-

¹ I ask you to note the increasingly frequent occurrences of “coherence”, “coherent”, and “incoherent” in current philosophical literature. It’s probably intuitively repugnant for you to interpret “incoherent” in these new uses as “inconsistent”. You’d do well to hold fast to that response. But how, then, do you interpret these coherence values if not in terms of the inapt alethic logic? This requires a conceptual logic I outline in this essay’s PART II. I hope to have a fuller version ready within the year, as I’ve been saying since about 1997. For earlier approximations see, *LOGIC: A Dialogue*, Holden-Day, San Francisco, 1964, and *The Critical Thinking Handbook*, A. K. Bierman and R. N. Assali; Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1996. Consult the latter first.

ophers occurs. An attentive accounting of the logical-epistemological-ontological topics in journals from *Mind* to the *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* shows a persisting, ‘unnatural’ preoccupation with the views of a clutch of philosophers active from the opening to the end of the 20th century; Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein (fading except in English departments) hold the top cited numbers, followed by Quine, Tarski, Strawson, Davidson, and Kripke. These names are off the top of my memory; they don’t reflect an actual count, which, I suppose, someone somewhere might have. Also, I cite these names for their popular repute among professional philosophers rather than for their exclusive superiority to other fine minds on the same or related topics. This remarkably long hundred-year preoccupation shows that all fine, narrowly focused minds grind all finally to fine-grained dust. The zealous village millers spare nothing and no one.

* * * *

Stephen Stich gives an example of what some people think is a necessary synthetic truth about a natural kind, water in his chosen case:

“(6) (x) x is water iff x is H₂O”.²

Natural kind advocates symbolize what they are trying to sell us by (6), which asks us to rely on essences--whatever ontological status they may have—that are alethically necessary grafts onto such kinds as water, per (6). However, no naïf *extensional* symbolization of the sentence “Water is H₂O” can be coherent, since, as I show, it is an *intensional* decision. Not even a possible-worlds’ interpretation can save it from this incoherence. A possible-world attempt to ape intensional logic has been off the mark for most Western philosophers who never cottoned to the pillar of Leibniz’s deus ex machina monadic coordinator. Without divine support, this extensional pretence would be like reading *Hamlet* as commedia dell’arte, to which Leibniz’s cheery theodicy was reduced by Voltaire’s merciless pen. I applaud his demotion. After this, we can not but reject his, and all others’, possible-world’s reduction of monads’ individual intensions to the Deity’s cosmically harmonized alethic extensions. Hence, a less ontologically suspect account has to be furnished. I do that in what forward marches below.

I suggest we reinterpret (6) as a de jure, stipulated shift to an \hat{H}_2O concept of \hat{water} that authorizes a leutic modality enjoinder.³ There are no ‘natural’ kind concepts, only *stipulated* kind concepts. Our Stipulating Chemist authorizes abandoning,

² P. 175, *Reconstructing the Mind*, Stephen P. Stich; New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.

³ “Leutic” is short for “symboleutic”, a word of Greek origin that interprets, roughly, as $\hat{advisory}$. Leutic modalities, [enjoined to], [enjoined not to], and [allowed to], are different advisory modes for *combining* lexical interpretations of word tokens to devise propositional interpretations of sentences. Honoring the advisories brings the blessings of coherent interpretations of sentence tokens, violating them carries the plague of incoherence. These three leutic modalities, respectively, are hypothetical cousins of the Kantian categorical moral modalities, [obligatory], [forbidden], and [permitted], and of the alethic modalities, [necessary], [impossible], and [possible]. The point of leutic modalities is to differentiate advisories for lexical *acts* within a coherence/conceptual logic. Advisories are to the linguistic via attiva as relations are to the via passiva.

for scientific purposes, the concept of water as ^colorless, transparent liquid occurring on earth as rivers, lakes, oceans, etc., and falling from the clouds as rain^ (*Webster's New World Dictionary*, 1986) after having discovered the H₂O composition of his water samples, which he may or may not think is the same for all samples of what he heretofore called "water", whether on earth or on twin-earth. But he will not hereafter call anything "water" that isn't composed of those chemical elements in those amounts. Talk about seaworthy rigidity! The Chemist's de jure advisory, incorrectly symbolized as (6), is authorized by a hypothetical lexical imperative. This imperative is on p. 16.

Stipulating conceptual changes is culturally central, because they're designed to provide shared interpretations of words, which isn't as easily accomplished as the stories told by natural kind advocates would lead the unwary to believe. The controversy over whether 'replicating' stem cells is 'cloning' humans illustrates that even people working in the same field where conceptual change and addition are marked (2007) don't jointly make as smooth a transition to recommended lexical/conceptual changes as the popular, ahistorical, H₂O account of water assures us. Revising and recommending a change to a lexical community's shared practices, requires de jure conceptual arguments to justify widespread and often upsetting change. Think of the complex of ethical, political, and microbiological issues re cloning. This tangle should be daunting enough to discredit anyone who characterizes "stipulate" and "conventionalism" as 'whims' or 'arbitrary, personal decisions'. That's cartoon philosophy.

(6), reinterpreted as a conceptual stipulation rather than merely a name stipulation, in its usual acceptance, enjoins us to substitute one and the same entity, say, a beaker of water, into its "x" variables:

"(6) (x) x is water iff x is H₂O"

This recipe does not, however faithfully followed, enable us to cook 'necessary synthetic' truths in any philosophical kitchen, but happily does equip us to stew up leutic enjoinders for new conceptual practices. Cast 'necessary synthetic' truths about natural kinds into the fire, as Hume counseled; no one can coherently use [if and only if, iff] to make an a posteriori, alethically necessary predicative statement. The contingency of natural events and states prevails in any actual and possible world. Modes of knowing them, a priori and a posteriori, are ancillary. This alone cautions us against making truth evaluations of (6), especially modally 'necessary' ones. Only de jure stipulations of enjoined

Stipulated Kinds 4

conceptual relations dare sport ‘necessary’ “iff”s. The extensional form of (6)’s symbolism deforms the enjoined leptic changes in our conceptual practices.⁴

De jure conceptual stipulation imposes two substitutional restraints.

The first restraint is on what entity we may substitute into (6)’s right-side “x”; it must be one that makes the statement true:

(6iit) <This beaker of liquid is H₂O >.⁵

The second substitutional restraint is that we must substitute one and the same entity into (6)’s left- and right-sides’ “x”s.

Once we’ve embraced these substitutional estoppels, it would be incoherent to substitute this beaker of liquid, into the left-side “x” of (6),

(6i) “*Beaker of liquid is water*”,

if we didn’t make the identical substitution into the right-side “x” of (6),

(6ii) “*Beaker of liquid is H₂O*”.

If (6iit) is false, because the liquid is alcohol, the substitution into (6i) is incoherent, because it violates the enjoined de jure conceptual stipulation that no liquid may be called “water” if it’s not interpreted as $\wedge H_2O \wedge$, which replaced the earlier concept of $\wedge \text{water} \wedge$ as $\wedge \text{translucent} \dots \wedge$ with the stipulated concept $\wedge H_2O \wedge$. (6i)’s incoherence blocks its use for making a true-or-false statement of any modal stripe; hence, it’s not false.

Moreover, if the interpretation of one of a stipulated “iff”’s sentences is incoherent, as (6i) is, given the assumed falsity of (6iit), the whole stipulation (6’),

(6’) (i) $\wedge \text{This beaker of liquid is water} \wedge$ iff (ii) $\wedge \text{This beaker of liquid is H}_2\text{O} \wedge$ is conceptually incoherent.⁶ Coherence value, prima facie, overrides truth value. Any sentence that has no coherent interpretation--is nonsensical, meaningless, in old speak—cannot be used to make a true or false statement; nor can any complex sentence one of whose sentences has no coherent interpretation be used to make a true or false statement.

⁴ I use slash marks around words and sentences to indicate tokens of them, /.../; double quotation marks to indicate a token word and sentence type, “...”; angle brackets to indicate statements, <...>. Carets around words indicate subject and predicate concepts; $\wedge \dots \wedge$, around sentences they indicate propositions; the latter are combinations of subject and predicate concepts (no determiners, no tense). Concepts and propositions are interpretations, respectively of word and sentence tokens. Interpretations are always token rewrites of interpreted tokens; these rewrites should not be confused with ‘meanings’; the rewrites don’t have to be and often aren’t synonymous with each other. /The herald is here/ may be resaid as /The Herald (newspaper) is here/ or as /M’Lord the herald has arrived (from Dunsinane)/. Sometimes the rewrites/resaids are identical to the original; /Mark, did you hear me?/ is a rewrite of /Mark, did you hear me?/, as we repeat it on a noisy dance floor. Thus, I stipulate $\wedge \text{proposition} \wedge$ as an interpretation/rewrite, unlike Russell and many others who *Principia Mathematica*.

⁵ For explanations of unfamiliar symbols I introduce, see the Part II, where I also explain some conceptual logic concepts and symbols for them to which I refer and use to make some points in the body of this essay. I suggest you look at the Appendix, at least superficially, when you need to crest a rise. For a list of (6)’s variants, go to p. 13.

⁶ Propositions’ are coherent or incoherent (coherence value); their coherence value depends solely upon whether or not they are constructed in accord with a lexical system’s advisories. Propositions in my lexicon are not statements; they’re evaluated solely for their coherence rather than their truth value. I indicate statements with angled brackets, <The mint was robbed>; I indicate proposi-tions with carets, $\wedge [\text{Sooth}] \text{ suspect} \text{ rob} \wedge$. [Sooth] advises us that the statement’s copula is to be understood as making a factual con-nection, for example, between $\wedge \text{suspect} \wedge$ and $\wedge \text{rob} \wedge$.

Stipulated Kinds 5

The logical constants we use to form complex sentences (and, or, ...) are 'defined' only with respect to the truth value of every constituent statement. Thus, if one sentence of a complex sentence has no coherent interpretation, no truth value can be assigned to it nor to the complex statement of which it's a part. The conjunction of a true statement and an incoherent proposition can't be assigned a truth value.

What's at stake here is (6i)'s coherence rather than its truth value. Whoever touts the complex statement's necessary truth value should look, instead, to its enjoined coherence. What is shown by the fanciful case that Twynn Urth's Wasser isn't Urth's watter, and it's all that's shown, is that you can't coherently substitute what is called "Wasser" into (6i). Twynn Urth can be a casuistic, but mistakenly, imaged alternative to Urth only because "iff" is truth logic's Janus-faced functor, as in (6). Unfortunately, an Unhappy Consciousness distorts its self-image, as GWF Hegel noted, when it betrays its own conceptual enjoinedments.

Thy Mynde, yn flotante Twynn Urth,
Ys caste affloate
Yn faveur of twynn confushyon
When yt porttrayes yon beeker's lyqwyd
As Urth's nature's dystyllashyon.

--Fanebius Perlyng

Stipulations have no truth value, only the probity of de jure coherence value; so, a fortiori, they can be neither 'necessarily' true nor 'necessarily' false. Hence, we are well advised to shift from a truth to a coherence evaluation of such natural kind stipulations as (6'). To make a false statement, as Aristotle says, is to say of what is not that it is or of what is that it is not. (6') says neither.

Suppose, on the other hand, that statement (6iit),

(6iit) <This beaker of liquid is H₂O>,

is true. In this case, (6i) should be interpreted, per a stipulated (6'), as

(6i*) ^This beaker of liquid is called "water"^^,

or, better, as a boldly de jure conceptual act, indicated by the functor [Conceive],

(6i**) ^[Conceive] this beaker of liquid ^(as) water^^,

(6it) <This beaker of liquid is water>.

(6i*) is the lexical act that unties the concept ^water^ from ^translucent, ...^ and bonds it to ^H₂O^. This is not conveyed by (6it).

This distinction between (6it) versus (6i*)/(6i**) isn't a product of 'arthritic' minds caught in a conventionalistic, semantic time warp. Rather, it's the product of minds that recognize the folly of rigidly continuing to think we can make statements about the world

denuded of language, (6it), as if, per impossible, we may conceive of a world in which we're stripped of language and incapable of formulating (6i*)/6(i**). Our betters should forsake their hopelessly wistful yen for mute 'objectivity'.

(6i*) is coherent by stipulation; it honors the "water"-conceptualizing stipulation (6'). It does not say of what is that it is; that's what (6iit) does. Nor can it, because water, unlike H₂O in our time frame, no longer exists in nature as it was thought of before our Stipulatin' Chemist proposed (6) and (6'). You shouldn't say of water that it is water *simpliciter*, if you've shifted your concept of it from casual, sensory properties such as ^translucent^ to ^H₂O^. So, put that seductive tautology on hold! ^Water^ before the Stipulatin' Chemist stipulated isn't identical to ^water^ after she stipulated; it's as incoherent to substitute pre-stipulated conceived water into post-stipulated conceived water tokens as it is to substitute wasser into /water/; the stipulated ^H₂O^ is not identical to ^translucent, ...^. Such is the fate of conceptually conjured entities; they come and go, speaking of Giotto, then of Michelangelo.

Please. Never break apart the pair of activities *naming-conceiving*; you must take naming more seriously than many new or late metaphysicians do/did! What you can do is call anything that is H₂O by the name "water", regardless of Twynn Urth chemists' ^wasser^ stipulations, since you're Urthy.

You'll reap one really big advantage from my proposal: You'll stop saying or thinking (6i) is a necessarily true synthetic statement; also, you won't even be tempted to commit this near orthodoxy. The only thing 'necessary' in this story is to honor the chemist's leutic enjoinder, (6i*)/(6i**):

"I *enjoin you to call* this 'water'/to conceive this as ^water^", which are quite different from

"It's 'necessary' *that* this is water".

Confusing the [Enjoined to] leutic modal with the alethic is a hold-over, orthodox habit that erases the role of agents' lexical/cognitive *acts* in favor of passive metaphysics, "Hey, that's the way things *are!*" In the name of hallowed 'objectivity', forgetting their newly claimed pragmatic roots and allegiance, some freshly minted essence realists think this passivity puts truth out of meddling hegelians' and berkeleyians' reach. Ma, non.

My point is we should avoid collapsing modal enjoinders of lexical *acts* into alethic 'necessary' modalities of stated *predication* <This *is* water>. People in the philosophy business who confound leutic [enjoinder] with alethic [necessity] go on to incoherently combine [necessary] with ^synthetic^ and ^a posteriori^. The synthesizing work—hooking ^water^ to ^H₂O^--was done in (6) by our brava Chemist, not by Mother Nature. There is no ^water^ in nature as there is H₂O. "Water" is a name with a new bonding once a sample's chemical composition is discerned; by and by, fellow chemists detach ^water^ from the concepts of casual sensory properties that were form-

erly used to justify calling a liquid “water”. In our post-(6’) epoch, whatever is H₂O should be conceived of as and *said* to be water.

Isn’t that a relief? You no longer have to confound conceptual enjoinder with metaphysical necessity, of whatever flavor—ever again. Believe me.⁷

Compliant, abused wives of excessive drinkers try to save their husbands’ good repute for the children’s sake in the face of Dad’s sorry home-coming spectacle and/or his maltreatment of them: “That ain’t your Pa talkin’, that’s the whiskey”. We, too, can excuse philosophers who say there are necessarily true natural kind statements: That ain’t your Pa talkin’, that’s alethic ethanol.

Stich correctly uses a universal quantifier in (6) to symbolize natural kind statements of some of its purveyors’ advocates; it’s a standard tool in truth logic, but a wholly deforming way of symbolizing natural kind stipulations, which have no truth value. The universal quantifier [all] is replaced by [any] in stipulations, which are governed by the substitution/emplacement estoppel:

For *any* entities emplaced in the subject terms in both sentences of an “iff” stipulation, you’re enjoined to emplace one and the same entity in both, as illustrated by (6i) and (6ii) above.

This is an [Identify] advisory, a count-of-one advisory. It enjoins us, for example, to assure ourselves and others that the two beakers of emplaced liquid in (6i) and (6ii) COUNT as ONE; it’s a condition for coherently executing the chemist’s stipulation, (6+):

(6+) You’re enjoined to call *any* liquid “water” iff that identical liquid bears the H₂O properties/composition.

How else could the enjoinder be honored, given the emplacement estoppel, expressed in (6+) by “identical” liquid, if we couldn’t count the substitutions into (6’)’s “*x*”s as ONE and the SAME, which is passively expressed in standard philosophical logic by “numerical identity”.⁸

It’s sometimes possible, of course, to count the referents of diverse names as ONE; if there were a Twynn Urth outside Putnam’s restrictive fiction, it would be conceptually possible/coherent that we should count Urth’s “watter” and Tywinn Urth’s “Wasser” as ONE. If the count were ONE, Wasser and watter samples would be numerically identical. (“Say, did some sneaky Urthman slip some H₂O watter into my Twynn Urth beaker?”)

In shifting from (6)’s quantifier [all *x*] to (6+)’s [any *x*], we preserve [all]’s universality. [Any *x*] is as universal as [all *x*], but gives us the latitude of choosing any

⁷ For an explanation of these leptic modals, see p. 41f.

⁸ What I’ve been calling “substitution” into tokens I will usually call **emplacing** from now on. This will distinguish substituting one symbol for another from emplacing an object in a subject token and a property trope in a one-place predicate.

specific entity we will emplace into (6+) rather than being committed to emplacing *every member* of a specified class, or of choosing *every portion* of a mass:

Any portion of a liquid that bears the properties H₂O will henceforth be called “water”.

[Any] frees us from classes. Truth logic is the whiskey of natural kinds’ advocates’. [For all x] and [x] tempts them to warp coherence value into truth value and then, unknowingly, to label leutic *enjoinments* as alethic *necessary truths* about exemplars of natural kinds. Forgive them, Hume, for your only truth-inebriated sons have forgotten their lineage.

Once a subject’s name, “water”, is *bonded* by an agent to a selected property or several of them, such as H₂O, it henceforth flies under the banner of the leutic modality [Enjoined to]. This bonding stipulation *enjoins* us to honor this lexical mode of combining the bonded concepts and all that follows from it—if you wish to understand how chemists use “water” and how you may wish to be understood by these enlightened scientific hoplites. (See [Bond], page 59f.)

Coming up (p.11ff) is a basic conceptual argument in which this bonding stipulation is a premise. As heretofore, the words in square brackets are interpretations of the copula “to be” and indicate different advisory modes of traveling from one concepts to another; advisory modes are *not rules*. This travel is a lexical *act*, something we *do* and which we may be *enjoined to do*, be *enjoined not to do*, or be *allowed to do*; the English portmanteau copula doesn’t fully flag which lexical act advisory is intended by the speaker’s/writer’s use of the copula. “Is”s and “are”s are stuffed full with several different kinds of advisories. [Bond] and [Sooth] are two of them, both of which are used in the argument below.⁹

Via attiva agents amenable to copula advisories leave worn trails twixt tokens in lexical space; our telltail travels are reported by via passiva disclosures. Predicative statement trails are launched with the use of the [Sooth] advisory.

The emplacements of one and the same beaker of liquid into (6)’s two “x”s,
 (6) “(x) x is water iff x is H₂O”,
 literally gives us (6E),
 “(6E) Ethe liquid in this beakerE is water” iff (6ii) Ethe liquid in this
 beakerE is H₂O”,

⁹ Other leutically governed advisories are [Negate], [Emplace], [Subsume], [Identify], [Counter] (for contrary concepts), [Contradict] (for contradictory concepts), [Link], and [Sooth]; the last is a leutically allowed advisory for predication, which does not concern us here.

Stipulated Kinds 9

The expressions bracketed by the [E...E] functor quotes indicate the liquid in that beaker. Someone's hand has literally put a beaker of liquid in the places held open by that pair of (6E)'s "x"s. See footnote 10 and p. 26f for further explanations of [Emplace].

Emplacing a fist in the place held open by /nose/ in /My nose is bleeding/ is incoherent; in common parlance, calling a fist a nose is wrong. Emplacing is putting non-linguistic entities, a nose and bleeding in the places held open, respectively, by the sentence's subject token /nose/ and its predicate token /bleeding/.¹⁰ Non-linguistic and linguistic entities contrast; the latter are animals' constructed graphic, audible, and palpable tokens whose sensed matter is convention governed, as /rosso/ and /red/'s conventions differ, whereas a nose or water or a magazine are not such conventional matter. Despite this contrast, non-linguistic entities become lexical items when they're emplaced, as I explain below; and, in fitting contexts, tokens may be treated as non-linguist objects. We emplace substantives into a sentence token's subject place and property tropes into its predicate place.¹¹ Emplacements may or may not be coherent.

Once an object or a property has been emplaced, sometimes consciously and deliberately as samples of H₂O water were, they become lexical entries in lexical space, although they continue to exist non-lexically as well, like a fist in the face makes our nose bleed, unlike a fist emplaced in /fist/. ^Coherent emplacement^ is the best way to interpret "direct reference".

Emplacements' coherence value is the creature of conceptual subsumption. As ^bird^ coherently subsumes ^robin^, so both concepts coherently subsume the robin flitting about in my garden, which is why I may emplace that robin (if I can get it to stay still) in the /robin/ of /My robin's back/. ^Parrot^ does not coherently subsume my robin.¹²

¹⁰ I use slash marks around a word, /nose/, to indicate that its referent/emplacement is a word *token*. This contrasts with my use of double quotes, "nose", to indicate that the referent/emplacement is a word *type*. The same conventions apply for any other kind of expression, such as sentences; /Jack is angry/ indicates a token sentence. A type is *any* token satisfying the same description. ^Type^ is creature of counting; any token that satisfies the same description is to be counted as one and the same as any other token satisfying the same description. A type is neither a class nor an 'abstract', spaceless/timeless, entity.

¹¹ I symbolize emplacement using a bracing pair of **E quotes**: [E...E], as in [EnoseE] @ /nose/. This indicates that something's nose has been put into the place held open by the /nose/ token. The square brackets around the "E" letters indicate that emplacement is a lexical functor; I usually drop the brackets for brevity. The nose emplacement is coherent, but *EVanity FairE* @ /nose/ is not. Your nose's bleeding may also be emplaced coherently in the predicate, as in *EbleedingE* @ /bleeding/. If both the subject and the predicate of a sentence have coherent emplacements, *EnoseE* @ /nose/ & *E(nose) bleedingE* @ /bleeding/, where the nose carries bleeding over into the predicate place, a statement, <My nose is bleeding>, made with the sentence /My nose is bleeding/, is true. With emplacement we will have structured a state of affairs with a sentence structure, that is, constructed a fact. There's no call for 'correspondence' of statement-and-'fact' here, and the coherence required is conceptual, not alethic. I abhor the diseased, eviscerated, sham concept ^content^, whether of a thought, sentence, statement, or proposition; but, to orient you to this familiar, odious lexical fashion-plate saw, the 'content' of that sentence is the nose and the bleeding. Coherent emplacements are the 'content' of propositions, the notoriously problematic 'referents' of standardly stodgy semantics; they're what we use to determine statements' alethic stature.

¹² For more on emplacement, see pp. 26f.

Stipulated Kinds 10

I treat a token's 'referent' as a ^{^coherent emplacement^}. You can coherently emplace a nose in the space held open by /body part/ but not a magazine; hence, that nose is one of the referents of /body part/ but magazine is not. When you coherently emplace a beaker of liquid into the place held open by /This liquid/ of /This liquid is cool/, you give that water a place in a sentence, and thereby, give it a place in a lexical system. The same holds for emplacing a trope, say red, into a predicate place held open by /red/ in

My seemingly unorthodox account of reference may be normalized by comparing it to emplacing the physical, spoken-written /herbaceous/ token into /P/ of /This leaf is P/. How else do physical, spoken sounds and written shapes become linguistic tokens except by being incorporated into a system of other tokens? Once we incorporate the sound or shape of /herbaceous/ into a particular place in a lexical system, a place only approximately, but poetically, indicated by

“any seed plant whose stem withers away to the ground after each season's growth” (*Webster's New World Dictionary*),
we have thereby added it to our vocabulary and also created the concept ^{^herbaceous^}.

* * * *

If you're a materialist, you have to account for concepts in terms of physical tokens; you have no other choice. An admonition: All that physicalist business about Artificial Intelligence (AI) computer modeling of the brain and its synaptic networks in modules, or not, is a physiological-based psychological sideshow, not logic. Don't let these irrelevant speculations distract you from your conceptual logic tasks. We need the bodily capacities to reason conceptually, but they're distinct from conceptual logic itself. You can't identify any needed capacities without first independently identifying what activity they're serving. Until you fill in the blank of <Tom has the bodily capacities to _____>, you can't begin to identify what those capacities are. If you fill in “throw a ball”, then, and only then, can you begin to inquire about and identify the physiology of throwing rather than, say, spitting. Similarly, until you fill in with “reason conceptually” and know what that is, you can't productively investigate the physiology of conceptual reasoning. That comes later in the story; now we're at its beginning. Thus, speculation about the physical capacities needed to reason conceptually is premature if you haven't characterized conceptual reasoning by its logic, no matter how incomplete this logic's development is.

However, an AI account of cognitive activity does have the same nominalistic constraints I'm claiming for conceptual thinking. AI is nominalistic, because nothing but token physical keystrokes, for example, physically activate the token electric impulses to run the software within the hardware. There is no way to enter an 'abstract idea', 'universal', 'thought' or 'propositional content' into an AI system. This goes for humans' 'soft', biological hardware as well. Hence, we have to forego lazy reliance on non-token

crutches ('abstract idea', ...) to account for human conceptual cognition. This is a methodological, not an ontological, point. Shift the scene from controversy about universals' *existence* to assessment of their *utility* in the physical world.

Each *place* for a token in a lexical system specifies a different concept. Remember: Meanings are sensibly unavailable for communication. We neither hear, see, smell, nor feel meanings, only physical tokens. Look at this page. You see tokens, but not meanings. Every request for the 'meaning' of a sentence you don't understand is answered with other tokens—forever it will be so. A definiens is as physical as its definiendum, and is not a 'meaning' but, rather, a set of tokens that clue you to places in a conceptual system. Hence, any account of 'meaning' has to be based solely on speakers' coherent routing practices between word tokens embodied in sentence tokens; our intuitive, untutored distinctions between coherent and incoherent routes use an implicit lexical system that conceptual/coherence logic makes explicit. These *via activa practices* get reported as *via passiva relations* between tokens and their emplacements in **lexical space**. 'Understanding' and 'communicating' have to be based solely on persons having isomorphic lexical spaces. Hence, the only possible method available to 'explain' 'meanings' is to uniquely locate word tokens in relation to each other in lexical space. Specifying those relations and how to establish their presence or absence is the business of conceptual/coherence logic. I sketch that in this essay's PART II, and, more fully in "On Emplacing"'s "Your Appendix, Tom", which will appear on this site pretty soon (In 2007?).

Yes, Tom, lexical space, the locus of 'meaning' is self- or unself-consciously built part-by-part over time; it is not a given, although newborns take it so.

The emplacement of a liquid (in its beaker) and of the sound blips or the ink pile of /herbaceous/ are on a par. Think of a conceptual system nominalistically, as a relational system of physical entities, of tokens and their emplacements in lexical space. If we share isomorphic trails from token to token and from token to coherent emplacement in this space, we will 'reach' the same interpretative destination, usually wind-bagged as "same meaning", "common understanding", "communication", or "Awright" (with palm slaps). Fellow traveling on the same routes in lexical space is all we need for mutual discourse and civilized cooperation; 'meanings' are as superfluous for these achievements as they are non-existent.

And now for the promised argument with the (6+) stipulation:

(6+) You're enjoined to call *any* liquid "water" iff that identical liquid bears the H₂O properties/composition.

Interpret (6+) as a stipulation bonding the name "water" to any liquid that is H₂O, thereby creating the concept ^water^. It creates ^water^ because both "water" and any liquid's coherent emplacement in any /water/ are lexically bonded to ^H₂O^. That emplaced liquid is given its place in lexical space by being subsumed by ^water^ and being bonded to

$\wedge H_2O \wedge$. Bonding a subject to a predicate(s) is an enjoined modality. (6+) is the *via activa* advisory to so bond subject and predicate concepts, and, so, subsumes objects and tropes via emplacement. This is how our Chemist modally enjoined you to travel on his stipulated, route in lexical space. (See p. 14 for a list of the many (6)s.)

Please note: The following argument fulfills my essay’s first-sentence promise that I will show you how fresh conceiving and stipulative naming are connected. I do so by moving from the a

(6+) You’re enjoined to call *any* liquid “water” iff that identical liquid bears the H_2O properties/composition.

<This liquid is H_2O > (6+)’s true consequent

(6i*) You’re enjoined to call this (H_2O) liquid “water”.

The following (6i**) is a rewrite of the stipulative conclusion (6i*):

(6i**) \wedge [Conceive] this H_2O -liquid \wedge (as) water $\wedge\wedge$.

(6i**)’s copula is a [Conceive] rewrite of (6i*)’s /call it/ advisory. We may coherently rewrite (6i*) on the nominalistic principle: Discursive conception is a coherent propositional combination of object and property concepts. Concepts are word tokens with places in a lexical system, achieved, for example, by bonding \wedge water \wedge and $\wedge H_2O \wedge$, and by coherent emplacement. (6+) stipulates *any* token’s place, such as /water/, in the English lexical system; hence, it leutically enjoins us to conceive the liquid in that beaker, as well as *any* other liquid sample with H_2O properties, as the concept \wedge water \wedge , which distinguishes it from \wedge Wasser \wedge .¹³

¹³ I italicized “any”. Although neglected, it’s an important determiner, because with nominalists’ escape from the fatal, platonic Forms and the class-forming determiner “all”. The functor [Identify] advises us to count the concepts on both sides of an identity sign, as ONE, as a numerical identity. \wedge Horse $\wedge = \wedge$ cavallo \wedge advises us that both sides of the [Identify] functor have to count as ONE concept if that identifying proposition is to be coherent. EseabiscuitE = EseabiscuitE advises us that the emplacements on both sides must count as ONE and the SAME horse if that identify proposition is to be coherent.

The type/token distinction can be made with “any”, leaving “all” out of it: Any token /t/ is a type “t”, if it satisfies a ONE count stipulation. One might stipulate that any English token spelled with the same letters be counted as ONE type. Thus, “t” is any token, /t/, satisfying that stipulation. Such ONE-count tokens are identical for logical purposes; they sustain the same valid inferences, regardless of which token occurs in an inference’s premises and conclusion. Think of logic teachers’ introductory “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man”, etc; it contains two tokens of “Socrates”. If the same person is emplaced in both, giving us a count of ONE and the SAME emplacement, the inference is valid. Similarly, two tokens of a type must be given identical interpretations to avoid equivocation.. “Water is *any* liquid that has H_2O properties. This liquid has.... Therefore...” The pairs of tokens--/water/ and /water/; /liquid/ and /liquid/; / H_2O / and / H_2O /--in this argument have to be given the same interpretation and emplacement to preserve the inference’s validity. This is the elementary lesson for budding logicians: Avoid equivocation, whether of concept or emplacement. The latter is particularly crucial for logicians who find inferences with indirect/oblique sentences troublesome. They fail to recognize that such inference’s premises of the form, <I believe S is P>, <S is not P>; so, <I believe <S is P> is false>, need additional identifying premises. If we interpret “is” as predication, to evaluate this kind of inference, we have to determine what “S” and “P” indicates $\wedge S \wedge$ and $\wedge P \wedge$, which begs for a theory of conceptual identity, or if they indicate ESE and EPE, which pleads for a theory of objects’ and properties’ identities. The validity depends on a reasoner supplying the following identifying premises: “I give the occurrences of “S” tokens ONE and the SAME emplacement; I give the occurrences of “P”’s tokens ONE and the SAME emplacement”.

Note that the second premise has angle brackets rather than conceptual carets. That's because it's a [Sooth] predication statement with which chemists can claim that a liquid has those chemical markers. Its copula is a [Sooth] advisory:

<[Sooth] this beaker's liquid H₂O>,

which in Middle English we may rewrite as:

<This liquid [in sooth is] H₂O>.

The conceivability, but not the actual conception of such a possibility, precedes making such predication statements, because lexical space invites open field running. Lexical space is a map of conceptual possibilities subject to mutations.

Because of lexical bonding authorized by a stipulated resolve in an agent-oriented account of lexical activity, the lexical act modality, [Enjoined to], replaces the via passive alethic [Necessary]. 'Necessary synthetic' statements are slumber-borne. Good night, possible-world snorers. Say au revoir to your dreams of alethic modalities; sleep tight in your eternal good night. You'll happily concur, I'm sure, once you pick one of the following stipulation choices, *Hx* or *Hy*. Friends of conceptual change, you have to stipulate which lexical bonding to ^water^ you'll henceforth honor.

It's pick-your-water-concept time! Don't let the dark forces of metaphysics bamboozle you into believing that because a sample of liquid, according to the best and latest 'science is composed of H₂O that this is the *essence* of water. Since when did chemists dictate Aristotelian metaphysics? This is a shell game in which some Urthian philosophers swap conceptual leutic coconuts for alethic peas. Recourse to aristotelian terminology betrays a want of innovative strategies; it's essential realism without the support of the rest of the Stagyrte's apparatus.

Suppose two liquid samples, earth's *Lx* and Urth's *Ly*, are indistinguishable on the basis of their casually observed properties, but that chemical analysis of *Lx* shows it's composed of H₂O, hereafter *Hx*, while *Ly* is composed of HO₂, hereafter, *Hy*.

The coherence logic of lexical space enables us to avoid the problem for validity and truth engendered by co-designative definite descriptions, intensions, concepts, essences; none of them can ever be one of the emplacements in an identity proposition's term when the emplacement in the other term isn't of like kind. This restriction is breached by the following example that Quine claimed violates substitutivity of identity and thereby blocks quantifying in: <"six" contains exactly three letters>, <"the immediate successor of five" contains exactly three letters>. The emplacement for "six" is the token E/six/E; but E/six/E is not the emplacement for "the immediate successor of five". It's hard to say what he intends to be its emplacement, perhaps a 'number', whatever that is, or perhaps the token numeral, /6/. In either case, it would be a stretch to suppose it's /six/, because if it were, there's obviously no problem. Also, there would be no problem if the example were properly written as <The token /six/ has exactly three letters> and <The written numeral of the immediate successor of /five/ has exactly three letters>, obviating the need for additional identity propositions. This example as originally written stacks the deck against substitutivity in so-called opaque contexts, which are not opaque if properly written with an eye to satisfying count ONE identify propositions.

I supply a method of counting concepts, objects, and properties in another place, forthcoming, given life and wit enough. On the determiner [any], see B. Russell's *Principles of Mathematics*, Chapter VIII; New York, "The Variable", W. W. Norton, 1964.

If you, the eminent chemist, call Lx water and use Hx rather than its observed properties to identify water, what you have done—no blame is attached to you for this—is *stipulated* that (6') will be your means of identifying water, because by using “iff”, you have bonded $\wedge Hx \wedge$ to the Lx liquid and refused it to the Ly liquid, although you might well have bonded the concept of Ly 's chemical analysis, $\wedge HO_2 \wedge$, to the Ly liquid, as you bonded $\wedge Hx \wedge$ to the Lx liquid, and stipulated that Ly is water, in which case we would have:

(6y) (y) y is water iff y is HO_2 .

In (6), you bonded $ELx E$ to $\wedge Hx \wedge$, creating $\wedge(Lx) \text{ water} \wedge$.

In (6y), you bonded $ELy E$ to $\wedge Hy \wedge$, creating $\wedge(Ly) \text{ water} \wedge$.

A LIST OF THE MANY (6)S

- (6) “(x) x is water iff x is H_2O ”. (Stich)
- (6i) “*Beaker of liquid* is water”,
- (6ii) “*Beaker of liquid* is H_2O ”,
- (6iit) <The liquid in this beaker is H_2O >.
- (6') (i) \wedge the liquid in this beaker is water \wedge iff (ii) \wedge The liquid in this beaker is H_2O \wedge ¹⁴
- (6i*) \wedge the liquid in this beaker is called “water” \wedge ,
- (6i**) \wedge [Conceive] the liquid in this beaker (as) \wedge water $\wedge\wedge$,
- (6+) You're enjoined to call *any* liquid “water” iff that identical liquid bears the H_2O properties.
- (6y) (y) y is water iff and y is HO_2 .

END OF LIST

My counsel to **replace alethic with leutic modalities** is impellingly pertinent here. It's easy for whomever confines their logical practices to alethic logics to confound \wedge coherence \wedge value with \wedge truth \wedge value, although they're logically distinct as the following argument proves: \wedge Coherent \wedge \neq \wedge true \wedge , because contradictory statements can't both be true, although both are coherent. Similarly, not both of two contradictory statements can be false, although both may be \wedge coherent \wedge . <Grace was granted> and <Not<Grace was granted>> can't both be true nor both be false, but both are coherent, if the first /Grace/ has the same emplacement as the second.

¹⁴ Propositions' are coherent or incoherent (coherence value); their coherence value depends solely upon whether or not they are constructed in accord with a lexical system's advisories. They are not statements, because they have truth value, unlike propositions that are evaluated solely for their coherence value. I indicate statements with angled brackets, <The mint was robbed>; I indicate propositions with carets, \wedge [Sooth] mint rob \wedge . [Sooth] advises us that the statement's copula is to be understood as making a factual connection between E_{mint} and E_{robbed} .

This difference in evaluation, as with Plato's top that is both spinning and at rest,¹⁵ can be resolved by making a distinction between *propositions*, which have coherence value, and *statements*, which have truth value. Statements' truth thrives only in the reflected light of their sentences' coherent interpretations.

H₂O rather than HO₂ is used to mark water for some de jure reasons, maybe because you, the Stipulator, and your faithful troop of chemists live on earth, which has no HO₂. What's the point of earthians asking for a glass of ^{^Hy^} Wasser when you're thirsty water if there isn't any on earth?

An influentially sized community, beginning with stout, forward looking chemists, may adopt these recommended conceptual shifts from casually observed similar properties of *Lx* and *Ly* to, respectively, H₂O and HO₂. When abetted by *au courant* school teachers, the 'word' spreads beyond that original dedicated gang. Now, if The Stipulator doesn't want to betray himself any more than his legion of chemists and dedicated students do, all of them are *enjoined to* affirm that whatever liquid has *Hx* is water and to deny that any liquid lacking *Hx*, is water. Those sworn to these bondings, who've taken the "iff" *Hx*-oath, are **enjoined** to observe these lexical practices.

Oathed linguistic stipulations shouldn't be undertaken frivolously. It's advisable for members of a linguistic community to keep the lexical faith with the Lexical Imperative, of which a simple version is given on page 16, in their broader conceptual studies, including philosophy.¹⁶

I hope it's clear that it's naïve to conflate name-making rights to bestow rigid proper names, such as "Hilary", willy-nilly with a chemist's empirically grounded, de jure recommendable bestowal of the kind name "water" rather than "Wasser" to water. It's not unfair to say a child's bestowed name is ^{^conventional^} in its thin sense, but "include me out" of describing a chemist's conceptual bestowal as such. He shifted from one concept to another. He can do so, because tokens aren't rigidly fixed in one location in the conceptual firmament, but are continually subject to movement, erasure, addition; natural-kind token names may be moved about in lexical space; we are both the masters and vassals of languages; lexical relations change with or without our rational will. It happens all the time. Try understanding rappers if you're over sixteen (2007).

¹⁵ The *Republic*, 436d.

¹⁶ The Imperative's fuller expression can be understood only with a coherence logic (in contrast to a truth logic). Familiar alethic logic is relatively useless, even baneful, for philosophic purposes; it needs to be supplemented with conceptual logic. Russell's and Frege's obsession with the foundations of mathematics set back the development of a more apposite logic for other than mathematics-foundation purposes. No alethic logic dedicated to establishing syncategorematic deductive truth relations between statements can ever enlighten us one whit about the relations between categorematic concepts. Truth conditions are not identical to coherence conditions, ever. Of course, conceptual relations launch consequences for truth relations, but the sharp distinction I'm drawing isn't evident to anyone who thinks these relations are, as Sir Toby Belch said when in his cups, "all one". Diverse intensions may have identical extensions, as know from Medieval times.

This minimal account of conceptual construction liberates us from heavy breathing pseudo-aristotelian metaphysics. Conceptual bonding of ^water^ and $\text{^H}_2\text{O^}$, frees us from resort to alethic modal necessity and its true-in-all-possible-world's account of natural kinds; it also frees us from a Dunkirk retreat to Aristotelian $\text{^essential properties^}$ and their unpragmatic nephews, ^natural kinds^ . Quine excoriated these dodges, but was too enraptured with an overly narrow extensional truth logic to capture the logic embedded in natural language lexical systems, as do many others who confuse truth with coherence and falsity with incoherence. ^Coherent^ and ^true^ , ^incoherent^ and ^false^ are not identical evaluations, because, as I argued above, only one of two contradictory statements is true and only one is false, but both are coherent. One \neq two; hence, one true \neq two coherents; the same goes for false and incoherent.

Truth logic is pretty much impotent for philosophical purposes. It's main, and, perhaps, only philosophically useful virtue, is to provide rewrite rules for sentences with alethically relevant logical constants and quantifiers in natural languages. Basically, it's a translation instrument that enables us to uncover alethic relations between statements we might not be able to discern without it. Its vice stems from its philosophical practitioners' reliance on it as the sole philosophically useful logic, as if it captured the whole of a language's philosophically important logic.

But there's light ahead. Coherence evaluations are occurring with alarming, overly-assured frequency in recent philosophic literature. The attribution of incoherence to someone's 'view' is supposedly fatal. But, ask yourself *what* is charged with *fatal* incoherence: Sentences, statements, theories, beliefs, concepts, interpretations, ...? Can such diverse targets be subject to one and the same charge? Also ask yourself *how* incoherence charges may be legitimized without sole reliance on finely tuned, unfortunately rare, austinian intuitions. If you're at a loss for immediate answers to these questions, that should tell you we're at an embryonic stage in the development of ^coherence^ . I know you won't be surprised if I tell you my coherence logic is an initial attempt to stimulate philosophers to help that concept 'grow up'.

We can start by taking the seemingly banal, Lexical Imperative seriously.

The Approximate Lexical Imperative

If you wish your sentences to be understood by others as you do, and if they wish you to understand their sentences as they do, then all of you *are enjoined to* adopt the same lexical practices.

This is a hypothetical, not a Kantian categorical, imperative. We're not talkin' morality here, just personal prudence and group conceptual solidarity.

In his Aristotelian Society "Inaugural Address" (2002), Tom Baldwin notes Wittgenstein's remark: "We say: 'If you really follow the rule in multiplying, you *must* all

get the same result.’ ... The emphasis of the *must* corresponds only to the inexorableness of this attitude both to the technique of calculating and to a host of related activities. The mathematical must is only another expression of the fact that mathematics [and chemical analyses, for example, of water--AKB] forms concepts. And concepts help us to comprehend things.”¹⁷ I suggest the key concept here is “attitude”, its “inexorableness” corresponds to the leutic [Enjoined], which is required if we wish to “comprehend” alike.

“Conventionalism” would be a jejune label for “the inexorableness of this attitude” to stipulated natural kind names, such as identifying water by \hat{Hx} by stipulating that “water”’s interpretation, $\hat{\text{water}}$, is to be bonded to \hat{Hx} in order to create a new concept $\hat{\text{water}}$, both of which are serious business. That new bonding could occur only after extensive empirical investigations and “a host of related activities”. Further, anyone who dismissively resorts to this banal label ignores how truncated our conceptual roots often are. I can’t think of a cultural context that wouldn’t be improved by acquiring a more ramified stock of stipulated concepts in lexical space. The agent-oriented genesis of new concepts is an endless job of work. How else could philosophers have found respectable employment for all these centuries?

Wittgenstein was dead right when he connected the modal [*Must*] to the “technique” of an agent’s “calculating”, and to a “host of related *activities* [my emphasis]”. His remarks invite a leutic interpretation of this modal [*Must*]. Wittgenstein was dead wrong in supposing that respect for “use” will free us from useless philosophizing. On the contrary, truncated “uses” are what cause conceptual problems, whether traditionally philosophical or not; they want philosophical/conceptual intervention. Trouble is breaking out all over. The increase of conceptual work in practical fields--medical ethics, poverty, environment, animal rights—are useful interventions. $\hat{\text{H}_2\text{O}}$ ramifies $\hat{\text{water}}$ beyond the truncated $\hat{\text{translucent, ...}}$; because it connects $\hat{\text{water}}$ to the extensive, systematically organized chemical and physical concepts of current science, it puts down deeper roots wider. This is a powerful de jure reason for bonding $\hat{\text{water}}$ to $\hat{(\text{H}_2\text{O})}$; it also provides a way to distinguish $\hat{\text{water}}$ from $\hat{\text{Wasser}}$ (Wow!), which $\hat{\text{translucent, ...}}$ doesn’t do and making it a strong de jure reason for stipulating that bonding.

In this connection, note that concepts, such as $\hat{\text{water}}$, can’t be altered. $\hat{\text{Altered}}$ entails that what is altered retains its identity despite changes; Stalin altered, but was still Stalin (Wasn’t he?) as he eroded from an innocent boy to a cruel man. But $\hat{(\text{translucent, ...})}$ $\hat{\text{water}}$ isn’t altered by $\hat{(\text{H}_2\text{O})}$ $\hat{\text{water}}$; bonding a different concept, $\hat{\text{H}_2\text{O}}$, to a liquid emplacement in “water” creates a concept incompatible with any other $\hat{\text{water}}$

¹⁷ Baldwin’s quote is from Wittgenstein’s *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, VII 67. Tom Baldwin, *Aristotelian Society supplementary volume*, LXXVI, 2002.

bondings, including \wedge translucent... \wedge . Incompatible concepts *aren't allowed* to be identical. The later, incompatible concept *replaces* the earlier one.

All concepts are incommensurable, dear Paul Stopwork.

Conceptual negation, $[\sim]$, denies identity of Concept_1 with $\sim\text{Concept}_1$; $\wedge\text{Concept}_1 = \sim\text{Concept}_1\wedge$ is incoherent. They are diverse, occupy different places in lexical space. That's what gives Tywnn Urth's $\wedge\text{Wasser}\wedge$ its conceptual bite; $\wedge\text{water}\wedge$ and $\wedge\text{Wasser}\wedge$ are incompatible concepts, which is why Fanebius Perlyng thought Twynn Urth such a "quaer playce". For our bravo chemist, if a liquid is translucent und so weiter, but lacks the H_2O marker, it ain't water by his new concept, just as Wasser ain't.

Concepts are replaceable, but not alterable; in this respect they share identity/diversity criteria with properties but not with physical objects. A painter who adds yellow to blue alters the paint but not blue; he *replaces* the color blue with green. Blue and green are contrary properties: $\wedge\sim\text{blue}\wedge$ is $\wedge\text{green}\wedge$ or $\wedge\text{red}\wedge$, or $\wedge\text{yellow}\wedge$ or $\wedge\dots\wedge$. Unlike physical objects, such as a smear of oil paint once blue now green, concepts don't keep their identity through change. Concepts are writ, as Keats said of his name, "on water".

"Conventional" does apply reasonably to proper names, but isn't exportable to natural kind's concept-making names. A mother's almost unlimited rights to bestow a proper name, "Hilary", $\wedge\text{Shilary}\wedge$, differs radically from a chemist's *empirically* grounded bestowal (hence, its claimed *synthetic* necessity). A mother needs no de jure recommendation to pick one name over another (although she may be urged to name it after a rich, childless relative), unlike the chemist's bestowal of the name "water" rather than "Wasser" to a liquid sample, conceived as $\wedge\text{H}_2\text{O}\wedge$, by which he thereby creates a new concept. The mother's bestowal is local, the chemist's epochal. To think otherwise is to be innocent of the differing constraints for naming individuals versus creating concepts of kinds. Kind-name rigidity resides not in the relation of a name to its 'referent' or to the referent's essence, but in (i) the stipulated bonding of predicate concepts, $\wedge\text{H}_2\text{O}\wedge$,¹⁸ to a contained, fluid substantive, EwaterE, and (ii) to EwaterE's conceptual offspring, namely, $\wedge\text{water}\wedge$.

* * * *

This account, which started with Stich's (6), is skewed, because "water" is a mass name and all bodies of it, wherever they are, are counted as ONE water, unlike cats and dogs that are not in their simultaneously disparate places counted as ONE cat or ONE dog. Count kinds are more problematically identifiable than mass kinds. Mass kinds' names can mislead the unwary about kind names' rigidity, because a mass name's des-

¹⁸ $\wedge\text{H}_2\text{O}\wedge$ is a kind congerie, a conjunction of concepts bonded to water, explained farther down the road.

ignated singularity--ONE water, ONE gold--is shared with a proper name's singularity; there's but ONE Greenwich, in one place at all times, and ONE Henry Kissinger in many places at different times. All waters are ONE; I wash my hands in *it* and the Titanic sank in *it*. But where is the ONE dog-kind that I can pet? We can pet this or that dog, but not dog-kind. The unpettable ONE dog-kind doesn't inhabit space/time, unlike water.

Whatever your metaphysical predilections, it's less fantastic for us corporeal creatures to explain count kinds as nominalistic, visible, aural word tokens inhabiting lexical space into which we may coherently emplace *any* dog rather than thinking dog refers to a nebulous 'abstract' *class* or essence that can be 'intuited' only with a 'mind's eye'. Logically, I prefer *any* dog whatever, regardless of its time and place, to a dated, located *member* of a class. [Any] has logical elegance; "[All] members" messes with when-and-where: These member dogs: When are/were they? Now, yesterday, 1,000 BC, 3,000 AD? In Delaware, Egypt, the Yukon? Nominalism is a fine way to avoid the airless fiefdom of classes of dogs, sets, pairs, and essences. Not even Henry Kissinger could pet dogdom or dogness! Nor could he have taken ordered pairs out to dine of an evening. [Any] works swell for conceptual logic.

To be honest, count kinds don't count down as mass kinds do. Count kinds are but shadows on the wall of Plato's Cave. This widely, secretly shared analogy explains why so many philosophers try to fill in the missing ONE dog-kind with their invented classes that exist in a spaceless/timeless realm. This extreme resort to a spurious correspondence of statements to a combo of 'abstract' objects and their properties/relations is a desperate attempt to secure truth value for such count-kind statements as <All dogs are domesticated>, interpreted as <The class of dogs is included in the class of domesticated animals>, and for the 'truth' of mathematical 'statements' some philosophers trot out sets.

Natural kinds' aren't all of one piece, so accounts of them can't be either.

* * * *

It's been popular lately for some hitherto analytic, formalist American philosophers, to confess born-again, native pragmatism and to read Wittgenstein as a pragmatist while clinging to, even promoting, 'truth' evaluation for such sentences as (6). They do not seem to appreciate that these are conceptually incompatible loyalties. Appraising (6) as a passive, 'fixed', truth-to-nature statement is incoherent with appraising it as agent-oriented pragmatists would do in their winning moments, namely, appraising it and its siblings as stipulated lexical acts.¹⁹ Such pragmatists consort with leutic instead of alethic modalities; they're strangers to proper name 'rigidity' intended by its promoters to preserve identities across possible worlds in order to salvage dispensable alethic modal-

¹⁹ See Baldwin's quotation of Wittgenstein, p. 16f.

ities. But saving necessity against ‘flaccid’ contrary to fact descriptions—Nixon might not have been president of the United States—with rigid designations—Nixon is always and everywhere forever Nixon, a count of ONE requirement—pits descriptions against actually being able to identify what remote entity, if any, *is* rigidly attached to a name--“Saint Pantalone”--without relying on these castaway, ‘flaccid’ descriptions that allegedly can’t underwrite alethic necessity. A pragmatist facing the choice between the historically arduous task of tracing centuries’ old ‘rigid’ causal ties between St. Pantalone and everyone who used or now uses “St. Pantalone” to establish a rigid name/person relation versus the use of a transparent, stipulated lexical enjoinder practice employing descriptions-- H₂O--to establish a rigid name/singular-mass-kind relation faces a no-brain choice. Especially since “water” is a proper name for the ONE-mass water. Kripke at least didn’t hide the consignment of this virtual historical task to an impossible real-time accomplishment.

Historians haven’t taken up the challenging task of crossing Kripke’s Styx. Oh? Why would they? How could they?

Worse: If natural kind formulas like (6) were interpreted as statements with rigidly fixed alethic necessity on the model of proper names, and if translucent liquid were rigidly designated by “water” on both Urth and Tywnn Urth, then such formulas couldn’t serve as flexible, fecund wombs for new concepts. What a waste!

Wm. James was responsible for dragging a false scent before baying packs of critics with his “what works” locution as the standard of *truth*. Peirce didn’t shield this scent from the attack dogs’ nostrils in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” nor in his Delphic Pragmatic Maxim (“Pragmatism”),

“In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception we should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception, and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception”,

which was clarified in Dewey’s version of pragmatism, who found the truth of <This is an apple> in the activated consequences of biting it: Its taste, texture, juiciness, and crackle. These “practical consequences” fail to ‘make clear’ that Peirce’s thrice-used “conception” in his Maxim--a common parlance with which he over-indulges himself here--has two distinguishable readings: ^Concept of^ an apple and ^true statement(s) about^ it. This compromises his Maxim from the start. The “sum of these consequences” could be both coherence and truth value consequences, the former being prima facie logically prior to the latter. How big is his ‘sum’? Are they circumscribable? Or do they just go on and on and on? Since then, latter-day pragmatists have introduced sibling locutions; it’s up to them to see if these remarks and questions apply to their version. As

for me, I don't want to be numbered amongst those who trash *vi attiva* coherent emplacement truth in the name of work-ethic pragmatism.

James and his followers should have applied that forked-tongue “works”’s truth standard to conceptual decisions alone and not to statements’ alethic merits. This essay on stipulating concepts suggests a different scent our native geniuses should have dragged before native and foreign hounds, namely, coherence of sentence interpretations. There are *de jure* reasons for adopting a new concept, amongst which are ‘practical consequences’. For example, after that initial stipulation we can distinguish “Wasser” from “watter” and heavy from other kinds of water, which we couldn’t do before.

Further, our self-conscious conceptual creation by stipulation has secondary ‘truth’ consequences, as every change in lexical space does, because shifts in coherence values cause shifts in truth values. Should I ever reach the Paradise of Tywnn Urth and belly up to a bar there, I cannot truthfully brag later <There I drank whisky and water>. Now that [^]watter[^] is bonded to [^]H₂O[^], and since no liquid in that “*quaer place*” has the properties of “watter”, I can’t drink it there. James should have conceived his ‘works’ as *de jure* concept formation, a step prior to an account of statements’ truth value. And so, too, many ‘homecoming’ confessors of that school have gone a step too far too soon, whatever variant locutions they use in place of James’ conceptually ambiguous “works”.

DEFINITION: THE BIG-SHOULDERED CULPRIT

An opportunity for philosophy was lost when Aristotle’s promotion of definition prevailed over Plato’s more promising trace of relations between concepts in his *Sophist*. There Plato tried to capture the concept [^]sophist[^], modeled on capturing [^]fisher[^] in the net of a lexical array, which Clayton Morgareidge showed could be depicted with a tree graph. In other places, Plato, too, was seduced by the false promises of definition, notably in the *Theaetetus* ([^]know[^]), and *Republic* ([^]just[^]). In Plato’s defense, the dialogue style with its many assents/dissents to “Do you agree that A is/is not B” and its use of numerous examples suggests a rich array of subterranean webs of lexical/conceptual relations, brought up explicitly in his relentlessly straightforward pursuit of [^]sophist[^].

Definitions have been a constant part of philosophers’ armory, held fast in text books that outline Aristotle’s *genus-differentia* notion of it. Definition remained implicitly rampant in Kant’s use of conceptual containment to identify analytic judgments (the predicate is “contained in” the subject), although he distinguishes various kinds of

definitions in his logic book. Carnap resorted to definitions (meaning postulates) for artificial languages to defend ^analytic^ from Quine’s assault. An uncountable number of contemporary philosophers still think definitions are useful for identifying concepts, even though they’re plainly inadequate to make the basic, benchmark cut between analytic and synthetic statements (vide Quine and Morton White). Further, definitions’ inadequacy induces chaotic reverberations in the a priori/a posteriori and, subsequently, in the necessary/contingent modal truth distinctions.

Check your own reliance on definitions.²⁰ For me, they’re bastard offspring of basic coherence advisories carried by the multi-function English copulas [to be] and [to have] in my version of conceptual logic, listed here and explained in PART II, beginning on page 24. It’s amazing and shameful how neglectful Anglo-Americans are of the rich powers of our copula, celebrated by others, especially Danish linguists. I feature the following advisory functor interpretations of the copula in my conceptual logic.

Conceptual negation (=|= statement negation), a monary advisory;

Among the binary advisories are:

Subsumption (of one concept by another, and its important sub-advisory),
 emplacement (of an object into a subject token and a trope into a predicate token)

bondage (of a subject concept to a predicate concept)

conger (conjunctive bondage of trope concepts to an object concept)

incompatibility (contradictory and contrary concepts, products of conceptual negation)

identity (of concepts and emplacements)

linkage (a range of concepts, each coherently soothable of a subject concept)

soothage (predication in its extensional acceptation).

I explain and illustrate their bearing on conceptual stipulation briefly in PART II, pp. 24 – 38. For those interested in the underpinnings coherence logic provides for concepts and conceptual change, and the role stipulation plays in that theatre, pp. 38 on gives you more coherence logic with which to think about substantive concepts over and above ^water^.

These advisories may be used to construct a canon of valid conceptual inferences that we may recruit to reason logically about our disagreements over concepts as well as ‘definitions’. I provide some such inferences as well as the grammar of conceptual logic in “A Precis of Conceptual Logic”, forthcoming in ~2008.

²⁰ For a list of kinds of definition, see pp. 318 – 329 in Bierman and Assali, 1996. Pp. 330 – 348 explain the several ways the copula may be interpreted for conceptual logic, not the familiar ones we find in extensionally oriented logic texts and treatises, and how these conceptual advisories provide the sub-structure to which the various kinds of definitions only hint at and depend on for whatever practical, non-theoretical, use they have.

Definitions as we find them in dictionaries and philosophical tracts are practical crutches but have no theoretical authority in identifying a concept. It's sufficient to show that *definitions* can't be prized philosophical success stories by the fact that even the most careful workers may disagree about them. Definitions are more often the problem than the solution to disagreements about concepts. Think here of "good" in its many definitions. How do you address that dead-end? Since they're subject to challenge, it should be obvious that we need another tool to address this problematic standoff. A canon, such as conceptual logic, is needed to help philosophers escape from definitional cul-de-sacs.

Quine effectively destroyed reliance on definitions as a conceptual tool, because, he argued, they don't deliver their promised synonymy without circularity. He's right. For that reason we can't rely on definitions to identify analytically true statements.

Still, analyticity and synonymy are not conceptually locked together. That's why, although the former is laid out in its sarcophagus, synonymy flourishes, providing we dare say we can interpret two or more token sentences of a type in the same way more than once. I've heard parents shouting at their unruly children: "Do I have to say it twice?!" "Checkmate" resounds all over the English speaking world and beyond, letting everyone know "the game's up, matey". Contemporary attempts to distinguish analytic from synthetic statements on definitional/linguistic grounds is over-simplified. Kant proposed a distinction, but didn't have the tools to provide its grounds. It requires more conceptual structure than definitions can provide.

Say "Good-bye" to 'meaning' and concepts as products of definitions. Think of definitions as approximate maps to coherent paths between tokens in lexical space. Our paths may or may not be isomorphic; if they are, our discourse may proceed with understanding, if they aren't there'll be diverging paths and misunderstanding somewhere down the line. That trouble can be addressed with the aid of conceptual logic, dismissing the synonymy of *defiendum* and *defiens*. "Synonym" has the unfortunate 'definition' of [^]same *meaning*[^]. I say unfortunate, because there are no meanings, only grammatical and lexical orderings. What you see when you look at a dictionary entry are not 'meanings' but physical tokens. Tha-thaa's all you see, folks.

By distinguishing different interpretations of the copula that establish different ways of connecting object concepts to object concepts, property concepts to property concepts, and object concepts to property concepts, we have the affinities we need to construct a (partial) conceptual logic with which we may prevail over the shortcomings of traditional definitions. One example of a shortcoming: How can you determine a la Kant that one concept is "contained" in another? What procedure would you use to justify this claim if you were challenged, remembering that this is a challenge to a definition? Kenneth Baker writes in his review of Bernard Williams' *Truth and Truthfulness*:

“Readers seeking a definition of truth will not find it in Williams’ book” because, he writes, it ‘belongs to a ramifying set of connected notions, such as meaning, reference, belief, and so on, and we are better employed in exploring the relation between notions than trying to treat one or some of them as the basis of the others.’”²¹

Williams was on the right track. However, his “ramified set of connected concepts” and “relations between notions” needs detailed, systematized fleshing out if the promise of his ramification is to be nourished. This is conceptual logicians’ assignment. I sketch some of how this systematic detailing would go in the following Part II.

Ordinarily, this essay would end here. But to do so, would leave the subject of ‘natural’ kinds at a more superficial level than it deserves, about where standard essays on the topic end. What’s wanted is a treatment that relies less on intuited, persuasive grounds. What answers that want is a more extended discussion of conceptual/coherence logic that is found at the end of “On Emplacing” (forthcoming), “Your Appendix, Tom” and the more formalized “Precis” following the Appendix for Tom (also forthcoming). Here, for overworked philosophy teachers, is a shorter, more informal version of conceptual logic’s resources that is enough to carry this essay a step farther than is normal. My structuralist account of concepts within a conceptual system and how it helps us to evaluate the coherence value of propositions underwrites my account of stipulated ‘natural’ kind concepts and is a platform for dealing with other conceptual changes. I invite you to continue.

PART II

Coherence and its Logic

This is a brief outline of the interpretations of the English copula central to conceptual logic, which I also call coherence logic, that I first used in *LOGIC: A Dialogue* (1965) and later in *The Critical Thinking Handbook* (1995). This essay extends that work in progress to develop an amplified conceptual logic. But, you will find more explication and applications of copula advisories in those books. I recommend the second over the first, particularly for its applications to serious conceptual issues and for a fuller development of inference schemes, although I’m not happy with its symbolism, which I’ve since improved and use here. In his *Structural Semantics*,²² John Lyon discusses some of the lexical ‘relations’ I employ, excepting [Emplace], [Link], and [Congery]; he uses lexical

²¹ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 22 September, 2002. Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002. Williams was one of the few who entertained a structural account of concepts. The trick in going beyond this insight is to tell us how his list of “connected notions” are connected.

²² Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963.

relations to interpret Plato's epistemic terms. Lyon does not develop a conceptual logic, but his discussion and application of lexical relations is excellent.

You will also be rewarded by his explanations of lexical relations in Chapters 8 and 9 of his *Semantics*, Volume 1.²³

Conceptual logic traces systematic relations between concepts as alethic logic does between statements. Its evaluative concept is **coherence**: **Coherent** and **incoherent** apply to propositions, which are tendered interpretations of sentences. Truth value, true and false, apply to statements, which are claims made with interpreted sentences. The increasingly frequent use of "coherence" in current philosophical literature shows an intuitive awareness of this value's importance; its contextual use strongly suggests most of its employers don't identify it *simpliciter* with the alethic [^]inconsistent[^], but the concept isn't mature enough for them to grasp what exactly it is. They don't go much further than using "incoherent" as a fatal pejorative. Their intuition that it can't be equated with [^]inconsistent[^] is correct. I proved this above: [^]Coherence[^] isn't reducible to truth, because <P> and <-P> aren't both true or both false, but both are coherent. Since [^]coherence[^] isn't an alethic logic concept, it needs a supplementary, coherence logic to rally it beyond its present embryonic state.

New Quotation Symbols

I introduced three new quotation symbols in the text above: [^]...[^], <...>, [...]. Two more are needed for lucid theoretical purposes, one for emplacement, introduced below, and one for word tokens; I kept them to a minimum in the preceding text, because I thought them unnecessary for clarity there.

Carets, [^]...[^]: Around a word token indicate a **concept**, which is an interpretation of a word token. [^]Bland[^], [^]mild[^], or [^]tasteless[^] are interpretations of /bland/ on different occasions of use. When carets surround a sentence, they indicate a **proposition** (=|= statement). A proposition is an interpretation of a sentence token's word tokens in their grammatical positions, and of its copula that I mark off with square brackets, [...]. Every sentence's copula advises us of the route a speaker intends to travel between its subject and predicate in lexical space per the monary and binary advisory list on p. 22. One interpretation of /This mozzarella is bland/ is [^][Sooth] [^]mozzarella[^] [^]mild[^]. [Sooth] advises us that the sentence's copula is predication and when we use it to make the statement, <This mozzarella is mild>, we're claiming the cheese before us has the taste property mild rather than, say, piccante hot.

²³ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.

Angle brackets, <...>: Surround sentences and indicate a statement has been made with them, subject to interpretations of the sentences used to make them. We make truth claims with statements and indicate to others, truthfully or not, that we believe them.

Square brackets, [...]: They indicate a writer's **via attiva interpretation** of a **copula advisory** to readers such as you. Bracketed words are conceptual **functors**, as the arithmetical[+], [x], [-] are; they advise *performing* lexical operations just as addition, multiplication, and subtraction symbols advise arithmetical operations. The *via attiva* for a copula may be an agent's lexical act of, say, advising an auditor to take a bonding or subsuming *path* from a sentence's subject concept to its predicate concept. The **via passive** is a *report* of a lexical journey, the route taken from one concept to another, as the right side of the equal sign in arithmetical 'statements' reports a calculator's journey on a numeral series. The journey from 0 to 2, then [+]² more ends up at (=) 4.

The linguistic *via attiva* (VA)--*via passive* (VP) distinction mirrors that for non-linguistic acts:

(VA) [Put] the glass [on] the table,
 (VP) She put/did not put the glass on the table;

(VA) [Subsume] ^house^ [under] ^shelter^,
 (VP) She subsumed/did not subsume ^house^ under ^shelter^.

* * * *

I favor the metaphor of travel in lexical space as a more apt image of how we nominalistically beget coherent propositions out of concepts in place of the reigning composition metaphor that I've called the Haggis Theory in another place. In that theory, sentences' 'meanings' are 'composed' of its parts' 'meanings', an offshoot of the barren, part/whole notions of concepts' definitions and analyses. It's time to move on.

* * * *

[E...E] is an additional quotation device. At ground zero, it embraces words to indicate that an object, or a property trope, or a written or uttered language token, has been emplaced in the space held by a word token. Think of emplacing as 'direct reference' (more on that soon). Word tokens, like variables, hold spaces open for emplacements. Emplacements bear witness to your interpretation of a token, which may be coherent or incoherent. Tokens of "coin" hold places open for coherent or incoherent emplacements of an object. If you emplace a penny in /coin/, ^EpennyE @ /coin/^, you've made a coherent emplacement interpretation^; if you've emplaced a rose, ^EroseE @ /coin/^, you've made an incoherent one. Tokens of "copper" hold a place open for the emplacement of a color trope, such as your penny's copper trope, ^E(penny)copperE @

Stipulated Kinds 27

/copper/^. The token sentence /This penny is copper colored/²⁴ has the following emplacement interpretation--one emplacement for the subject and one for the predicate—in which the tokens of “@” are followed by the token space into which an object or trope is to be or has been emplaced:

^E(penny) @ /penny/ & E(penny)copperE @ /copper/.

Since property tropes aren't detachable from the objects of which they are a property, the /(penny)/ in /E(penny)copperE/ indicates the object that carries a copper trope into the place held open by /copper/.

Here at zero level, emplacing objects into a sentence's subject token and tropes into its predicate tokens is easy. Here's how to do it.

Write in a clear space on your bank statement in rather large script, calligraphic if you like, the token sentence

/This penny is copper colored/.

At zero-level emplacement, you may physically emplace that penny into the place where your sentence's /penny/ is.

Do it.

And, by emplacing that penny into the place where your sentence's /copper/ is, you will be physically emplacing its non-detachable color trope into your sentence's /copper/.

Let's say your penny *carries* the copper colored trope with it.

Do it.

The statement

<This penny is copper colored>

is true under those coherent emplacement interpretations. If your emplacement into /coin/ of /This coin is copper colored/ carried a silver trope into /copper/, <This coin is copper colored> would be false, because a silver trope isn't coherently emplaceable into /copper/.

Notice that this account doesn't ask you to emplace a 'fact' into the sentence nor to check the correspondence between a sentence and a 'fact'. Rather, you've *made* a fact. Voila. You've fitted denisons embedded in your “manifold of intuition” into a grammatical/ lexical order. There's not a whiff of 'correspondence' nor of alethic 'coherence/consistent' in this emplacement account of how we determine statements' truth. Please keep in mind that the ^coherence^ concept used here embraces conceptual combinations rather than statements; the traditional coherence account relies on the alethic ^consistent^ interpretation of “coherent”.

²⁴ Slash quotes indicate a token expression, as distinguished from a type expression for which I use the usual double quotation marks. A type is any token that satisfies a count of a one-one requirement. For example, if our count requirement for a type is the same spelling, then two tokens, /copper/ and /copper/, count as ONE type; *any* physical token may be a (specified) nominalistic type. “Any”, unlike “all”, doesn't tempt us to make an abstract class or set of tokens out of a type.

The [Emplace] copula advisory is no stranger to you, because it's a 'direct reference' interpretation of the copula that occurs in such indexical sentences as /This *is* Biff/ and /That *is* black/. We use them to attune others to our coherent emplacements into tokens. With /This *is* Biff/, whose /This/ is buttressed with suitable means for picking out the single object indicated by /This/, you can inform others that your coherent emplacement for /Biff/ is your dog Biff, and that ^E**biff**E @ /Biff/^ is coherent. Similarly for Biff's color trope. /That *is* black/ informs others' of your coherent emplacement of the contextually identified trope into /black/, making ^E**(biff)black**E @ /black/^ coherent. These coherent emplacements into /Biff/and /black/ make <Biff is black> true.

Emplaced substantives and tropes are when, respectively, inserted into a sooth sentence's subject and predicate places are the 'content' of propositions and statements. [Emplace] is also in part an ordering copula. Words don't refer; persons refer, and what they do when they refer includes putting a substantive and a trope into a sentence's order; they emplace a substantive into the place held open by a subject token and emplace a trope in a place held open by a predicate token. I don't know about you, but I'm really, really tired of the gearless form/content distinction and will say no more about it here. There's more on the [Emplace] advisory beginning on p. 58.

There obviously are other than penny/copper, ground zero emplacements. It's not possible to hand-emplace the moon in /moon/ as we did a penny. Pointing at the moon serves quite well, if we manage by various means ("the bright, sliver shape up there...") to focus our interlocutor's attention on the moon. I won't pursue even a semi-exhaustive list of techniques for emplacing objects and properties other than zero levels here.²⁵

The [Emplace] copula interpretation also occurs, controversially, in sentences with definite descriptions, such as /Tolstoy *is* the author of *War and Peace*/. Some think that a definite description or a passel of them provides the 'sense' of "Tolstoy", which we may use to identify the person described.²⁶ This is off the mark, which I explain in what follows.

We may divide <Tolstoy is the author of *War and Peace*> and <Your present is the one wrapped in pink paper> into four parts:

Name or indexical | copula | the | person or object description.

²⁵ See Bierman and Assali, p. 311 for more techniques. There we use "substitution" instead of "emplacement". Quine promoted emplacement, although he used the old-fashioned "designated" instead of "emplaced": "It is rather the object designated by such a [singular] name that counts as a value of the variable; and the objects stay on as values of variables though the singular terms be swept away."

²⁶ However, it's been pointed out that definite descriptions may not identify one and only one coherent emplacement. There might have been another emplacement satisfying "the author of *War and Peace*". Unfortunately, due to the poverty of earlier theories of concepts, coherent emplacements into proper names has become fruitlessly entangled in a myriad of irrelevant and outmoded theories of names' ^sense^, ^meaning^, ^connotation^, ^denotation^, and ^reference^ feeding off the rich undergrowth nourished by mediaeval logicians, later by Frege, Mill, Russell, and C. I. Lewis's accounts of these ooncepts.

I suggest we rewrite such sentences, one that takes advantage of the emplacement interpretation of their copulas.

The Name/indexical part of the form may be of long or short usefulness; “Tolstoy” is pretty long, “Your present” is real short. Interpret the copula “is” as [Sooth] predication, which requires coherent emplacement of objects into the subject token to determine a statement’s truth value:

[Emplace] EtolstoyE @ /Tolstoy/,

[Emplace] Eyour presentE @ /Your present/.

Russell/Whitehead aberrantly interpreted the copula in those statements as [Identify].²⁷ They and their followers didn’t treat it as a logical, count functor but as an epistemic protocol. It tipped the treatment of definite descriptions toward singular attribution and thereby invited unwary persons to suppose their singularity would provide the identification of a proper name’s referent by contributing to its connotation. “The” does indicate that one and only one object/person fits the description *in a relevant context*, which entity, if it exists, may be coherently emplaced in the singular Name/indexical token; however, this says nothing about the description’s connotational import of /Tolstoy/. Instead of dragging a definite description into connotational service, I suggest we transform the person/object description part of the form into a statement, which may be true or false; that makes it unsuitable as a ‘necessary connotational attachment’ to a proper name but does make it suitable for contingent predication.

Grammatically, by interpreting the copula of sentences with definite descriptions as a [Sooth] predication functor, the Name and the indexically flagged (The/Your) phrase become the subjects of statements and their descriptions become their predicates. The “is” may meld into the verb /wrote/, as in (T) below, or may be part of the predicate, /is wrapped in/, as in (P). This gives us the rewrites

(T) <Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace*>,

(P) <Your present is wrapped in pink paper>.

This “is” of sentences with proper names and definite descriptions, having been interpreted as a [Sooth] advisory, invites us to coherently emplace ^EtolstoyE @ /Tolstoy/^ and ^Eyour presentE @ /Your present/^ into their respective subjects. That advisory still holds for (T) and (P), because, in order to determine the truth of these newly minted [Sooth] statements, we have to emplace, respectively, Tolstoy and your present, into

those statements’ subjects. If they, respectively, carry the tropes wrote-*War-and-Peace* and wrapped-in-pink-paper into /wrote *War and Peace*/ and /wrapped in pink paper/, (T)

²⁷ Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, Vol. 1, 2nd. Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925, p. 67.

and (P) are true. Imagine! A statement with a definite description turns out to be an invitation to an emplacement, truth-making saraband. The auditor of /Your present/, although embedded in holiday ritual, has no need of connotation to pick out the coherent emplacement. To pick out “which one” is EYour presentE, contextual isolation suffices.

From this we can learn by techniques unlike Kripke’s that definite descriptions do not provide ‘connotations’ for their subjects. If <Tolstoy’s wife wrote, or was the major co-author, of *War and Peace*> (transcribing his kerosene-lighted, midnight scribblings into fraught, readable narratives) is true, it falsifies <Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace*> *simpliciter*; and if there is another pink-wrapped present from Genevieve, not you, lying unseen behind the Christmas Tree, there goes that unique emplacement criterion. Both alternative cases annul the uniqueness claim promised by “the” descriptions no matter how sincerely deployed.

Further, on traditional standards, the ‘meaning’ of a word *must* ‘attach’ to it; it’s ‘*necessary*’ that it do so; if it doesn’t, “heartfelt” couldn’t assuredly be interpreted as \wedge sincere \wedge nor “water” as \wedge H₂O \wedge . Both Kripke and Putnam assume this necessary tie. Given the way I interpret sentences with definite descriptions, it’s clear that statements with *different* emplacements, namely, Tolstoy’s wife and a second pink-wrapped present, yet with the *same* description, may be made true by those coherent alternative emplacements. Given that a unique individual’s name *must* be attached to a unique connotation, it’s clear that if the same definite description-cum-predicate applies to more than one individual, the *must/necessary* uniquely-required attachment is foiled; hence, definite descriptions cannot serve as names’ connotations. Kripke was right about this: Definite descriptions of the kind discussed here do not provide ‘connotations’ for “Tolstoy” nor for “Your present” (in pink). And who could have thought so? Maybe John Searle?²⁸

²⁸ My account of concepts promotes the same result for wholly unlike reasons. The very idea that a description or passel of them could provide a ‘connotation’ of a proper name or an indexically identified object is a still-born child of outmoded, simple ideas of definition, analysis, and meaning. I replace them with a lexical/conceptual space structured as coherent pathways charted by eight binary copula interpretations, and a monary conceptual negation (\sim), not to be confused with statement negation (-). These pathways in league constitute an embryonic part of conceptual logic. A concept is a lexical token’s place in nine dimensional lexical space. I abandon traditional \wedge connotation \wedge , \wedge meaning \wedge , \wedge definition \wedge ; the firewall between \wedge intension \wedge and \wedge extension \wedge crumbles as \wedge reference \wedge becomes \wedge emplacement \wedge , which is subject to the same evaluative judgment—coherent or incoherent—as a [Subsume] proposition, because it’s a ground zero species of [Subsume]. Emplacing occurs at the bottom of subsumption pathways, regardless of which emplacement method we use—whether directly by hand (the penny), by pointing (the moon), electron microscopic images of molecules, or inference (quarks). For elaboration of this account of concepts go to p. 38, “A Little Conceptual Logic”. Further, the statements retrieved from sentences with definite descriptions are [Sooth] factual, attributive statements; their copulas are leuitically allowed; both \wedge [Sooth] ruby dirty \wedge and \wedge [Sooth] ruby clean \wedge are coherent. This contrasts with an enjoined copula such as [Bond] where neither \wedge [Bond] emerald(stone) red \wedge nor \wedge [Bond] emerald yellow \wedge are coherent, because \wedge [Bond] emerald green \wedge is an enjoined coherence. Enjoined [Bond] overrides allowed [Sooth] except when a sooth statement is true, which is an extremely important exception, and the only one where logical positivists score a goal. The exception requires a more elaborate account of conceptual logic than I can provide here. I do, however, give a partial explanation in the “Little Conceptual Logic” farther on and a more complete one in the Appendix to “On Emplacing”, forthcoming, on my website:

This proof that definite descriptions don't bless us with (ordinary) proper names' connotations goes deeper, right down to the earlier proof that \wedge coherent \wedge can't be reduced to \wedge true \wedge nor \wedge incoherent \wedge to \wedge false \wedge (Both of two contradictory statements are coherent, but not both are true nor both false). This routs Kripke's claim that there are necessary synthetic truths for all possible worlds, because it relies on mistakenly interpreting the copula in /Tolstoy is Tolstoy/ as a [Sooth] predication (synthetic) and on the *truth* of <Tolstoy is Tolstoy> in all possible worlds. However, this spreads no *alethic* cheese, because the interpretation of the copula in /Tolstoy is Tolstoy/ is [Identify], not [Sooth] predication. [Identify] enjoins us to emplace ONE and the same person in both tokens of "Tolstoy" if \wedge [Identify] Tolstoy Tolstoy \wedge is to be coherent:

EtolstoyE @ (first) /Tolstoy/ and EtolstoyE @ (second) /Tolstoy/.

If we do so, giving us a count of ONE and the same emplacement in both tokens, we have a coherent [Identify] proposition:

\wedge [Identify] EtolstoyE EtolstoyE \wedge .

If the count is TWO, it's incoherent.

/Tolstoy is Tolstoy/ spreads *coherence*, not *alethic*, cheese on [Identify] propositions. If the *via activa* \wedge Tolstoy = Tolstoy \wedge is coherent, *then* the *via passiva* identity statement <Tolstoy = Tolstoy> is true. My interpretation tells us we're leutically *enjoined* to emplace one and the same person, EtolstoyE, into "Tolstoy"'s tokens whenever and wherever one occurs in order to satisfy coherent emplacement, simply equivocation avoidance. That's our logically assigned task; we have no other for 'identity'. Both

(T) /Tolstoy wrote *War and Peace*/ and

(T') /Tolstoy co-wrote or did not write *War and Peace* (as we know it)/

have coherent interpretations; and they're inconsistent if we emplaced one and the same EtolstoyE in /Tolstoy/ in (T) and /Tolstoy/ in (T'), regardless of whether (T) or (T') is true. A statement, <Space is nutritious>, doesn't have *alethic* value if its sentence's interpretation, \wedge Space is nutritious \wedge , is incoherent.

The fly in Kripke's anointment is the *alethic* modality, [Necessary]; he and his cohorts mistake *alethic* necessity for the *leutic* [Enjoin]. Enjoinments aren't held fast by Parmenide's chains of necessity, but are subject to change per the history of "water"'s interpretations. There is no truth about any individual in any world or worlds at any time that is necessary; 'necessary truth' is an oxymoron, with or without the enfeebled buttress of the *a priori*. Statements about individuals are true *or* false; we can't shuffle off that */or/*, although we aren't always entitled to claim it's one or the other. We blood and bone

creatures will always, now and forever, be dancing, fleetingly in the dark in tandem. Predication and identity statements' alethic modality is [Possible], never [Necessary]. However, because the leutic [Allowed] modal of predication/[Sooth] and [Identify], copula interpretations have been misconceived as the alethic [Possible], the latter must be deep-sixed.

Let's face it: There's no fool-proof method of identifying an individual that may be coherently emplaced in a proper name. Where are you, Neurath and Thales, now that we need you to remind us that endlessly restless water, not rigid earth, is our philosophical locale?

Kripke's 'rigid designation' is a version of Russell's "*logically* proper names" that jettisons the messiness of "*ordinary* language proper names". Russell adopted the first for his semantics in order to obtain ideal, clean extensional inferences, to avoid being sullied by "*ordinary* proper names", such as "Lev Tolstoy". Logically proper names are suited to regimented and imagined alethic logic unlike natural languages' ordinary names. Russell always kept in mind the acute difference between the semantics for an ideal logical symbolism needed for the foundations of mathematics and that for its use as a logic applied to natural languages. This concern led him to think of ordinary names as fallen angels, condemned to 'disguised' descriptions. He recognized the epistemological problem of identifying the entities designated by ordinary proper names. Which Lev Tolstoy?! Into which token name?! How can you identify the coherent emplacement for a name? And once some lovely bones are found, may we not ask, "This is Tolstoy?". How can others identify the emplacement we intend when we utter or write our tokens of "Lev Tolstoy"? Is it that famous Russian author or perhaps my apartment building's superintendent? Are we facing epistemological suicide or homicide when we confuse logical, rigid designation with ordinary proper names' 'reference'?

"Tolstoy" tokens present an obvious obstacle to rigid designation: Two persons may have one and the same 'ordinary' type name, "Tolstoy, Leo/Lev". Thus, two tokens of it may have coherent but different intended emplacements and be potentially ambiguous; so, if you claim, <Lev Tolstoy went mad at the end of his life>, I can legitimately ask "Which Lev Tolstoy are you talkin' about? *That* Tolstoy, the famous Russian author, or my building super who'd finally had it with that erratic building boiler?" Now, instead of languidly relying on an ordinary proper name to designate rigidly one and only one person in perpetuity, we have to stretch ourselves to identify the designated person without reliance on a haplessly multivocal 'rigid' name.

If you're set on reliable 'descriptive' means for identifying and re-identifying an object or a trope, as any serious person is, you'll have to resort to relational rather than attributive descriptions. Relations provide *unique* data appropriate to identifying the *unique*, "*the one-and-only*", coherent emplacements into tenured ("Tolstoy) or adjunct

(“Your present”) names. Think of a child’s time and place of birth, foot print, birth-mother’s name recorded in our county offices; they are relationally unique and cumulatively potent, hence, well suited to the task of identifying a single person should we be seriously challenged. Your dentist’s records prevail later. We can profitably use this information to identify the use of *that* “Tolstoy”’s tokens--/Tolstoy/, /Tolstoy/.... --by identifying the coherent emplacements for them. (Because objects’ and properties’ have different identity count mandates, my challenges to coherent singular object emplacements don’t apply to properties, although they do to tropes.)

Impatience at my query about “*which* Tolstoy” provoked the rebuke, “*That* Tolstoy”, assumed one of the person’s so-named is so well known that I’ve made myself ridiculous by asking *which* person I’m to emplace in the uttered name. Yet, it’s so patent that a token of “Lev Tolstoy” may take distinct coherent emplacements—which depends on the speaker’s choice—that Russell told us to distinguish “ordinary” from “logically proper names. These “Lev Tolstoy” tokens take different emplacements if (A) and (M) are true:

(A) Lev Tolstoy was a famous Russian author who never visited Manhattan.

(M) Lev Tolstoy was my Manhattan apartment building’s super.

I know this may seem irrelevant, but might not someone ask, “Which came first, the egg/name or the chicken/emplacement?” The answer is: The emplacement identity came first. I suspect most of my readers, upon seeing a token of “Tolstoy” would emplace the famous Russian author rather than my building manager into it. What’s going on here is that a person is identified ‘first’. We say “S’s name is ‘N’” and “S” answers to ‘N’”, because we assume identifying an emplacement takes primacy over learning its ordinary name. “N names S” and “Which name identifies S?” occur in philosophical discourse, but that locus is seldom the best source for information about natural language practices. To answer this artful ‘Which’ question, you first have to identify the person intended without reliance on, even despite, the ordinary name. “Say, is this movie we’re to called *Rigid Emplacement Meets Flexy Names*”? Extensional and intensional logic need the regimentation of Russell’s “logically proper, ‘rigid’ names”, without which emplacement ambiguity corrupts inferences rife with equivocation, oblique reference, and indirect discourse. Russell was right to seal off ordinary from logically proper names; only the latter, by stipulation, rigidly designate their ‘referents’ and enable us to regiment such inferences with astute use of coherent emplacements, $^{\wedge}[E\dots E] @ /N/\wedge$, where /N/ is a proper name. This is the conceptual logic version of ‘rigid designation’ and ‘logically proper names’.

Consider Quine’s argument against modal logic’s proponents. It has terminally crippling emplacement problems.

(1) 9 = the number of the planets

(2) N ($9 > 7$) (/N/ is an abbreviation of [Necessary])

(3) N (the number of planets > 7).

(1) and (2) are supposedly true, but (3) is false, although the argument is allegedly valid because /the number of planets/ in (3) has been substituted for /9/ in (2), and because, by (1), 9 and the number of planets are identical/equals.²⁹ But this ‘equals for equals’ substitution cannot go through because /9/ in (1) and /the number of planets/ in (2) aren’t ‘equals’; these tokens don’t have identical emplacements due to their being used equivocally. Here’s a rewrite of the argument that highlights the equivocation, which shows why the argument is invalid, with or without its /N/s or its alleged scope errors. (Never mind that Pluto is no longer counted as a planet.)

(1’) The *count* of the planets stops at 9 (one-to-one matching of planets and numerals in the positive integers series) betrays the improper use of the identity, /=/, copula in (1); the count result stops at /9/ but a count result is not identical, =|=, to E”9”E in the integer series. (This is a true statement.)

(2’) Any *numeral* token of “9” comes after any *numeral* token of “7” in the positive integer series. (This is a coherent proposition.)

(3’) The *count* of the number of planets goes past a *count* of /7/. (This is a true premise.)

Coherent emplacements for a “9 count” of planets, an act, differs from a successor “numeral” of /7/, which is a place in a numeral series; they aren’t “equals”, that is, they aren’t identical. The argument suffers a deadly bout of equivocation, which is why we can’t validly infer (3) from (1) and (2). This interpretation of Quine’s argument reveals we have a ‘factually true’ (1’) and (3’); (2)’s alethic /N/-Necessary has vanished, replaced by a leutically enjoined coherent (2’). (2’) *enjoins* us to travel past “7”’s tokens to reach “9”’s tokens in the integer series, which explains why (3’) is an empirical claim: it’s a correct via passive report that the author of the argument has observed her community’s numeral practices of counting and addition.

In this connection, to emphasize a point I made earlier: Replace arithmetical ‘statements’ with propositions that are judged by their coherence rather than their truth value. The [+] operator in

$$/2 + 2/$$

enjoins you to travel two more places after /2/ on the integer series, whereupon you will end up at /4/ in the series, if your series is isomorphic to mine. If you so travel, $2 + 2 = 4$ is a *coherent* proposition, not a true statement. Sans emplacements of objects’ measured tropes in the numerals, such as a body’s mass or acceleration--in old-speak, sans emplacement of ‘states of affairs’—arithmetical statements aren’t true. Anyone who

²⁹ See *Names and Descriptions*, Leonard Linsky, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 49f.

claims $\langle 2 + 2 = 73 \rangle$ is true hasn't made a false 'statement' about the sum of those 'numbers', but embraced an incoherent proposition, because it doesn't accord with her community's arithmetical practice, $2 + 2 = 4$. Just because there aren't true arithmetical or mathematical statements, you need not bemoan the loss of 'truth' and 'objectivity'. Mathematical propositions' intersubjectively verifiable coherence value replaces phantom 'objective truth' value. You haven't forfeited sound mathematical evaluations; you can find all you need in a germane, intersubjectively based lexical zone. Those who share lexical practices are the best of friends in their journey over the cognitive rainbow.

Attitude statements in arguments also present apparent difficulties for inference validity if we ignore the strictures of coherent emplacement, which is the conceptual kin of Russell's logically proper names and Kripke's rigid designators as in the following inference:

- (A) \langle Jenny (Diver) believes \langle Jack (the Knife) is her (only) husband \rangle \rangle ;
- (B) \langle Her husband is a philanderer \rangle ;
- (C) hence, \langle Jenny believes \langle Jack is a philanderer \rangle \rangle .

Whose inference is this? Its third-person "Jenny believes" (A) and (C) indicate they're not Jenny's but an Outsider's statements. (B) is silent on Jenny's belief about her husband's philandering. So, the Outsider's inference to Jenny's belief (C) is unsound.

Blame its unsoundness on information missing from (B). That's why we Outsiders can't *soundly* infer (C) is true, although we could if we knew (B') is true:

- (B') Jenny believes \langle Her husband is philandering \rangle .

With (B') true replacing (B), an Outsider's inference to (C) is sound even though Jenny might not draw conclusion (C), although she's entitled to do so, given her (A) and (B') beliefs. With the help of coherent emplacements, it's easy to show the Outsider's inference, [(A), (B'); so, (C)], is sound. By replacing that inference's /Jenny believes/s with Jenny's /I believe/s, we can transform the Outsider's inference into Jenny's. Were she to make this first-person inference, her inference is sound given that her (A) and (B') beliefs' truth rest on *coherent emplacements*. Nothing surprising here; millions of wives for centuries have so inferred validly. I explain.

Jenny's belief that (A) is true depends on her emplacing EjackE @ /Jack/ and the trope that Jack carries, Emy husbandE, into (A)'s predicate: E(jack) my husbandE @ /my husband/. Her belief that (B') is true depends on her emplacing EjackE @ /My husband/ and emplacing the trope that Jack carries into (B')'s predicate, E(jack)philanderingE @ /philandering/. She can rationally have those beliefs if she's made those coherent emplacements. If she did, she would thereby, without further ado, have em-

laced EjackE into (C)'s /Jack/, which, by (B'), has already coherently carried the EphilanderingE trope into (C)'s predicate, which makes (C) true.³⁰

Via passive logical investigations of inferential behavior cannot but take a normative, critical mien toward it when we reflect on our via attiva inferring acts. Jenny, even we and others, frequently don't rationally infer, but this doesn't rescind sound evaluative criteria, which is our present topic. If Jenny and her informed Outsider are rational, their soundness judgment prevails. If neither Jenny nor the Outsider infer nor believe Jack is philandering, the soundness of [(A), (B'); hence, (C)] isn't nullified, because its soundness doesn't depend on what Jenny consciously believes or on what is known. To see this, remind yourself that in via passive evaluation of inferences without attitude statements we assume a hypothetical stance: *IF* the premises are true, and *IF* the argument is valid, *THEN* the inference is sound. Thus, if conclusion (C) were false, because Jenny doesn't believe her husband is philandering, it doesn't defeat the via passiva inferences' soundness; rather, it censures Jenny's and we Outsiders' via attiva failure to follow the argument where it leads.

Neglect of the different conditions for the validity and soundness of inferences with attitude statements versus those without them springs, according to the above remarks, from a failure to respect the difference between via attiva inferences and via passive evaluations of them. Our evaluations are always via passive reflections on via attiva inferences; that's the critical, normative stance; our subject matter is the flood of via attiva inferring that rushes toward the sea of knowing-and-unknowing. A viable pragmatism scrupulously respects the via attiva/via passive distinction. Thus, rejection of the [(A), (B); hence, (C)] inference shouldn't be blamed on its attitude statements, but to the lack of information (B) carries when the Outsider denies the inference's validity. So, the problem with [(A), (B); hence, (C)] is a want of soundness not of validity. When soundness is remedied by care for the coherent emplacement that Jenny's (B'), "I believe", brings, we can only shout "Hurrah!" for the healing powers that coherent emplacement bestows on seemingly intractably invalid inferences that host indirect discourse state-ments.

Indulge me in an emplacement rewrite of and a pertinent commentary on Jenny's inference, Tom. If her inference is rendered as coherent emplacement propositions that make true the sooth³¹ statements she believes, we have:

- (A) EjackE @ /jack/ & E(jack)my-only-husbandE @ /my only husband/
 (B') EjackE @ /my only husband/ & E(my only husband)philanderingE @ /philandering/;

³⁰ You may have noticed a parallel here to Venn diagrams. By drawing/emplacing the premises so that they're true, you've thereby drawn/emplaced a true conclusion, if the specified emplacements aren't equivocal.

³¹ On the [Sooth] functor, a statement forming predication, see p. 65f.

(C) EjackE @ /Jack/ & E(jack)philanderingE @ /philandering/.

With this interpretation, the Outsider's inference, [(A), (B'); (C)] is sound. Coherent emplacements that make the premises true, make the conclusion true without fail. To make (A) true, Jack has to carry the husband trope into /husband/, \wedge E(jack)husbandE @ /husband/ \wedge . To make (B') relevantly true, Jenny has to emplace ONE and the same person in /my only husband/ as into /Jack/. Also in (B'), Jack, Jenny's only husband, carries the philandering trope into /philandering/, \wedge E(jack)philanderingE @ /philandering \wedge , which is why we get, unavoidably, that same trope emplacement in (C)'s predicate. 'Direct reference', coherent emplacements of objects into proper names that coherently carry tropes into such objects' predications makes statements true. So, coherent emplacement plays the same semantic role for natural languages that Russell engaged for logically proper names in an ideal symbolism for mathematics.

* * * *

Here are some results I'd like you to remember. Rigid designation, whether of 'natural' kinds or proper names, heralded as a break with Russell and especially Frege, is still held fast by those who work only in alethic logics, and are not as revolutionary as advertised. The new way to escape the seemingly self-generating epicycles in which philosophers rotate while toiling on the topics discussed is through the use of conceptual/coherence logic. It dispenses with alethic modalities and replaces them with leutic, pro-active modalities for agents' lexical acts. The sooth interpretation of the predicative copula, buttressed with the emplacement advisory, [E...E], replaces reference and representation, enabling us to deal more simply and naturally with the semantics of 'ordinary' proper names, definite descriptions, and the logic of inferences with modal and attitude statements.

Serious conceptual stipulation versus school name stipulation blesses us with new de jure justified concepts, such as H₂O, that we may drop like manna into vacant lexical spaces.

Basically, natural kind proponents are trying, as I am, to account for the truth value of <This liquid is water> and <This liquid is not water>. I think their explanations are Truth Lite. They rely on "rigid naming" to exclude anything from being water if it's not H₂O, as sown into Stich's (6), which is where this foray began. (6) is unacknowledged stipulation. Nominators did not check all water samples to see if they're H₂O in order to confirm this universal statement's truth (nor could they get *necessary* truth by that procedure). They couldn't verify (6) by exhaustive enumeration nor by induction, because they'd have to be able to identify water samples *before* testing it for its H₂O composition. The rigid naming of a liquid as water comes *after* stipulating water's H₂O benchmark. This logical disordering is as fatal for the extensional/alethic/possible-worlds' logic account of natural kinds' as a lethal heart attack. Stipulations, of course, don't have truth

value; what they do have is enjoined coherence value, which we accept on de jure grounds if we find them useful for a better earthly life. Once we decide to speak as we're enjoined to do by a *conceptual* stipulation, we can use that to determine the truth value of <This liquid is/is not water>.

Rigid name stipulation is too threadbare to explain kind concepts; it lacks, and must by its nature, the conceptual and historical elaborations needful to be explanatory. Suppose Jason Southwell from Failing Falls, Alabama, had discovered that a liquid, which he and his slaves had always called "water" had an H₂O composition. But, because this inquiring, self-taught planter lived outside the ring of respected, corresponding chemists, he was unable to spread his stipulated concept. Have you ever heard of Southwell, a dignified Reb? Of his early discovery? If not, the lessons to be drawn are that stipulation without fecund social circumstances doesn't spread the 'word', and that stipulation without a conceptual logic that ties it to a lexical system is but solitary, arbitrary conventional naming ("Saul", "Hilary"), not a shared conceptual change, even if you purport to factor in the 'essence' chestnut, which mangles what are conceptual kinds into 'natural' kinds.

The argument I've made may be stated summarily as follows.

^[Bond] water H₂O ^ A stipulated, coherent proposition, justified de jure;
[Bond] is an enjoined advisory, adopted per the Lexical Imperative (p. 16f).

<[Sooth] this-liquid water

<[Sooth] this-liquid water> is true because EliquidE @ /liquid/ & E(liquid) H₂OE @ /H₂O/ are coherent emplacements.

<[Sooth] this-liquid water> is false when this liquid is Twin Earth's Wasser and when its composition properties, HO₂, are coherent emplacements, as in

EwasserE @ /liquid/ & E(wasser)HO₂E @ /HO₂/, and because water and Wasser's compositions are incompatible,

[Incompatible] HO₂ H₂O^.

<This Wasser liquid is water> is false; in short, Wasser isn't water because it's not H₂O but is its incompatible HO₂/~ H₂O.

These sweeping claims may seem exaggerated, but a little conceptual logic may help you understand the hitherto unexploited logical resources that were buried in the copula and the lexical system. We can use them to infer which of our proffered travels in lexical space are coherent and which are not, at least in the English lexical system.

***A Little* CONCEPTUAL LOGIC**

I know it's a gamble to commit time acquainting yourself with even the rudiments of an invigorating new logical program that can't boast the imprimatur of celebrated savants, especially since you're already up to your keister in teaching, correcting papers, rewriting an article, committee work, Saturdays dedicated to the children, Sundays at the beach/mountain/river cabin. Besides, the 'natural kinds' topic has been pummeled for a few decades, so it's unlikely there's something new that a conceptual logic can bring to its table.

On the contrary, I've shown above that there is something "new and improved".

Even so you may not want to delay your pressing projects to learn something that doesn't patently forward your envisioned philosophic contribution or your career. One price you will have to pay, however, for not learning even a little bit of conceptual logic here is that you can never, ever reject a philosophical position as "incoherent" in any discourse, written or spoken, without a twinge of shame if you harbor an inchoate idea of ^coherent, ^incoherent^, ^coherence value^. Nor will you ever be able to accede knowledgeably, shamelessly to such a denunciation. Anglo-American analytic philosophers, recently joined by some splendid Continental comrades, have been rotating in Ptolemaic epicycles around the Nineteenth-Twentieth century's brilliant modern stars, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. If you're epicycling about them in company with S. Kripke, D. Davidson, and protean H. Putnam in our post-Modern era, I hope this immodest essay will help you to escape the overwhelming alethic pull of these European and American luminaries.

I've challenged an alethic account of 'natural' kinds, claiming they can't be properly explained except as conceptual stipulation based on the coherence of combinations of concepts in what I call propositions, interpretations of sentences. The crucial move here turns on the axis of ^coherence^. The term has become more and more widely used. However, the evaluation ^coherence^ still wears swaddling clothes in most philosophers' lexical cribs. It can get past the fashionable and mature only with nurture drawn from a conceptual logic. That's why what follows is a vital part of rethinking 'natural' kinds. The rest of this essay is an account-lite of a conceptual logic that will fit you for a more mature use of ^coherent^ and ^incoherent^, the Ur-ground for alethic logic

CONCEPTUAL NEGATION AND BINARY COPULA ADVISORIES

Conceptual logic's functors are interpretations of the copula and negation, "not". They're advisories to via attiva sentence users and recipients.

Conceptual negation differs from statement negation, although both are monary functors. Conceptual negation is an advisory operation on concepts and propositions that creates incompatible concepts and alters the coherence value of propositions. Statement negation alters the truth value of predication statements.

There is one conceptual monary advisory, [**Negate**], which we English speakers use to negate concepts and propositions rather than statements. I symbolize it as [\sim] and statement negation as [-]. Note how I use [\sim] to negate propositions: $\wedge[\sim\text{Subsume}] \wedge\text{lion}$ [under] $\wedge\text{mouse}$ ^{^^}, $\wedge[\sim\text{Subsume}] \text{EheideggerE}$ [under] $\wedge\text{clear}(\text{writer})$ ^{^^}.

There are seven binary copula advisories: [**Subsume**] (plus an eighth, subsumption bottom-dweller functor, [**Emplace**]) [**Contrast**], incompatible concepts, contradictory and contrary, [**Bond**], [**Conger**], [**Identify**], [**Link**], and [**Sooth**]. They provide a surprisingly ample lexical space.³² I treat interpretations of sentences' copulas as binary advisories on what path to take in lexical space when you go from a proposition's grammatical subject to its grammatical predicate concept supposing you want to understand and to be understood by other fluent speakers of a language. Nothing in the grammatical order, $S \rightarrow P$, prevents you from generating coherent combinations in $P \rightarrow S$ order.

The literature on lexical relations is extensive and some writers introduce a very large number of them.³³ Such numbers grow out of respect for the many influences grammar has on interpretations of sentences. I'm after different, *logical*, game from the big-number scholars. The only relevant grammar in my account is the subject/predicate distinction and my isolation of the copula's several roles we can use to set up the operator/functor framework for a logic that we may use to reason about the coherence value of a proffered combination of concepts, in contrast to a logic with which to reason about the truth value of statements. There are no determiners, no articles, save a subterranean [Any], nor tenses in my propositions.

I distinguish token sentences, /.../, from their interpretations by someone, $\wedge\text{...}$ [^], and from statements, <...>, made with the conjoined use of token sentences and their

³² Laura Schroeter reflects on David Chalmers and Frank Jackson's two-dimensional semantics. She presents their account of it in "Gruesome Diagonals", *Philosophers' Imprint*, www.philosophers'imprint.org/003003/, Volume 3, No. 3, August 2003. She also critiques this view effectively, which leads her to say we should "reject the simple model" (p. 7), with which I agree in spades. On p. 3 and 19 Shroeter presents a grand list of de jure reasons to consider when we think about the concept of water neglected by a two-dimensional view of semantics and by "Twin Earth-style scenarios".

³³ See the introduction to my Appendix to "On Emplacing", forthcoming, I'm sure, on my web site at http://www.sfsu.edu/~phlsphr/arthur_bierman.

interpretations. Propositions are interpretations of sentences. ^...^ also indicates a word token's interpretation, which I call a ^concept^; concepts are individuated and identified by their locations in lexical space. My quarry is a conceptual/lexical logic we can use to make inferences about the coherence value of sentential combinations of substantive and property concepts. My intent is to hone ^coherent^ as an evaluation tool from its present embryonic, crudely intuitive state into a mature, less intuitive instrument. This outline is confined to one-place predicates and needs to be supplemented to cover 2+-place predicates.³⁴

My logic is adapted to discourse typically of interest to philosophers, innovative lawyers, contentious students, intellectual bar patrons before their fourth drink, and challenging citizens who find standard-issue concepts and their sentential combinations open to challenge. Plato's Socrates showed how easy it is to expose the incoherence of even the most embedded conceptual habits. Parties to discourse often unwittingly harbor conceptual differences that disrupt mutual understanding and cooperative action, both of which may occasion perilous social ruptures that can't be fully allayed except in groups small enough and with time enough for Socratic discourse, *provided* all its interlocutors are girded with conceptual logic, implicit or explicit, and led by a fearless adept.³⁵

I don't claim there aren't other useful or indispensable copula advisories for capturing my prey than those discussed here. There are no exhaustively Utopian logics. Like other logics, mine is an unending work in progress. But seeing old, new, or topical philosophical issues from the perspective of even a relatively simple conceptual logic is disorienting enough to disclose new ways to address and/or discharge them, which is what I've tried to do with ^natural^ kinds in this essay and with the liar and other paradoxes in "On Emplacing", which I hope will entice my logic betters to improve my conceptual logic offering. I think you'll find it even more disorienting, although for different reasons, than the Slingshot argument that Stephen Neale presents and corrects so persuasively and exhaustively.³⁶

* * * *

Conceptual functors have **leutic modalities**. They replace alethic modalities.

[**Enjoined to**] replaces [Necessary]

[**Enjoined not to**] replaces [Impossible]

[**Allowed to**] replaces [Possible].

³⁴ Multi-place predicates are employed in ordering objects in relation to each other. Most of them have been misidentified as 'relations'. Ordering does not require the existence of relations, only a coordination of word order in sentences and the order of objects in time and/or space. See Wilfred Sellars's *Science, Perception and Reality*, 1963, "Naming Saying", Chapter 7; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. There he introduces "Jumblese" where 'relational' sentences are represented by a configuration of names. Jumblese is a prelude to my preferred treatment of multi-place predicates.

³⁵ See *The Philosophy of Urban Existence: A Prolegomenon*, A. K. Bierman; Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1973.

³⁶ Stephen Neale, *Facing Facts*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

These three leutic modalities reflect the *via activa* stance toward the conceptual logic of language. They are modes of our tendered lexical *acts*, our lexical travels in lexical space that we invite others to take with us, as Chaucer’s travelers invited others to join in the tattling while on their mounted pilgrimage to Canterbury.

All copulas except [Sooth] either [**Enjoin (us) to**] or [**Enjoin (us) not to**] travel from one concept to another. Only the [Sooth] copula is an [**Allowed**] modality; it frees us to elect our conceptual travel--within enjoined limits. We’re allowed to choose which coherent proposition, *^Tolstoy wrote War and Peace^* or *^Tolstoy did not write War and Peace^*, we want to use as a vehicle for a statement we think we’re entitled to assert is true, or, if we intend to lie, that we’ll use as a vehicle for a statement we think we’re entitled to believe is false. [Sooth] propositions are our conceptual “elective affinities”. *^~Clean^* enjoins us to travel to *^dirty^* or *^soiled^*, or any other contrary concepts as *^~dead^* enjoins us to travel to the contradictory *^alive^*.

By yielding, per the Lexical Imperative, to others’ enjoined copulas, we construct a lexical/conceptual space isomorphic to our tutors’ coherent (and incoherent) practices. Oh, sweet child. Oh, respected mentor. [Bond], for example, is an enjoined advisory, which, like all copula advisories, has its **via activa** (VA) and **via passive** (VP) modes.

(VA) *^[Bond] ^water^ ^H₂O^^ ^[~Bond] ^water^ ^H₂O^^*

(VP) *<She bonded/did not bond ^water^ to ^H₂O^>*

((VP) is true if she so bonded, false if she didn’t.)

(VA) *^[~Bond] ^Water^ ^H₂O^^*

(VP) *<She did not bond ^water^ to ^H₂O^>*

((VP) is true if she didn’t bond, false if she did.)

One of Wittgenstein’s aims in the *Tractatus*, was to identify what one can say and what one cannot say (4.114- 5). I interpret “can say” as a [Sooth] statement riding on the back of a coherent interpretation of a [Sooth] sentence, and where “cannot say” is a [Sooth] sentence that has no coherent interpretation, and, so, has no back on which a statement may ride. Wittgenstein wondered what our [Sooth] limits are. He was trying to find the border between coherence (sense) and incoherence (nonsense) with the sole aid of truth logic, then dominated by Russell. He failed, because he did not supplement truth logic with conceptual logic. He got it right that tautology and contradiction are not sooth statements; they “do not make sense” (4.461 - 4.4661). His aim persisted through 1932 – 34. “...the orders “Bring me sugar” and “Bring me milk” make sense, but not the

combination “Milk me Sugar...To say “This combination of words makes no sense” excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language.”³⁷

FUNCTOR ADVISORIES EXPLAINED
Conceptual and Propositional Negation

Symbolize **conceptual and propositional negation** as [~], **statement and judgment negation** as [-].


Conceptual and propositional negation is the only one-place advisory. It modifies concepts and propositions, unlike statement negation, which modifies judgments and statements. ^Cheerful^ entails ^~gloomy^ as ^gloomy^ entails ^~cheerful^, which, in standard, inadequate English, we say <^Gloomy^ and ^cheerful^ are opposites>. What are these opposites? Words, ideas, thoughts, properties, objects, concepts? They’re ‘opposite’ concepts, from whence we speak of ‘opposing’ concepts of emotional/mood states: ^gloomy^ vs. ^cheerful^. Conceptual negation, [~], gets us on the road to a precise understanding of ‘opposites’.

^Married^ entails ^~single^ and ^single^ entails ^~married^. Note that recent challenges to the traditional concept ^marriage^ complicate the old surety of exclusive ‘opposites’. Men marrying men and women marrying women, although contested ‘morally’ and mostly unrealized in legal status as of 2007, may occur commonly in the future. The *union* of men|men and women|women in matrimony with the same legal rights as married men|women now have would alter the logical relation of ^married^ and ^single^. ^Single^ would have three ‘opposites’ instead of one.

“Are you single Josh/Jill?”

“No, I’m married.”

This could be interpreted as Josh/Jill is: menfemmarried, menmarried or femmarried. Consider these new relations between these contrary concepts in lexical space.



In this conceptual configuration, ^single^ is no longer a *contradictory concept* of ^married^, because it no longer has but *one* ‘opposite’. Rather it’s a *contrary concept* of ^married^, because each concept has two ‘opposites’ from ^menfemmarried^, ^men-

³⁷ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, PART I, The Proposition, and its Sense, p. 189; Ed. Rush Rhees, Trans. Anthony Kenny: Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press; 1974. On p. 193, Wittgenstein says, “For us language is a calculus; it is characterized by *linguistic activities*”. He did not produce the ‘calculus’, the ‘grammar’ of language so far as it is the structure upon which ‘sense’ perches. I’m proposing conceptual logic as that calculus. Notice his slide toward the *Investigations* with his “*linguistic activities*”.

married[^], and [^]femmarried[^]. Because [^]union[^] subsumes three different conceptual relations, [^]~single[^] entails either [^]menfemmarried[^], [^]menmarried[^], or [^]femmarried[^].

[^]Divorced[^] negates [^]married[^], which gives us [^]dismarried[^], which entails either [^]~menfemmarried[^], [^]~menmarried[^] or [^]~femmarried. Divorce takes us back to single-dom. Note that the following [Sooth] *proposition pairs*, (i) and (ii),³⁸

(i) [^][Sooth] Jenny married[^] and [^][Sooth] Jenny single[^], and

(ii) [^][Sooth] Jenny femmarried[^] and [^][Sooth] Jenny single[^],

are coherent. However, the *statements pairs*, (iii) and (iv),

(iii) [^]<[Sooth] Jenny married> and <[Sooth] Jenny single>, and

(iv) <[Sooth] Jenny femmarried> and <[Sooth] Jenny single>,

are not both true nor are both false.

Also, because conceptual negation, [~], engenders the incompatibility of [^]married[^] and [^]~married[^], it thereby logically underwrites statement negation, [-]:

<Jenny is ~married > entails <[-]<Jenny is married>>.

This [^]married[^]/[^]~married[^] example is a banal case, the best kind for nudging out conceptual relations and showing how they may be ordered into inference patterns we may use to reason about problematic concepts. Such examples are valuable because (i) they use native speakers' (almost) universally shared practices and (ii) because we can extrapolate from them when we need a canon to clarify concepts and to reason about conceptual differences.

Deny and affirm vs. negate

I **deny** the coherence of the proposition, [^][Bond] cadaver alive[^] by negating its functor, [^][~Bond] cadaver alive[^], or by saying < [Bond] cadaver alive[^] is incoherent>. I **affirm** [^][Bond] cadaver ~alive[^]'s coherence by not negating its functor, or by saying < [Bond] cadaver ~alive[^] is coherent>. This differs from **negating** propositions' predicates; [^][Bond] cadaver ~alive[^] alters a proposition's coherence value; the *incoherent* [^][Bond] cadaver alive[^] becomes the *coherent* [^][Bond] cadaver ~alive. Denying/affirming versus negating predicates are distinct acts, applying to both propositions and statements. A lot of mischief in logic is caused by ignoring this distinction, as occurs when logicians try to 'interpret' logical symbolism into ordinary language. One of the more egregious examples of this is Tarski's reading of his Convention T symbolism.³⁹ Affirming and denying are public commitments to coherence and truth value; negating predicates changes propositions' coherence value (except in those with a [Sooth] functor) and changes statements' truth value.

³⁸ The [Sooth] copula/functor in statements, [forsooth], is ordinarily thought of as 'factual' predication—true or false to the 'facts'.

³⁹ See my website letter to Nino (Cocchiarella), http://www.sfsu.edu/~phlsphr/arthur_bierman.html.

* * * *

Negating, $[\sim]$, a concept, $\wedge C1^\wedge$, gives us $\wedge \sim C1^\wedge$. $\wedge C1^\wedge$ and $\wedge \sim C1^\wedge$ are **incompatible** concepts. For example, $\wedge \text{dead}^\wedge$ and $\wedge \sim \text{dead}^\wedge$ are incompatible. Often English has a separate word for a negated concept, as $\wedge \text{dead}^\wedge$ is a rewrite of $\wedge \sim \text{alive}^\wedge$. “Poor Judd is dead” scans better but is conceptually similar to “Poor Judd is not alive”. Because $\wedge \text{alive}^\wedge$ and $\wedge \text{dead}^\wedge / \wedge \sim \text{alive}^\wedge$ are incompatible contradictories, and because $\wedge \text{dead}^\wedge$ is bonded to $\wedge \text{cadaver}^\wedge$, $\wedge \text{the cadaver is alive}^\wedge$ is incoherent. I use $[\!]$, (Oh, my gosh!), as the symbol for the functor [Incompatible].

$\wedge [\text{Bond}] \text{ cadaver dead}^\wedge$
 $\wedge [\!] \text{ dead alive}^\wedge$

_____ $\wedge [\sim \text{Bond}] \text{ cadaver alive}^\wedge$

You’re not allowed to bond $\wedge \text{cadaver}^\wedge$ to $\wedge \text{alive}^\wedge$; however, since

$\wedge [=] \sim \text{alive dead}^\wedge$,

$\wedge [\text{Bond}] \text{ cadaver } \sim \text{alive}^\wedge$

is coherent.

_____ $\wedge [\text{Sooth}] \text{ cadaver alive}^\wedge$ and $\wedge [\text{Sooth}] \text{ cadaver dead}^\wedge$ are incoherent.⁴⁰

The $[\dots n't]$ of $/\text{isn't}/$ negates the copula of $/\text{A tusk isn't a stone}/$. Interpret that as the negation of that sentence token’s advisory functor, [Subsume],

$\wedge [\sim \text{Subsume}] \wedge \text{tusk}^\wedge [\text{under}] \wedge \text{stone}^\wedge \wedge$.

Negating a proposition’s functor negates the proposition, which differs from negating a concept. We use negated functors to advise our auditors that we’re not allowed to travel from $\wedge \text{stone}^\wedge$ to $\wedge \text{tusk}^\wedge$ on a subsumption pathway in lexical space. $\wedge \text{Mineral}^\wedge$ and $\wedge \text{organic}^\wedge$ are incompatible; since $\wedge \text{tusk}^\wedge$ is subsumed by $\wedge \text{organic}^\wedge$ and $\wedge \text{stone}^\wedge$ by $\wedge \text{mineral}^\wedge$, you’re not allowed to subsume $\wedge \text{tusk}^\wedge$ under $\wedge \text{mineral}^\wedge$.

Statements versus Judgments

Statements are via passiva two-valued: True/false. Judgments are via attiva three-valued: Entitled to claim a statement is true, is false, or not entitled to either.⁴¹ So, state-

⁴⁰ These incoherent sooth conclusions are important; they mark the difference between alethic and leutic modalities. Many logicians hold that a necessary true statement entails the statement is possibly/contingently true: $\langle Ns \dashrightarrow \rangle s$. In conceptual logic, an enjoined proposition, where leutic [Enjoined] replaces alethic [Necessary], entails that both $\wedge p^\wedge$ and $\wedge \sim p^\wedge$ are incoherent: $\wedge [\text{Enjoined}] p^\wedge$ does not entail $\wedge [\text{Sooth}] p^\wedge$ nor $\wedge [\text{Sooth}] \sim p^\wedge$ but does entail $\wedge [\sim \text{Sooth}] p^\wedge$ and $\wedge [\sim \text{Sooth}] \sim p^\wedge$. [Enjoined to] and [Allowed to] are incompatible leutic modalities as are the moral modalities [Obligatory to] and [Permitted]. Thus, conceptual logic dodges the alethic conundrum: If $\langle s \rangle$ is possibly true so is $\langle \sim s \rangle$; but if necessarily $\langle s \rangle$, then $\langle \sim s \rangle$ isn’t possibly true. Hence, $\langle Ns \dashrightarrow \rangle s$ is incoherent.

ments are not identical to judgments. However, [Not, -] operates on both via *attiva* judgmental acts and on statements. Interpret the judgment <[-Entitled]<Nightmares are welcome>> as denying anyone *is entitled to judge* <Nightmares are welcome> is true. Because, judgments are three-valued, it's left open whether there is enough evidence to *entitle anyone to judge* <Nightmares are welcome> is false; that is, there may not be enough evidence to *entitle anyone to judge* <[-]< Nightmares are welcome>>.

Propositions versus Judgments

Similarly, by conceptual logic, via *passiva propositions* are two-valued, coherent/incoherent, while via *passiva judgments* about a proposition's coherence value are three-valued entitlements. For example, the statement

<A six-day fetus is a person>,

requires that the following proposition be coherent in order for that judgment to be coherent:

^[Subsume] ^person^ ^6-day-fetus^^.

The /a/ in that statement indicates the copula is a subsumption functor. This proposition is either coherent or incoherent, no middle ground. There is, however, a third ground for judgments about the coherence value of this proposition, because no one may have produced a sound enough argument to entitle us to judge it either coherent or incoherent.

To have a sound argument for either requires (i) conceptual premises that report widely shared lexical practices by *at least* a majority of a language's speakers, if addressed to the majority, and (ii) the conceptual argument is valid. Since a community's conceptual/social life cannot pacifically thrive with a 51-49 split of 'widely shared' lexical practices, "widely" often needs more than 51% of speakers' to share lexical practices. What percent? I don't know. Depending on a community's power structure and the cognitive capacities and information of its members, a powerful elite composed of 5% may impose its lexical practices and eventually influence most other members to adopt fearfully or unconsciously the elite's conceptual mode of cognizing their experience. No one who's lived in a substantial part of the 20th Century or read Orwell's discerning critique of state conceptual tyrannies could minimize the difficulty of making 'widely shared lexical practices' less vague. I can do no better here. Whoever can, please tell me how to do it.

Obviously, a 50 - 50 split in a language speakers' conceptual practices doesn't provide *enough* support to a conceptual inference's premises coherence to entitle us *prima facie* to judge a conclusion is coherent or incoherent. Hopefully, however, having a logi-

⁴¹ True and false are ideal via passive regulative ends. Honest, via *attiva* informed judgments are our best approximations to them.

cal conceptual canon, we may utilize agreement on related but more distant concepts in lexical space to tip the scales from 50 – 50 to, say, 70 – 30, *enough* to justify the 70%ers' entitlement to judge the proposition as coherent or incoherent, whatever their own practice might be. Of course, this doesn't finalize the entitlement once and for all; the discourse may go on and on as philosophers are wont to do.

Via attiva -- Via passiva

Propositions are **via attiva**. They are the outcome of interpreting sentences, which are either similar or dissimilar rewrites of a sentence. The proposition ^The book is long^ is a similar rewrite/interpretation of /The book is long/; ^The book has a lot of pages^ is a dissimilar rewrite.

We use propositions to tender coherent lexical travel paths we may take with our sentence utterances. Taking interpretations to heart shows respect for the *Lexical Imperative*, which says: If we wish to be understood by others as we understand ourselves and if we wish to understand others as they understand themselves, we must adopt isomorphic lexical paths. ^[Subsume] pear [under] fruit^ is a widely shared interpretation of /A pear is a fruit/, while ^[Subsume] pear [under] collar^ is not.

Statements reporting propositions' coherence value and reporting statements' truth value are via passiva: <^[Subsume] ^pear^ [under] ^fruit^^ is coherent>, <<The pears are ripe> is true> are via passiva statements. These claims are two-valued; there's no "mister-in-between".

Let's cop to it, we humans have access only to via attiva entitlements, which thrive on sharing practices for coherence and evidence for truth. We never have privileged access to final via passive truth about truth value or coherence value. True and false are the gods of epistemological theology; knowledge prelates have overdrawn on their faith in these gods' existence. I'm sorry if atheistic epistemology depresses you, but between

<Henny believes <S> with evidence> and <Henny knows <S>>, there is no detectable revelation that assures Henny <<S> IS TRUE!>, which is standardly required if we're to conclude that <Henny knows <S>>. So, how can Henny conclude she KNOWS <S>? /Henny/ doesn't appear in <<S> IS TRUE!> as she does in /Henny believes <S> with evidence/. Where has Henny gone? Why was she aced out of that claim? Who else ascertains <<S> is true>? Is there a disembodied knower, an omniscient being, B, who performs this merciful service: <B affirms <<S> IS TRUE>? And kindly informs us of it?

More modestly, returning to Henny, what other premise(s) could she bring to support <<S> IS TRUE!> beyond the evidence she has that would entitle her to that judgment? I doubt there is an answer to that question. If so, any attempt to overturn Gettier's

challenge to Plato's 'standard' account of ^know^ in the *Theaetetus* is doomed. The "IS TRUE", premise is devoid of omniscient support for we secularists. Truth is shy, belief loud, and evidence insouciant.

Statements are *assumed* to be via passive true or false in school-example alethic arguments. In this mode, [Not, -] alters the truth value of a statement; if <Nightmares are welcome> is true, <[-]<Nightmares are welcome>> is false, and vice versa, a simpler semantic story than negation weaves for judgments, which occur in our daily discourse and are part of our active, communal life where we affirm and deny, challenge and agree, ridicule and sanctify.

Via passiva statements enter center stage *after* we reflect on our via attiva practices, perhaps mostly when we disagree about propositions' coherence or our judgments' truth entitlements. Then we have to resort to inferences, alethic or conceptual, to heal the ruptures if we want rational cures. Traditionally, logicians were not aware of or negligently *assumed* there are via attiva propositions that legitimize the coherence of via passive alethic premises in school-example alethic arguments, of which I too was guilty, Heretofore, such premises have been paraded at masqued balls as alethic a priori, verifiable, falsifiable, or flirtatious truth-conditions', all of which conceal the via attiva conceptual practices of their flesh-and-blood animators. This must stop. Now!! See p. 43 where I explained how conceptual negation underwrites statement negation: ^[Sooth] Jenny ~single^ entails <-<[Sooth] Jenny single>>.

* * * *

Since propositions have coherence but no truth value, it would be incoherent to apply alethic statement or judgment negation, [-], to them. You've noticed that the words in square brackets in propositions, as in the conceptual argument below, are copula advisories; [Bond] is an enjoined advisory that underwrites 'definitions' but is not to be confused with them. I use square brackets around functors to distinguish them from concepts. [Bond] enjoins travel between a substantive's concept and a property/trope's concept: ^[Bond] flint brittle^. [Identify] is also an enjoined advisory. Its negation, [~Identify], advises us that we are [Enjoined not to] replace one concept for another in a conceptual logic inference, per below.

[Bond] ^statement^ ^truth value^	A non-exceptional advisory
[Bond] ^proposition^ ^coherence value^	Also non-exceptional
[~Identify] ^truth value^ ^coherence value^	You're enjoined <i>not</i> to identify truth and coherence value. This was proved earlier; contradictory statements are coherent, but not both are true nor are both false.

[~Bond] ^proposition^ ^truth-value^.

It's incoherent to bond truth value to propositions.

Quine's indeterminacy-of-meaning thesis (*Word and Object*) is easily dismissed if we use a related conceptual argument. Because he did not supplement alethic with conceptual logic, he didn't have the information that could have saved him from his mistake. He thought, relying on behavioral information as the only evidence for the meaning of an empirical sentence, that /rabbit/ could be interpreted as ^whole^ or as rabbit ^parts^ without damage. He considered only *alethic* choices. The following conceptual inference shows his alternative interpretations of /rabbit/ offends coherence logic.

Here are two interpretation of /rabbit/ in /The rabbit is running/. Is the ^whole^ rabbit running or are rabbit ^parts^ running? Given that running is autonomous movement,

(1) ^[Subsume] run [under] autonomous movement^,
and that only whole animals are autonomous movers,

(2) ^[Bond] rabbit-whole autonomous runners^,
and that

(3) ^[Incompatible] whole parts^,
it follows that ^rabbit parts run^ is incoherent,

(4) ^^[~Sooth] rabbit-parts run^.⁴²

CONCEPTUAL LOGIC FUNCTORS

Conceptual negation

Some of what follows is a repetition, but, because of the logic's unfamiliarity, it may be helpful to reinforce what I said before.

We use conceptual negation, [~], to advise our auditors that a concept we've negated is either the contrary or contradictory of the negated concept. Conceptual negation is familiar to English speakers under such affixes as [un-] in ^unkind^, [in-] in ^inhuman^, and [dis-] in ^disagreeable^. ^Moral^, ^immoral^, and ^amoral^ are contrary concepts whereas ^dead^ and ^alive^ are contradictory concepts.

A concept and its negation are conceptually incompatible, either as contradictories or as contraries. Contradictory concepts are minimal contraries, consisting of but two contraries. English lexicographers have focussed almost exclusively on synonyms to the neglect of antonyms, unlike French and Italian lexicographers, with the result that conceptual negation's contribution to interpretations of word tokens has been undervalued by English speakers and philosophers. English dictionaries' entries seldom list antonyms.

⁴² For this last step, see footnote 40, p. 46.. (2) ^[Enjoined , Bond]^ entails (4) ^[~Sooth] p ^ & [~Sooth] ~p^.

Propositional negation

I use proposition negation, also symbolized by [~], in front of advisory functors, as in [~Bond], to negate propositions. With negated functors we can deny there is a coherent path between a proposition's concepts. For example, with [^[~Subsume] feeling [under] paper^], we deny the coherence of [^Subsume] feeling [under] paper^.

[Subsume] is an advisory whose leutic modality [Enjoins us to] subsume ^canary^ under ^bird^. [^[~Subsume]^ enjoins us *not* to subsume ^paper^ under ^feeling^; we use it to deny the coherence of that subsumption. We're enjoined not to take that subsumptive lexical space walk from ^paper^ to ^feeling^. Stop! Will you please refrain?!

Read [^[~Subsume] feeling paper^] as: You're enjoined *not* to subsume ^paper^ under ^feeling^. It's incoherent to do so. Once you're familiar with the leutic modalities of advisories, you can drop them from your readings. Thus, in reading [^[~Subsume] feeling paper^] and [^Subsume] feeling paper^, you need not use [*Enjoined to*] and [*Enjoined not to*] in propositions' readings. [Sooth]'s modality is [Allowed to] rather than [Enjoined]; it's typically used to make factual statements. You may also drop [*Allowed to*] from the propositional readings for the [Sooth] functor.⁴³

I will often drop carets around words when they lie within proposition's enclosed in caret quotations when you're unlikely to be confused. I do so, because the elements of propositions are concepts, ^feeling^ and ^paper^, as well as advisory functors, such as [Subsume]. Propositions with the [Sooth] de facto copula allow you to predicate coherently a property or a relation and its 'opposite' (single/~single) of a substantive(s). The negative of

^[Sooth] trial fair^,

an interpretation of /The trial was fair/, is

^[Sooth] trial ~fair^,

which is an interpretation of /The trial was not fair/. These propositional companions tell us: You're allowed to sooth ^trial^ to ^fair^ and ^~fair^. Both propositions are coherent, but not both of their respective statement offspring pair,

<[Sooth] trial fair> and <[Sooth] trial ~fair>,

can be true nor can both be false. Thus, ^true^ isn't identical to ^coherent^.

Remember that the negation of a proposition's predicate concept, ^~fair^, differs from the negation of its copula advisory,

^[~Sooth] trial deciduous^.

⁴³ In "On Emplacing", Part IV, Modalities, beginning with p. ~109, I prove that all binary lexical functors except [Sooth, .] are enjoined and that [Sooth] is an allowed functor.

I use the negation of a functor to affirm/deny that a proposition is coherent, to affirm/deny that there is/is not a coherent sooth path from ^trial^ to ^deciduous^ . Native English speakers know intuitively there's no such path in lexical space, that it's an absurd proposition, because it's incompatible with the coherent sooth path from ^tree^ to ^deciduous^ , and because $\text{^[Subsume] tree [under] plant^}$ and $\text{^[~Subsume] trial [under] plant^}$ are incompatible since ^tree^ and ^trial^ are incompatible. ^Tree^ is bonded to plant tropes, to ^leafy^ and ^sappy^ , while ^trial^ is bonded to legal tropes, ^adversarial^ , ^constitutional^ , ^innocent^ . Diverse bondings put subject concepts on incompatible, subsumption pathways.

Two propositions identical in all respects except that one copula's advisory is negated are incompatible. If $\text{^[Subsume] feeling pain^}$ is coherent, $\text{^[~Subsume] feeling pain^}$ is incoherent. If $\text{^[Subsume] feeling paper^}$ is incoherent, $\text{^[~Subsume] feeling paper^}$ is coherent.

However, there are many occasions when we aren't able to *judge* or *agree* that a proposition is coherent or incoherent, because our concepts are too embryonic. Is 'harvesting' stem cells abortion? Is assisted dying 'murder' in all cases? Is leaping from one of the Twin Tower's burning top floors 'suicide'? Incompatible answers to these questions call for the aid of conceptual logic.

Subsumption

Symbolize the [Subsume] functor as [/].

A concept may subsume one or more as [/] concepts in a transitive series. Conceptual subsumption differs from the transitive extensional concept of class and set *inclusion*. Interpret /A carrot is a root vegetable/ as a subsumptive *proposition*, $\text{^[Subsume] carrot [under] root vegetable^}$, a coherent proposition. Interpret $\text{^All dogs are brown^}$ as a sooth proposition; it bestows its coherence on the *statement* $\text{<[Sooth] dogs brown>}$, which is rendered as $\text{<All dogs are included in brown dogs>}$ in extensional logic. Earlier, logical habits would have led many philosophers to claim a priori truth for the 'carrot' 'statement' and a posterior truth or falsity for the brown-dog statement. Both were and are wrong. By introducing propositions and their coherence value, I correct this error. We may abandon the epistemological distinction between a priori and a posteriori truths by abandoning the alethic [Necessary] for the leutic [Enjoined to] and [Possible] for [Allowed to]. We may also abandon [Impossible] for [Enjoined not to]/[Not Allowed to].

Replace necessary statements with coherent propositions whose copulas are leutically enjoined.

Replace possible statements with coherent propositions whose copulas are leutically allowed.

Only one of allowed contradictory sooth statements, <[Sooth] S P> and <[Sooth] S ~P>, may be true; likewise for false; however, both are allowed coherent.

Frege’s “falling under a concept” stiffened logicians’ decision to use \wedge (class/set) inclusion \wedge injudiciously. “I say that something belongs to a class when it falls under the concept whose extension this class is.”⁴⁴ Frege’s “falling under a concept” is close to what I’ve called emplacement, [E...E], a sub-type of conceptual subsumption. But his “it” covers only ‘objects’, not tropes; for him, it’s “senseless” to say a trope falls under a property concept. If he’d enriched his logic conceptually, his original intention, rather than handcuffing himself to Plato and his numbers, and to Boolean extensions, he could have dodged Russell’s Paradox bullet: the class of all classes that includes itself. Frege overreached conceptual limitations in his zeal to confer on them unshackled power to create his beloved extensions.

Note, however, that Frege did distinguish between the “subordination of a concept under a concept from that of an individual (object) falling under a concept.”⁴⁵ He noted in “On Concept and Object” that “we might perhaps say: An object falls *under* a first-level concept; a concept falls *within* a second-level concept”⁴⁶

I would have counselled Frege if I knew then what I know now and lived then rather than now and knew him, as I might not have, to choose [within] over [*under*]. By doing that he’d have saved us his mischievous diruption of *Bedeutung* und *Sinn*. \wedge Truth \wedge and \wedge extension \wedge seduced an unholy number of logicians overly obsequious to the sirens of logistic and platonic exigencies for mathematical foundations in their “quest for certainty”.

\wedge [Subsume, /] Colored scarlet \wedge is coherent; so is \wedge [~/] red puce \wedge , because \wedge [/] red puce \wedge is incoherent. [/] has the leutic modality [Enjoined to], [~/] of [Enjoined *not* to]: You’re [Enjoined not to subsume] \wedge puce \wedge under \wedge red \wedge . These leutic modals replace the alethic modals, where we shouldn’t interpret

“Scarlet *has to be* a red” as <*Necessary* that scarlet is a red>,

but as

\wedge [*Enjoined to* subsume] red scarlet \wedge ;

and where we shouldn’t interpret “Puce *can’t be* a red” as *impossible* that puce is a red>, but as [*Enjoined not to* subsume] red puce \wedge . The indefinite article “a”, the cousin of [Any], in these sentences steers us toward treating the copula in these sentences and statements as subsumption advisories.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ G. Frege, *Grungesetze der Arithmetik*, Vol. II, quoted from *The Frege Reader*, Ed. Michael Beaney, p. 280, Trans. Peter Geach: Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1997.


⁴⁵ Beaney, “Letter to Marty, 29.8 .1882”, Trans. Hans Kaal, p. 81. Frege’s [subordination] is perhaps similar to my [Subsumption]. Beaney, p. 189; Trans. Peter Geach.

⁴⁶ Beaney, p.189, Trans. Peter Geach

⁴⁷ Notice the difference in the subsumption order here-- \wedge Colored \wedge before \wedge scarlet \wedge --from earlier where I supplemented [Subsume] with [under] and wrote the concepts in the reverse order, \wedge [Subsume] scarlet [under] red \wedge . My ordering hence-


In a world without language, there are no functors nor their leutic modalities, hence, no coherence values. There can be no modalities about paths between color concepts, for example. Only when languages and the coherence value of their propositions become constructed world items can we celebrate hypothetical, leutic lexical modalities and parallel categorical, kantian moral modalities.

A concept may subsume branching pathways of *concepts* as in this partial noun pyramid, which **must not** be read as a series of class inclusions! Please?



Concepts on branching pathways are incompatible as $\wedge\text{swine}\wedge$ and $\wedge\text{bird}\wedge$ are; concepts within braces are a **range** and they are incompatible with each other as $\wedge\text{finch}\wedge$ and $\wedge\text{thrush}\wedge$ are; each concept in each pathway is incompatible with any concept in another pathway as $\wedge\text{swine}\wedge$ and $\wedge\text{finch}\wedge$ are. I explain this further in the next section.

Noun concepts subsume nouns but not property concepts and vice versa. $\wedge[\text{Subsume}] \text{bird} \text{canary}\wedge$ is coherent but $\wedge[\text{Subsume}] \text{bird} \text{yellow}\wedge$ is not. Subsumed concepts, $\wedge\text{red}\wedge$ and $\wedge\text{green}\wedge$, may also subsume sub-branching pathways, as in this partial property pyramid.



Logicians should stop interpreting “All canaries are animals” as the *statement* $\langle\text{The class of canaries is included in the class of animals}\rangle$. This is a deeply serious misreading of that copula. The correct reading of that sentence is the *proposition* $\wedge[\text{Subsumption}] \text{animal} \text{canary}\wedge$. It should be evaluated for its *coherence* rather than its truth value. If this [Subsumption, /] interpretation is widely honored, then, according to the Lexical Imperative (p. 16), you, too, should honor it, if you wish to understand “All canaries are animals” as others do and if you wish to be understood as others understand it. Its leutic do--in conjunction with adopting the same other lexical advisories your linguistic kin do.

forth, when I eschew [under], will put the subsuming concept first and the subsumed concept second, as in $\wedge[\text{Subsume}] \text{red} \text{scarlet}\wedge$ to match our normal English order $\langle\wedge\text{Red}\wedge$ subsumes $\wedge\text{scarlet}\wedge\rangle$.

What I've pointed out about <All canaries are birds> does not, of course, apply to <All canaries are flighty>. The /are/ in /are birds/ is properly interpreted as [Subsume]—Every canary is *a* bird—whilst the /are/ in /are flighty/ should be interpreted as [Sooth]. I say soothed because ^canary^ isn't bonded to ^flighty; that's why ^[:] ^my canary is ~flighty^ is coherent. The /are/ in /All canaries are yellow/ may have a [Bond] interpretation, ^[Bond] canary yellow^ to distinguish canaries from other finches.

Emplace

Symbolize the [Emplace] functor in its full form as [E...E] @ /.../.

It's the lowest level of subsumption. EheelE indicates a heel, say, Achilles' heel. We may emplace Achilles' heel, a substantive, into a sentence's noun place, and one of its property tropes, mortal vulnerability, into its verb/adjective place:

^Eachille's-heelE @ /Achilles heel/ & E(achille's-heel)vulnerableE @ /vulnerable/.

Achille's heel tragically carries the trope, mortal vulnerability, wherever he goes. I discuss emplacement further where I explain the de facto verification of *sooth* statements. It retires the functor [Refer to] from the philosophical lexicon to a home for sclerotics.

The extension/intension and meaning/reference dualisms disappear with the introduction of this advisory, despite Quine's stricture: "When the cleavage between meaning and reference is properly heeded, the problems of what is loosely called semantics become separated into two provinces so fundamentally distinct as not to deserve a joint appellation at all".⁴⁸ There is, however, a "joint appellation" and it's called "coherence semantics". Emplacement/reference is evaluated as coherent or incoherent, just as propositions/interpretations of sentences are.

[Emplace] is a ground-zero species of [Subsume]. An emplaced object is subsumed by a noun concept, a trope is subsumed by a property concept. /The mudpie is hard/ is a sooth sentence into whose space occupied by the noun token we may coherently *physically emplace* a mudpie—EmudpieE @ /mudpie/--and into whose predicate adjective token we may coherently *physically emplace* a mudpie's trope—E(mudpie) hardE @ /hard /; the mudpie carries it's trope, EhardE, into /hard/. Our emplacement activities equip ^mudpie^ to subsume EmudpieE, and ^hard^ to subsume mudpie's EhardE trope, *making the fact* that entitles us to claim <The mud-pie is hard> is true. Such facts constructed by emplacements of objects and tropes into sentences' subjects and predicates should not be confused with 'states of affairs'; the latter take up unbidden residence in our perceptual manifold out of which we sort objects and tropes. Because objects are deemed suitable for coherent emplacement in sentences' noun tokens and

⁴⁸ W.V.O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, "Notes on the Theory of Reference", p. 130: Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1953.

tropes are deemed suitable for coherent emplacement in sentences' adjective tokens, we *make facts* when the objects and tropes are coherently emplaced in the lexical structure of sentence tokens, Voila! Les faits.

Incompatible--Contrast & Counter

The [Incompatible] functor is symbolized as [!].

We use conceptual negation, [Not, ~], to create incompatible concepts and propositions. It has two sub-advisories, [**Contrast**] for contrary concepts and [**Counter**] for contradictory concepts.

We **counter** \sim snide \wedge with \wedge snide \wedge and vice versa, which makes a concept and its negation incompatible: \wedge [!] snide \sim snide \wedge . We **contrast** \wedge boat \wedge and \wedge car, \wedge [!] Boat car \wedge . They're contrary concepts, because both are subsumed by \wedge vehicle \wedge as are other means of our transportation: \wedge [/] vehicle boat \wedge , \wedge [/] vehicle car \wedge , \wedge [/] vehicle train \wedge . \wedge \sim Boat \wedge subsumes all the contraries of \wedge boat \wedge amongst which are \wedge car \wedge and \wedge train \wedge . I call concepts **adjacent** if they're immediately subsumed by the same concept.⁴⁹ I call the immediately subsumed concepts a **range**. I use braces, {...}, around a range as I did in my subsumption examples above. \wedge Car \wedge , \wedge boat \wedge , \wedge train \wedge are in the range \wedge {car boat train} \wedge subsumed by \wedge vehicle \wedge . These noun range concepts are incompatible because they're bonded to incompatible trope concepts, respectively, \wedge travels-on-roads \wedge , \wedge travels-on-water \wedge , \wedge travels-on-rails \wedge .

[Bond, :] car travels-on-roads
 [Bond, :] boat travels-on-water
 [!] travels-on-roads travels-on-water

[!] car boat

This inference shows that the incompatibility of property concepts dictates the incompatibility of nouns. Noun concepts bonded to incompatible trope concepts are also incompatible; nouns inherit their bonded tropes conceptual relations, as the conclusion of the above inference shows.

Frege championed the "unsaturated" function/predicate as the dominant factor in statements; it's a metaphorical version of the predicate adjectives' primacy over nouns' conceptual relations as limned in the above inference. I'd say Frege's central 'discovery' was the forced parallelism between mathematical functions and sooth sentences' predi-

⁴⁹ *Adjacent* subsumed concepts are immediately subsumed, because they have no intermediary subsuming concepts between them and their subsuming concept; they are the first concepts we encounter on a subsumption pathway under a subsuming concept. The concepts in the range \wedge {car boat train ...} \wedge are *adjacently* subsumed by \wedge vehicle \wedge . \wedge Adjacent \wedge concepts hints at incompatible \wedge remote \wedge concepts, a hint to be taken seriously. Distinguishing between is important but I won't expatiate on that in this essay.

cates, which drove his philosophical/logical/mathematical endeavor. Both predicates and functions delivered his sought extensions, the first in messy natural languages, the second in an ideal, constructed language.

* * * *

Propositions, too, are contrary or contradictory, depending on whether their predicates are contraries or contradictions.

$\wedge [/]$ Scarlet heather \wedge is incoherent, because \wedge red \wedge and \wedge heather \wedge are on incompatible subsumption pathways, subsumed, respectively, by the contrary incompatible \wedge red \wedge and \wedge green \wedge . \wedge Green \wedge is incompatible with \wedge red \wedge , because (i) $\wedge \sim$ red \wedge subsumes \wedge green \wedge in its range of contrary subsumed concepts, $\wedge \{ \textit{green yellow purple ...} \} \wedge$, and because (ii) the $\wedge \sim$ red \wedge concepts in a range bear the mark of Cain by inheriting its incompatibility with [red]. Each concept in a range is incompatible with any other one in the range; the concepts in $\wedge \{ \textit{green yellow purple ...} \} \wedge$ are contraries: $\wedge [!]$ green yellow \wedge , $\wedge [!]$ green purple \wedge . {Live \sim alive/dead} is a contradictory range, because neither of those concepts subsumes any concept as $\wedge \sim$ red \wedge does. Contradictory concepts are subsumption dead-ends. Even if the old trapper staggered in half dead, he's still alive. The above valid conceptual inference can be rewritten in a more obvious inference form:

$[!]$ red \sim red
 $[/]$ \sim red {green yellow purple ...}

$[!]$ red green

Each concept in a range may or may not subsume other concepts; \wedge green \wedge subsumes \wedge heather \wedge and \wedge emerald \wedge ; $\wedge \sim$ alive \wedge subsumes none. Any concept on separate pathways subsumed by incompatible concepts are incompatible with any of the other's, as \wedge heather \wedge on \wedge green \wedge 's pathway is incompatible with \wedge crimson \wedge on \wedge red \wedge 's pathway.

$[/]$ P1 P2 or $[/]$ P2 P1 P1 subsumes P2 or P2 subsumes P1 entails. they're not incompatible.

$[\sim !]$ P1 P2 You may read $[\sim !]$ as [Compatible], because of double negation. $[\sim \textit{in-compatible}] \{ -- \}$ [compatible]. This inference is equivalent to the following one.

$[\sim \sim !]$ P1 P2

$[\sim /]$ P1 P2 and $[\sim /]$ P2 P1

If we transpose the above argument by exchanging the premise and the conclusion, we get this argument. By double negation, the premise becomes $[!]$ P1 P2. Incompatible property concepts entails that neither subsumes the other.

Per the second argument, substantive concepts in branching pathways are incompatible; $\wedge[!] \text{ pig bird}^\wedge$ is incompatible. But you knew that because you know the scorn conveyed by $\langle \text{Sure, and pigs can fly!} \rangle$.

$\langle \text{Harshness can't be gentleness} \rangle$ should not be interpreted as a necessarily true statement about these character traits. Rather, it should be interpreted as $\wedge[!] \text{ harsh gentle}^\wedge$, because $\wedge[!] \text{ harsh } \sim \text{harsh}^\wedge$ and because $\wedge[/] \sim \text{harsh} \{ \text{gentle lenient kind } \dots \}^\wedge$.

$[!] \text{ harsh } \sim \text{harsh}$ Negation produces incompatibility.

$[/] \sim \text{harsh} \{ \text{gentle lenient kind } \dots \}$ A subsumed range of contraries.

$[!] \text{ harsh gentle}$

$[!] \text{ harsh lenient}$

$[!] \text{ harsh kind}$

Inherited incompatibility of $\wedge \text{harsh}^\wedge$ with $\wedge \sim \text{harsh}^\wedge$'s subsumed range of concepts.

Identify

Symbolize the [**Identify**] functor as [=].

This advisory's pretenders are tortured by so many errors that I cringe at bringing it up. But that's as unavoidable as its classic accounts' ablation is. Although I symbolize the [**Identify**] conceptual advisory as [=], I know of no preceding uses of this symbol that resemble mine. There can be no characterization of concepts' identity without conceptual logic, and I know of but one related conceptual logic precursor, Johann Andreas Segner (1704 – 1777), who constructed an 'intensional' syllogistic.⁵⁰ W. E. Johnson's $\wedge \text{determinable}^\wedge$ and $\wedge \text{determinate}^\wedge$ come close to my view, because he explicitly distinguishes the logic of "adjectives"'s conceptual divisions from "substantive"'s sub-class divisions.⁵¹

It's important to keep in mind that the [=] advisory in conceptual logic applies to *concepts*, not to stars, Kings of France, the number of planets in our solar system, et cetera, except when these figure as emplacements. Any token of a type that has a place in lexical space is a concept: A token + its lexical relations is a concept. If two tokens of a type are in different places, each is a different concept. When Belle knows a token's location in lexical space, she possesses a concept. Any two or more tokens, whether of the same or different type, may be assigned to that same place if they have the same coherent advisories/relations to other tokens in a lexical space. A document from the Great State of California 's Franchise Tax Board notes that a 2000 legislative act "eliminates the term and concept of 'income year'" from the Personal Income Tax Law. How gratifying that the Tax Board director shares my nominalist view of concepts. Yet ident-

⁵⁰ Segner, *Specimen Logicae Universaliter Demonstratae* (with Appendices: Two Dissertations de Syllogismo), edited by Mirella Capozzi, who also supplies a brilliant, long, CLXXII page introduction; Bologna: Editrice CLUEB, 1988.

⁵¹ See his *Logic*, Part I, Chapter XI, The Determinable, pp. 173-185; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1921.

ity of concepts and such other of the world's furniture as you may conceive do share this: [Identify] for all of them is a **count one** advisory.

Identity is not a reflexive relation between an entity and itself; it's incoherent to think of ONE thing in a TWO-place relation. The emplacements into two terms of a relational sentence must be diverse to preserve the difference between one- and two+-place predicates. If \wedge reflexive \wedge and \wedge relation \wedge were compatible, there would be no difference between one- and two+-place predicates. It's the count of the emplacements in the terms of a sentence with the [=] functor, not the number of terms, that cleaves [=] from \wedge relation \wedge . \wedge [Bond] relation 2-emplacements \wedge : If the emplacements into the terms of relational sentences aren't diverse, the predicate isn't a coherent relation: \wedge [\sim =] one two \wedge . Emplacements into relational sentences may be substantives (Larry and Marge are married) or tropes (Yellow is brighter than blue).

Of course, we may have a token sentence that has TWO different names, /Samuel Clemens = Mark Twain/; these diverse names make [=] interesting, useful, and surprising, as Frege pointed out. "John Smith is John Smith" can be interesting, because this widely shared name probably has several diverse coherent emplacements. To avoid equivocation in inferences, the [Identify, =] copula enjoins us to emplace ONE and the SAME person into its two terms if both occur in an inference.

\wedge [Identify, =, count one] Esamuel clemensE @ /Samuel Clemens/ &
Esamuel clemensE @ /Mark Twain/ \wedge

This proposition is coherent if and only if the coherent emplacements into /Mark Twain/ and /Samuel Clemens/ is ONE and the SAME person. He's not relationally identical to himself; there isn't Mark Twain and another himself; he's but **ONE** self. Interpret "numerical identity" as \wedge count of one \wedge , or as \wedge ONE and the SAME \wedge . What's the count of the emplacements into /Franklin X. Wilberforce is Franklin X. Wilberforce/ on its occasion of use? Distinctions have to be made and, perhaps, information assembled before you can answer that question, but at least "What's the count of" points you in the right direction. Is there more than one person who may be coherently emplaced into these /Franklin X. Wildberforce/s? Only one? Does Jenny emplace the same person into both of them as you do?

The method of counting concepts is wholly different from counting kings, stars, and planets, because concepts are not physically emplaceable *simpliciter* as kings and other physical objects are. Tokens are emplaceable as any other physical objects are, but they transmute into concepts only when emplaced in a conceptual/lexical space of tokens structured by conceptual functors. Hence, they can be counted only with the aid of conceptual logic, whose functors engender lexical structures.

I'm sorry, but I have to leave you hanging here as this is not the place to provide enough of that logic for you to know how to make conceptual identifications; I bequeath


you the these generic notions: Each concept/token has but one place in lexical space, located by determining a token’s coherent advisory routes to other tokens. Just call it conceptual or lexical space travel, and wait for the next installment, please. I do, however, provide some basic conceptual inference patterns after this section and will supply a précis of conceptual logic after “Your Appendix, Tom”, hopefully before 2007 sinks in dark water.

Bond

Symbolize the [**Bond**] functor as [:].

You met [**Bond**] earlier, in the elaborate conceptual fox-trot to the music of “Stipulated Bonding, ‘tween ^Water^ and ^H₂O^”.

So far, I’ve discussed conceptual advisories of how to combine substantive concepts (SS) with each other and property concepts (PP) with each other. With bonding I turn to consider advisories about combining substantive and property concepts (SP) in sentential combinations.



^[Bond, :] vehicle transports^, ^[Bond, :] train via rail^, and so forth.

This substantive/property travel obtains also for the [**Conger**], [**Link**] and [**Sooth**] advisories. The [**Link**] advisory, like John the Baptist, goeth “before” [**Sooth**]. These substantive/property conceptual advisories go beyond what I’ve seen in expert systems and of what has become known as “ontology” with their predominant subsumption tree structures. The lexical picture becomes much more complicated, interesting, useful, and powerful with these four (SP) conceptual logic advisories. I use them to connect substantive and property conceptual structures to each other in the above four different ways and with two different leutic modalities, [Enjoin] for [Bond], [Conger], and [Link] versus [Allowed] for [Sooth].

Our de dicto knowledge makes us wonder about the lexical system of someone who says “Bogs are dry land” if we interpret it as the proposition ^[Bond] bog dry-land^. Since ^dry^ and ^wet^ are incompatible, ^[!] dry wet^, and since ^[Bond] bog wet-land^ is an enjoined advisory, these premises render ^[Bond] bog dry-land^ incoherent. This inference may be written more perspicuously as,

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| [!] dry ~dry/wet | ^Wet^ and ^dry^ are incompatible trope concepts. |
| [:] bog wet-land | You’re enjoined to bond ^bog^ to ^wet^. |
| [~:] bog dry & wet | You’re enjoined not to bond bog to incompatible property concepts. |



Link

Symbolize the [Link] functor as [*].

[Link] is an advisory for traveling from a substantive concept to an enjoined *range* of property concepts, each of which may be coherently *soothed* of the substantive concept, *provided* the substantive concept is *not* bonded to one of the concepts in the range. $\wedge[:]$ Glass brittle \wedge --} $\wedge[\sim.]$ glass {rubbery unbreakable ...} \wedge . This proviso is explained and illustrated further in the Sooth section below. I introduced \wedge range \wedge in the discussion of the [Incompatible, !] functor above. A **range** consists of concepts each of which is immediately subsumed by the same concept; \wedge immediate \wedge ranges have no intermediate subsuming concept between them and their subsuming concept.

All concepts in a range are at the same level on a subsumption pathway. \wedge {Fast slow} \wedge is such a range, because \wedge moves \wedge immediately subsumes \wedge {fast slow} \wedge . Each of this range's concepts is on the same level. None are subsumed by an intervening concept between \wedge moves \wedge and them. \wedge Fast \wedge , in turn, immediately subsumes \wedge swift \wedge and \wedge fleet \wedge as \wedge slow \wedge immediately subsumes \wedge sluggish \wedge and \wedge slothful \wedge ; so, \wedge fast \wedge and \wedge slow \wedge are intermediate concepts between \wedge moves \wedge and \wedge swift \wedge and \wedge sluggish \wedge , the latter aren't immediately subsumed by \wedge moves \wedge ; they're one level below. Further, because \wedge swift \wedge and \wedge sluggish \wedge are on branching subsumptive pathways, they're incompatible as \wedge fast \wedge and \wedge slow \wedge are. So, \wedge [!] Slow fast \wedge entails \wedge [Link, *] snail {slow sluggish} \wedge is not incoherent, but \wedge [Link] snail {fast swift} \wedge is.

\wedge [Link, *] Vehicle {fast slow} \wedge is a coherent link proposition. \wedge [*] Vehicle {slogging trudging dawdling} \wedge is of questionable coherence, because they're de dicto property concepts in a range normally linked to \wedge animal \wedge rather than to machines: \wedge [/] animal snail \wedge and \wedge [~/] animal vehicle \wedge ; \wedge [!] animal vehicle \wedge .

[Link, *) is important because it's a bridge between the enjoined advisories discussed above, especially between [Bond] and [Subsumes] on one hand, and the allowed [Sooth] advisory on the other. [Link] functors draw boundaries of coherent 'factual', sooth predications.

In his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein was looking for a functor that performs as [Link] does, but didn't isolate it, because he relied exclusively on Russell's extensional logic.⁵² He came close: "'Bring me sugar', and 'Bring me milk' make sense, but not the combination 'Milk me sugar'". (*Grammar*, p. 189) The latter "'combination of words makes no sense' and excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language" (p. 189). Wittgenstein writes, "For us a language is a calculus; it is character-

⁵² See paragraphs 136, 137, Part I, "The Proposition, and its Sense", *Philosophical Grammar*, Ed. Rush Rhees, [Trans.] Anthony Kenny; Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.

ized by *linguistic activities*” (*Grammar*, p. 193, his emphases). This is his prelude to language in “use”, the central term of his *Philosophical Investigations*, an almost uselessly vague term. It becomes useful if you think of it as my *via activa* in lexical space as woven into our daily emplacements. Language investigations don’t start with a theory of concepts or ‘meaning’. Catch language on the fly (use) comes before inspecting mounted specimens.

Here’s a valid derivation of a coherent link proposition:

[Bond, :] vehicle moves
 [/] moves {fast slowly smoothly ...}

[Link, *] vehicle {fast slow smoothly ...}

Enjoined [Bond] and [Link] premises, like these, yield a rich harvest of linked ranges, which in turn yield serried ranks of coherent sooth propositions. Each property predicate of a linked range may be sooth-predicated of the subject noun concept to which it’s linked, *unless* the subject concept is bonded to one of the predicate concepts in a range. In the example, ^fast^, ^slowly^, and ^smoothly^ may be coherently soothed of ^vehicle^. This is why we can coherently say a vehicle is fast, slow, and so forth.

Here is an inference whose third premise is an example of the above limiting-bondage proviso that renders sooth propositions using this range’s other concepts incoherent:

[Sooth, .] Train moves
 [Subsume, /] moves {on rails on water on roads ...}
 [Bond, :] train (moves) on rails^

[~Sooth, .] train(moves) on water, on roads, in air...;

These propositional premises with their functors, are so *de dicto* and *de facto* socked in that the conclusion, ^[~Sooth] train(moves) on water^ eludes serious challenge. The [Incompatibility, !] of the concepts in the second premise’s range, ^moves on rails^/^on water^/^on roads^/^in air^ have become firmly esconced in our lexical habits.

Also, each substantive concept in the range subsumed by ^vehicle^, {boat car train ...} is coherently soothable to every property concept in the {fast slowly smoothly} range, because they’re subsumed by ^moves^. This is why we can coherently say a boat, car, or train is fast, slow, smooth, fleet (except for the East German Trabi), *vitesse de pointe*. Ludwig, with a little conceptual logic, you could’a explained why some “combinations” make “sense” and others do not, why we ‘can’ coherently sooth/say some statements and ‘cannot’ coherently sooth/say others. R.I.P. It is done.

I reserve further discussion of [Link, *] until I introduce the [Sooth] advisory. Coming right up, Fanebius.

Sooth

Symbolize the [**Sooth**] functor as [·].

I use [**Sooth**] because such Old English usages as “Forsooth, Sire”, “In sooth, my Lady” were early surrogates for [^]truly[^] and [^]in truth[^], and because newly discovered true [**Sooth**] statements may ‘smooth’ the entry of altered coherence structures into lexical space. The discovery <This liquid’s composition is H₂O> led natural philosophers to a new advisory, namely, [^][Bond, :] this-liquid H₂O[^], which moved [^]water[^] and water to places in lexical space different from those that [^]translucent...[^] had enjoined. Everyone had called ‘this-liquid’ “water”; so, our chemist hero, baptized it with same name. His [**Sooth**] discovery and new [**Bond**] stipulation integrated with chemistry’s increasingly richer conceptual structure inclined him to stipulate, de jure, this new bond of [^]water[^] to [^]H₂O[^]. He thereby deliberately altered lexical space, specifying different coherent pathways than were there before: Out with [^]translucent[^] in with [^]H₂O[^]. The hold of the old pathways lingered on but was gradually relegated to ‘Archaic’ by the conoscenti.

The leutic modal for [**Sooth**] propositions is [**Allowed to**]; [^][·] rose red[^], [^][·] rose blue[^], [^][·] rose white[^] are coherent; you’re allowed to travel coherently from [^]rose[^] to [^]red[^], to [^]blue[^], to [^]white[^], ..., because [^][:] rose[^] [^]colored[^] and [^][/] colored {red blue white}[^]. Coherent sooth propositions allow us to hazard various coherent statements: <This rose is red>, <All those roses are blue>, <Some roses are white>. Sooth propositions’ *leutic* modal [**Allowed to**] supplants the *alethic* modal [**Possible**], because [**Possible**] derives from [**Allowed to**]. So, we may dismiss [**Possible**] in favor of [**Allowed to**].

Contrast those coherent allowed sooths with [^][·] ruby(jewel) blue[^], which is incoherent, although both [^]red[^] and [^]blue[^] are in the range subsumed by [^]colored[^]. It’s incoherent, because [^]ruby(jewel)[^] is *bonded* to [^]red[^]. This blocks the coherence of [^][·] ruby(jewel) blue[^] (and other soothed [^]~red[^] concepts), because [^]blue[^] is incompatible with [^]red[^].

[!] red blue Symbolizes “Red is not a blue”.

[:] ruby(jewel) red This is a [**Bond**] enjoinder.

[~·] ruby(jewel) blue You’re *not allowed* to sooth [^]ruby(jewel)[^] and blue[^]; that is, you’re enjoined *not* to sooth them.

We’re also not allowed to sooth [^]ruby(jewel)[^] to [^]green[^], [^][~·] ruby(jewel) green[^], nor to any of [^]green[^]’s subsumed concepts ([^]emerald[^]...). This is another example of the bond proviso illustrated above by the incoherence of [^][·] train moves-on-water[^].⁵³ The first premise establishes the incompatibility of [^]red[^] and [^]blue/~red[^], the second bonds [^]ruby(jewel) to [^]red[^]; hence, [^]blue[^], and its subsumed concepts--[^]sky[^], [^]cerulean[^]--are not coherently soothable of [^]ruby(jewel)[^], which is the conclusion of this inference. [^]Hat[^], unlike [^]ruby(jewel)[^], is not bonded to any concept in the color concept range.

That's why it's coherent to sooth ^{hat} to any color concept in the ^{colored} range. Ludwig, if only you were here now!⁵³

Here's a cautionary note. ^{[Sooth] bog dry} may be coherent depending on what is emplaced in /bog/. Its coherence would benefit from geological change if the coherent emplacement for /bog/ is the pre-dry bog. An earthly depression may have been a bog but no longer is once it's dried up. However, the truth of the time-ruptured ^{<[Sooth] bog dry>} does not make ^{[:] bog wet} incoherent. Rather, this bonding assures us this depression is no longer a bog. This example shows we need not introduce tense into this version of conceptual logic. Sentences may be tensed and their occasions of use may be dated, which counsels us to attend to context when we interpret sentences, such as "This *former* bog is dry", one of whose interpretations may be the untensed ^{[.] (this)~bog dry}. This context counsel is justly cited so often that my explanation of how we incorporate tense into conceptual logic should be banal enough to satisfy friendly philosophers and linguists. Context is a factor in interpretation; with it, we can do enough to make a tensed conceptual logic unnecessary. The dated geological change and our present-time interpretation help us select the coherent emplacement for /bog/. The date of emplacement needn't date the concept ^{bog}. The unheard, sweet-context refrain may have seduced Plato and Frege to embrace the Siren of timeless Forms and concepts, but not me.

* * * *

The moral here is: Lexical de dicto space enjoinedments reign over [Sooth] predications *unless* we have true sooth statements verified by coherent subject and predicate emplacements into the sooth sentence that are conceptually incompatible with enjoined de dicto advisories. Emplacement coherence trumps enjoined coherence.

Recent true sooth statements undid some old bondings. New paleontological discoveries in China encourage those who claim that birds had their origin in dinosaurs. Clear imprints in earthly repositories of forearm feathers and large breastbones needed for attached flight muscles, plus a bevy of features typical of unfeathered dinosaurs provide evidence that ^{<These are imprints of bird/dinosaurs>} is *true*. The lineage may have split off later, but the creatures whose imprints these are were a bridge between dinosaurs and our present-day birds. So it is claimed and so it is disputed. Further, a recent DNA discovery shows chickens may have descended from Tryannosaurus Rex.

Suppose it is true. This would change the enjoined subsumption advisories held before the discovery of these feathered creatures' remains. Once upon a time, ^{[!] dinosaur bird} was coherent, because these concepts were incompatible; now, they're not,

⁵⁴ This inference pattern shows that alethic and leutic modals are not identical, at least not to C. I. Lewis's S5, in which ^{<[Necessary] p entails p>}. In conceptual logic, ^{[Enjoined] p} does not entail ^{[Allowed] p}.

because $\wedge [/] \text{ dinosaur bird}^\wedge$ is coherent under this discovered supposition, and because the concept, $\wedge \text{ dinosaur}^\wedge$, and any of its subsumed concepts, such as $\wedge \text{ bird}^\wedge$, are compatible, $[\sim !]$. The following, similarly formed inference, shows its validity:

$[/] \text{ vehicle automobile}$	A coherent subsumption similar to
	$[/] \text{ dinosaur bird}$.

$[\sim !] \text{ vehicle automobile}$. Similar to $[\sim !] \text{ dinosaur bird}$.

DNA discoveries, under proper assumptions, are forcing a lot of conceptual changes in classifications and the dynamics of evolution. Notice, however, that the coherence of $\wedge [\sim !] \text{ dinosaur bird}^\wedge$ depends on some stable bondings, for example, $\wedge [:] \text{ bird feathered}^\wedge$ and an enormous number of bondings of property concepts to $\wedge \text{ dinosaur}^\wedge$ and $\wedge \text{ bird}^\wedge$ that enable paleontologists to identify imprints as those of dinosaurs including $\wedge \text{ four-legged}^\wedge$. A substantive concept may be soothed coherently to multiple property concepts that are conceptually incompatible. I expand on this apparently incoherent claim in my account of the [Conger] functor in the next section.

What I've just shown is important. True statements invade lexical space and we may decide to erase leutically enjoined coherences and their modals to keep lexical systems open to change, which capsulizes my ruminations on our chemist's stipulated $\wedge \text{ water}^\wedge$. It also limits positivists' simplistic attempt to frame the *whole* of a theory of meaning in terms of verifiability; latter day versions use the vague and undeveloped "truth conditions" theory of meaning, verifiability's first cousin once-removed. You must have ached to ask "How many truth conditions are needed to deliver a meaning for a sentence?", "All?", "Some?", "Which ones?", "How can I determine which ones are enough?", "How can we use truth conditions for *statements* to isolate the meaning of a *word*?" An answer to the last question is crucial for anyone who holds a theory, as many 'truth condition' theorists do, that the meaning of a sentence is composed of its words' meanings—words' meanings first, then sentence's meanings. "How can I specify 'truth conditions' without repeating the sentence whose meaning I'm supposed to be baring?", "How can truth conditions, an extensional gauge, be wholly and always sufficient for determining 'intensional meanings'?", "Have truth-conditions' proponents forgotten that two non-identical intensions may deliver equivalent truths?"

The positivists' verifiability slogan,

If **S** is not verifiable, **S** is not meaningful,
is terminally partial. So is its transposed equivalent,

If **S** is meaningful, it is verifiable.

These formulas apply *only to sooth* statements. All the other binary conceptual advisories occur outside sooth's province; their *via activa* habitat is propositions, which have coherence rather than truth value. *Via passiva* true, correlative sooth statements depend

on the prior coherence of the propositions that are the pre-conditions for statements' truth/falsity.

The slogan of the logical positivists' cousin,

The meaning of S is given by its truth conditions,

is also terminally partial. The existing coherent constellations of tokens in lexical space are background for our linguistically aided cognitive ventures into the natural world. We

go forth loaded with coherent combinations of concepts, a Santa's sackful of 'meanings'. These conceptual constellations alone furnish coherent interpretations of [Sooth] sentences, without which we can't make true statements about the natural world; we crib their 'meanings' from these "starry clusters". This doesn't diminish the major contributions verifiable sooth statements add by enriching and changing these constellations.⁵⁴ The positivists were on to something, just not on to everything. Do most philosophical reform movements exaggerate? Yes.

I propose positivists' exaggeration occurred, despite Hegel's more fertile approach to conceptual change, because of Wittgenstein's atomistic account of truth—atomic/elementary facts and their pictures--under G. E. Moore and Russell's tutelage.⁵⁵ Moore, first, then Russell rebelled against the then-reigning, totalizing Absolute Idealism of the Oxford philosophers, Bradley leading that parade. What's right about these rebels' views, can, I propose, be saved, even by a simple conceptual logic. What's wrong can be left in the museum with such other philosophical debris as innate ideas, intuitions of axioms' truth, 'mental' language ('meaning' as phlogiston), atomic and negative facts, alethically necessary and impossible truths, whether analytic or synthetic, essences, meanings, definitions purportedly expressing words' 'meanings', and I could go on.

Conger

Symbolize the [Conger] functor as [:+].

Congeries of attribute (property) concepts are symbolized as $\wedge[A1...An]$.⁵⁶ A congerie of attributes is shorthand for a conjunction of concepts, $\wedge[A1 \& A2 \& \dots An]$, all of which are bonded to the same substantive concept or its parts, relations, and aspects. In the conger functor symbol, [:+], bonding is shown by [:]; the [+] part shows that

⁵⁴ "Just as we cannot think of spatial objects outside space nor temporal objects outside time, so we cannot think of *any* object outside the possibility of its combining with other things". Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, 2.0121; (trans.) Daniel Kolak; Company; Mountain View, CA, Mayfield Publishing, 1998.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 2.061 "Elementary facts exist independently of one another".

⁵⁶ I don't distinguish between \wedge property \wedge and \wedge attribute \wedge , but it should be understood that I intend them to include \wedge relation/ordering \wedge , so that there are concepts of one-place and one+-place attributes. I use the letter "A" from "Attribute" in congeries with their square brackets to make their symbolism easily distinguishable from link ranges, {P1...Pn}. I do distinguish \wedge quality \wedge from attribute/property \wedge , however, because \wedge quality \wedge is a one-place property concept only, and because qualities are the products of interaction between sensitive creatures and other entities, including such inorganic ones as spectrometers, scales, and cloud chambers.

/ \ / \
 {old young} {robust withered}

The concepts subsumed on one pathway, ^age^, are incompatible with those subsumed on the other, ^physique^, because ^EyoungE @ /withered/^ is an incoherent/~coherent emplacement. You can't verify <My only dog is old^ by emplacing EwitheredE in /old/. Yet both <My only dog is old^ and ^My only dog is withered^ may be true. How is this

possible? This is a serious challenge to conceptual logic, whose roots go back to Parmenides' claim that you can't say what is false, and to Plato's refutation of that claim in the *Sophist*, as well as to Plato's question in his *Republic* (436a-b) "How can a spinning top be both at rest and in motion?", and to his answer to a related question in the *Republic*, "How many parts does our soul have?"

I wrote /*apparently authorize*/ these incompatible sooth predications on the previous page, hinting that I have an answer to "How is it possible to truly sooth incompatible concepts of a single substantive?"

My answer borrows from Plato's answer to his question about the spinning top, which relies on my earlier observation that substantives are complex: They are a manifold of parts, aspects, spatial, temporal, and other relations to other substantives, Congeries' attributes and their subsumed ranges are, upon discriminating observation, predicated of **different parts, relations, aspects, dates, or locations** of a 'single' substantive's **manifold**. The incompatible property concepts aren't soothed of ^my only dog^ *simpliciter* but of distinct features of its manifold. Plato noted that the **axis** of a spinning top is at rest and its **periphery** is in motion in relation to the same surface. Distinguishing these parts of a top provides distinct subjects for sooth statements as in the following statements whose predicates, /at rest/ and /in motion/, have different subjects:

<The *axis* (of one and the same the top) is at rest>

<The *periphery* (of the one and the same top) is in motion>.

The subjects of these statements are features of a substantive's parts-manifold; ^top^ is divided into ^axis^ and ^periphery^. The different subjects of these statements entails the statements are logically independent although their predicates are incompatible. Both may be true, as the following emplacements show:

Etop-axisE @ /axis/ & E(axis)at-restE @ /at rest/,

Etop-peripheryE @ /periphery/ & E(periphery)in-motionE @ /in motion/.

Plato was sensitive also to relations in manifolds' contexts, which yield different subjects for statements. Taking relational predicates as having at least two substantives (subject and object), we may expand <Socrates is short> to <Socrates is shorter than Plato> or to <Socrates is taller than Alcibiades>; although ^shorter than^ and ^taller than^ are incompatible predicates, they may both be true because the height-relation of Socrates' manifold to Plato's differs from that to Alcibiades' manifold. Socrates-Plato

and Socrates-Alcibiades are different substantive pairs; hence, these statements about their relative heights are logically independent, which is why both may be true although ^{^shorter^} and ^{^taller^} are incompatible concepts. Similar instructions in Plato's work apply when the temporal element of manifolds are pertinent; Plato at eight years was shorter than Socrates, at twenty-eight he was taller.

Aspects belong to a substantive's manifold but they're dicier to characterize than the foregoing features, because ^{^aspect^} is an embryonic concept. I'll say just enough to show ^{^aspect^} figures in the explanation of why incompatible aspect concepts may be soothed truly of "one and the same substantive" without giving a full conceptual account of it. If you have a mature or more mature account of ^{^aspect^}, tell me about it.

Aspect features differ from part elements of a substantive's manifold. ^{^Axis^} and ^{^periphery^} parts of a top are distinguished by their location on the top. The odor and color of a cherry are aspects but not parts of it, because color and odor aren't fully distinguished by their different locations on the cherry, but by the energies they emit relative to observers' different sensors, viz., to nasal and visual receptors, respectively. The energy exchange between a cherry and an observer's eyes depend on reflected light, that between a cherry and the olfactory cells on molecules via air. And so it goes with other senses.

These disparate aspects of objects' manifolds extend to 'objective' measurements of them. We use a spectrometer, an object, to measure 'objectively' the wave length of 'colors'. And because we respond to different wave lengths as different perceived colors, we distinguish between subjective and objective, but coordinated, aspects of manifolds, Van Gogh versus but coordinated with a Bosch spectrometer's measured response. The 'subjective' aspect of "He ain't heavy, Father, he's my brother" may diverge from a scale's 'objective' register of his fat brother's 250 pounds. Such divergence qualifies them as disparate but *semi*-coordinated; */semi-/* is my hedge against the embryonic ^{^aspect^}.

These modest reflections on substantives' manifolds shows the fecundity of conceptual incompatibility. The thorough-going incompatibility of concepts forces us to distinguish manifold elements of substantives in order to explain why incompatible predicate concepts don't hinder our entitlement to claim both <[.] My dog is old/P> and <[.] My dog is limpy/~P> are true. By doing so, we rid ourselves of contradictions, such as <My top is at rest and in motion>.

I say incompatibility is */thorough-going/*, because any property concept in lexical space has to be incompatible with any other, except for subsuming-subsumed concepts, in order for them to be distinct. The same holds for substantive concepts, being creatures of

property concepts. Hegel's merit was to recognize the fecundity of concepts incompat-ibility, which he admixed with alethic contradiction, but Marx doesn't always confuse them. He was very impressive with his relational distinction of ^money^ from ^capital^.

^Money^ - Commodity-Money-Commodity, CMC

^Capital^ - Money-Commodity-Money. MCM.

In CMC, money is a medium of exchange; I pay you \$5 for aspirin, for something of use-value to me. In MCM, on the other hand, money is spent for a commodity that will not be used by the buyer but, instead, will be sold to make money the buyer can re-invest to

make more money, MCM+. Money in MCM is capital with which one can grow richer rather than using it to buy aspirin to relieve my headache. These relational differences are features of money vs capital's congeries., ^[!] money capital^.

Hegel's demerit was to overreach by extending Plato's use of substantives' manifolds to cosmic excess with his idealistic reach for a utopian Absolute, so beloved by the Super-Romantic Thomas Carlyle and others with uncurbed imaginations.

We may coherently emplace my dog and his properties into /My dog is old, tired, withered, .../ to make the following statements true and de facto coherent,

<[.] My dog old>
 <[.] My dog tired>
 <[.] My dog withered> ... ,

because the *simpliciter* subject, /My dog/, is modified by different elements of its manifold. Such modifications are probably of de jure origin, as the H₂O chemical elements of water's manifold were. These emplacements,

<My dog's *age* is old> Emy-dogE @ /My dog/ & E(my-dog)oldE @ /(age)old/
 <My dog's *energy-state* is tired> um so weiter @ (energy)/tired/
 <My dog's *physique* is withered> @ (physique)/withered/

modify the *simpliciter* substantive ^dog^, turning it into diverse statement subjects selected from my dog's manifold.

The concepts of manifolds' elements that sit atop elements' subsumption pathways have been called ^categories^—space, time, part, whole, aspect, relation. Lower level changes in their pathways via de facto discoveries boil upwards and force us to change, de jure, by adding, subtracting, and maturing category concepts in lexical space. Morphology and genetics, for example, are maturing jointly. *Panta rei*.

* * * *

We're back to this essay's theme via this brief tour of some conceptual logic: 'Natural kinds' aren't so 'natural'; they're actually de jure kinds, because conceptual innovators find good reasons to change the congeries of a kind--water was the beginning example. <<[.] S P> is true> is a de facto ground for <^[.] S P^ is coherent>.

<<[.] Water H₂O > is true> --} <^[.] Water H₂O ^ is coherent>; de jure stipulation, ^[:+] water H₂O^, supplanted the earlier conger, ^[:+] water [liquid translucent potable...]^ . Thus, ontological categories aren't fixed; they change because of sooth discoveries. Bottom-dwelling emplacements invite us to alter, de jure, conceptual space and to induce the birth of new conceptual relations in it and to alter its sanctioned coherence values. They also invite new categories. The water example invites us to augment sensory with measurable chemical concepts by which we may reconceive its manifold.

With [Conger], we distinguish such kind entities as trout, hamsters, and sealing wax. The conger ^[:+] hamster [pulmonary furry footed burrows]^ distinguishes the ^hamster^ kind from the ^trout^ kind, ^[:+] trout [gilled scaly finned swims ...].

It's tempting to think of ^object/^, ^event^, ^process^, ^soul^..., as substantive categories. I think we should resist this and restrict ^category^ to property concepts, and classify these substantive concepts as *kinds* instead of *categories*, each of which is distinguished by differing congeries. Although I've focused mainly on one-place property concepts, one+-place ^ordering^ attributes, relations are probably more important to our conceptions of nature's substantives and their changes. They had a good start, figuring prominently in Plato's list of manifolds' elements.⁵⁸ We use such ordering concepts as ^number^, ^same^, ^different/other^, ^spatial^, ^temporal^, ^mutable^, and ^structured^ to conceive the diverse congeries of objects, events, and processes.⁵⁹

I'm more tempted to think of concepts located atop property subsumption pathways as categories. Material property categories are up for grabs by physical scientists and philosophers of science. They could improve their scores by using some conceptual logic. For an imaginative account of fresh categories, an extension of Cassirer's emphasis on relations, you could profitably get lost in Whitehead's neglected masterpieces, the pure *Process and Reality* and its poetical version, *Adventures in Ideas*.

Kind Congeries

⁵⁸ The shift to relation from property in conceptual history was presented convincingly and brilliantly by Ernst Cassirer in his *Substance and Function, and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*; Chicago, Open Court, 1923, (Trans.) by William C. Swabey and Marie C. Swabey,. The first part of that book, was published originally as *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* in 1910. It is early but not out of date, especially for ahistorical philosophers. Cassirer was one of the first Continental philosophers to appreciate the pragmatists' recognition of the shift to relations from properties, especially noting John Dewey's contributions to *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). Dewey's essays in that collection were published in *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916), which I consider his best book. Those 1903 essays together with later ones make up the 1916 *Essays*. So far in my conceptual logical studies, property concepts, one-place predicates, have dominated. In other places, I've suggested how to deal with ordering relations, but I can't trumpet many successes so far. Isn't that the excitement and pleasure of philosophy, that in one lifetime we can never finalize our investigations? And isn't it that which keeps us from being bored to death?

Stipulated Kinds 72

The functor $[:+]$ of $^{\wedge}[:+] S [A1 \dots An]^{\wedge}$ is a kind congruency advisory, where $^{\wedge}[A1 \dots An]^{\wedge}$ is a range of disparate **attribute/property** concepts each of which is bonded to $^{\wedge}S^{\wedge}$. They complicitly license $^{\wedge}S^{\wedge}$ as a **kind entity**.

Each attribute in a kind congruency is either a category concept or is subsumed by one. Thus, most concepts in a kind congruency are at a lower subsumption level than its subsuming category concept. The dates of $^{\wedge}\text{Big Bang}^{\wedge}$ and $^{\wedge}\text{assassination of Caesar}^{\wedge}$ are at a level below $^{\wedge}\text{temporal}^{\wedge}$'s, as $^{\wedge}\text{Greenwich}^{\wedge}$ and $^{\wedge}\text{North Pole}^{\wedge}$ are below $^{\wedge}\text{spatial}^{\wedge}$.

Properties coherently soothed of substantives, ordinarily said to be predicable of them, aren't congruency concepts, because sooth attribute concepts are *not bonded* to substantive concepts.

It would be easy to confuse kind with sooth attributes. You might unknowingly do so upon reading what Keith Remhart wrote, "Americans are widely viewed as arrogant, loud, ignorant of other cultures and self-absorbed", which he thinks are reasons why people from other countries are buying less of our exports than before (Oct. 14, 2005, ?). These soothed attributes are not included in $^{\wedge}\text{American}^{\wedge}$'s congruency. Remhart's kind congruency of $^{\wedge}\text{American}^{\wedge}$ includes the bonded $^{\wedge}\text{United States citizen}^{\wedge}$, $^{\wedge}\text{born}^{\wedge}$ or $^{\wedge}\text{naturalized}^{\wedge}$, or $^{\wedge}\text{long-time resident}^{\wedge}$, the latter a vague conceptual stretch, but probably apt for many cases. Remhart's attributes, $^{\wedge}\text{arrogant}^{\wedge}$, $^{\wedge}\text{loud}^{\wedge}$, ... are soothed, not bonded to $^{\wedge}\text{American}^{\wedge}$. They do not specify $^{\wedge}\text{American}^{\wedge}$ as a kind but trade on its kind congruency to describe some US citizens.

Yes, all this does bear on stipulated substantive concepts, not only on stipulated H_2O $^{\wedge}\text{water}^{\wedge}$ but all others. Lexical space is constructed, not given. By now, I'm sure you're grateful that with coherence logic you can't avoid making stipulative de jure decisions to conceive kinds of substantives.

Traditional ontologists have used property category concepts to distinguish distinct *kinds* of top-dog substantives, such as mind and matter. Descartes used the $^{\wedge}[\text{extended } \sim\text{thinking}]^{\wedge}$ congruency versus $^{\wedge}[\sim\text{extended thinking}]^{\wedge}$ to distinguish material from mental substance.⁵⁹ Traditional alethic logicians often confuse category property *concepts* with essential de re *properties*, as if they were doing or aping natural science classification. Rene' was and his current progeny are held fast in Aristotle's conceptual scheme.

⁵⁹ It's doubtful that $^{\wedge}\text{mental}^{\wedge}$ is a category concept. I don't argue for it here, but it's fairly far down on $^{\wedge}\text{living}^{\wedge}$'s subsumption pathway. Aristotelians, and certainly, Leibnizians, have attributed category status to the mental, hence, to the substance status of $^{\wedge}\text{mind}^{\wedge}$. I say this because Aristotle said everything has its 'end' as if everything were a conscious being, living or not; Leibniz's monadology is very explicit about claiming that each monad, every existing entity, is a 'mind'. Wild!

We draw also from property sub- category, subsumption pathway's 'lower depths' to construct substantives' congeries. Substantives' manifolds are the chaos from which we select and stipulate the properties that will be our congeries with which we may conceive and identify substantive concepts, such as ^plant^ versus ^animal^, ^chicken^ versus ^egg^, ^dinosaur^ versus ^bird^. The congerity functor reflects substantives de facto carrying many kinds of tropes, some of which are bonded to objects, [:] and [:+], and some of which are linked, [*], and soothed, [.] to them.

Dispensable Debris

I will register briefly only that dispensable debris borrowed from Kant's and the Schoolmen's distinctions that figure centrally in S. Kripke's accounts of rigid designators and H. Putnam's accounts of natural kinds that we can consign to the debris bin with the help of conceptual logic:

Analytic/Synthetic

A priori/A posteriori

Alethic modalities: Necessary, Impossible (Possible is a derivative of the Allowed [Sooth] copula for coherent 'factual' sentences)

These distinctions were made in earnest search for an account of [^]knowledge[^], but they have remained, amazingly, at an embryonic stage for centuries. I think it's because—except for forgotten rare exceptions—truth logic has been the sole canon in the lists. With conceptual logic of even the rudimentary kind sketched above, we can replace that debris with more finely tuned copula functors that the progenitors and supporters of their alethic distinctions hoped would help them accomplish their mission. I hope that being relieved of them, they will be received happily by some veteran and neophyte critics of these outworn, contested fixtures. Others have creeds to defend that rely on them who, I also hope, will try open-mindedly to shift from their ingrained habits of reliance on those bearded categories.

These logical/epistemological veteran concepts are often said to be jointly related--[^]analytic[^] to [^]a priori[^] and to [^]necessary[^] or [^]impossible[^]; [^]synthetic[^] to [^]a posteriori[^] and [^]possible[^]. Many alethic modalists eschew [^]synthetic/necessary[^] except for bold iconoclasts amongst which are I. Kant and S. Kripke, for different reasons. Iconoclasts seem to stop at the precipice of [^]synthetic a priori, necessary/impossible[^] and [^]analytic a posteriori, possible[^], which hint at some combinatory conceptual decency, unless at least one of the terms is interpreted outside historic norms.

ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC

Roughly, analytic/synthetic indicates different logical relations between a sentence's subject and predicate, per the remarks about Kant and Carnap in the section on definition above (p. 21 ff). A priori/a posteriori indicates different epistemological grounds for establishing the truth value of statements and/or the variant ways of cognizing different kinds of objects to which sentences' subjects refer, for example, Hume's "ideas" versus "matters of fact", or a near-20th-Century orthodoxy of linguistic vs. non-linguistic grounds. Alethic modalities of possible worlds are the stillborn off-spring of the truth logic canon initiated by Leibniz's possible-worlds account, elaborated in contemporary possible-worlds' semantics, and of C. I. Lewis's intensional logic where he featured [^]entailment[^] in place of [^]material implication[^]. Both the possible-worlds and

the intensional accounts of modality, however, heed solely to a truth logic canon, and, consequently, solely to its alethic modalities. Analytic relations served by definitions are inadequate tools; they don't equip us with enough logical apparatus to make fine-grained conceptual distinctions without which we can't assign coherence value to our interpretations of sentences, including their differing kinds of copulas. Yet, we have to know sentence interpretations' are coherent even before we can begin to assign identified 'statements' their alethic modalities; otherwise we face a snarl of alethic and conceptual logic relations frustrating our judging minds. Putnam's embryonic treatment of ^natural kinds^ stands in the docks as an exemplar. An 'intensional' logic is empty sans a support system that we can use to identify statements' conceptually based propositions. What relations does Putnam's logic purport to regulate when he hasn't even told us how to interpret the copula in "Water is H₂O. (It's [Bond, :].) Unheeding, he hurries on to make alethic claims. Apparently he's subscribed to Satchel Paige's advice, "Don't look back, they might be gainin' on you".

The payoffs for augmenting our alethic logical canon with conceptual logic—illustrated here by how it helps us re-think ^natural kinds^--are the more mature distinctions it confers in contrast to the embryonic debris listed above. There are other rewards, but I hope this is enough to whet the appetites of adventurous philosophers, philologists, and translators.

ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC

The interpretations of the binary copulas sketched above and monary conceptual negation [~] show that the analytic/synthetic distinction is too simple to capture the seven travel advisory routes between concepts. Also, adherents to it almost always fail to register the negation of concepts endemic in English and other languages without which you can have neither a conceptual nor an alethic logic. This failure led Frege to confuse incoherence with falsehood; he tosses any statement that isn't true into the false bin, even incoherent ones, although they can be neither true nor false. <Space is nutritious> would be false for him, even if it relies on an incoherent proposition.

- | | | |
|---|-----------------------|---|
| 1. | [:] matter molecular | Whatever concepts characterize space, they are ^~molecular^. Relations between noun concepts take their cue from the relations between their congeries. |
| 2. | [~:] space molecular | |
| <hr style="width: 25%; margin-left: 0;"/> | | |
| 3. | [!] matter space | This is a sooth functor because ^[.] food ~nutritious^ is coherent also. |
| 4. | [/] matter food | |
| 5. | [.] food nutritious | |
| <hr style="width: 25%; margin-left: 0;"/> | | |
| 6. | [.] matter nutritious | |

3. [!] matter space

8. [~.] space nutritious

3. seals the fate of 8.'s incoherence. It's important to differentiate 8. from \wedge [.] space \sim nutritious \wedge , which is as incoherent as \wedge [.] space nutritious \wedge . 8.'s and \wedge [.] space \sim nutritious \wedge 's [~]s are in different positions which Frege couldn't, having only truth negation; this fed his exaggerated pan-falsehood attributions.

Definitions are often trotted out as tools to distinguish analytic from synthetic relations. Quine showed their inadequacy for this purpose, but was too dedicated to extensional logic to turn his hand to a conceptual logic that could be an alternative to possible-world semantics as was C. I. Lewis's alethized intensional logic. For Quine, the copula serves logically only to express such extensional relations as membership and set and class inclusion. I feel free to consign the analytic/synthetic distinction to the philosophy museum; conceptual logic provides a replacement program. Bullets trump arrows.

The simplistic 'analytic' ground for truth is replaced by the binary coherence advisories outlined above —[Subsume] and its sub-advisory, [Emplace], [Bond], [Conger], [Incompatible], [Identify], [Link]. [Sooth] replaces 'synthetic'; coherent sooth propositions sire the coherence of their associated statements with which we make truth-value claims. For example, the coherence of \wedge [.] food nutritious \wedge authorizes the coherence of <Food is nutritious> and <Food is not nutritious>. Coherent [Sooth] advisory travel in lexical space is allowed via the routes enjoined by the above listed seven via attiva copula functors—[/], [E...E], [:], [:+], [!], [=], [*]--or by routes authorized by the truth of their associated statements.

A PRIORI/A POSTERIORI

The epistemological distinction between these two different grounds for determining the truth value of statements bows out in favor of a tripartite distinction of the grounds for determining the coherence value of propositions: De jure, de dicto, de facto.

The **de jure** mode is suited to an agent-oriented account of conceptual creativity. Conceptual conflict, confusion, or incertitude may call for conceptual change. The de jure grounds for change rest on favorable practical results. The shift to a new concept of water illustrates this. This mode doesn't determine truth value, but it does alter the coherence value of propositions, sentences' interpretations and, subsequently, does alter, also, the truth values of some de dicto statements, such as <Birds aren't dinosaurs>.

The **de dicto** mode reports the lexical practices. I called this the via passive earlier. We appeal to de dicto truths about our conceptual travels in lexical space to support

the coherence--not the truth—of the premises in our *conceptual* arguments. <[Bonded, :] bog wet> is a via passive report that a community’s speakers follow the via attiva [Bond, :] bog wet^ custom. These truths may be supported by each person’s idiolect practices—“I wouldn’t say “Space is nutritious”—or by lexical investigators in field work—“No occurrence of this”, “Figurative”, “Archaic”—or, more importantly, by using coherence logic to challenge speakers’ reports of lexical travels by facing them with what they actually say--(“Didjaever drown in a *dry* bog, Jesse?). This is the philosophically indispensable Socratic technique, conspicuously absent from ‘Opinion Surveys’ (“Do you approve/disapprove of ...?”).

De dicto reports may conflict, in which case the use of conceptual logic may help us to resolve it. If we can’t resolve the conflict with conceptual arguments, using de dicto premises, conceptual arguments can point us to judicious de jure conceptual changes in the premises’ concepts. The unreliability of personal reports is shown abundantly in Plato’s Socratic dialogues; if personal reports are indecisive, incompatible, or doubtful, we may ride conceptual logic to the rescue with de jure arguments, illustrated in Plato’s *Theaetetus* by the series of interlocutors’ revised answers to “What is knowledge?”.⁶⁰

The **de facto** mode hands priority of propositions’ coherence value to true **sooth** statements. The truth of <This liquid is H₂O> grounds ^[.] liquid H₂O ^’s coherence. The actual combination of the liquid and its H₂O properties shows that there is a [Sooth] copula route between those concepts. This may or may not induce us to make conceptual changes. It did in the ^water/ H₂O ^ and the ^dinosaur/bird^ examples; true sooth statements were replaced by stipulated bond functors:

^[Bond, :] water H₂O^ replaced <[Sooth, .] water H₂O>.

^[Subsume, /] dinosaur bird^ replaced <[.] dinosaur feathered,...>.

It’s unlikely that the truth of <My rose is wilted> will motivate a stipulated change from a [Sooth] to a [Bond] functor.

We usher de facto truths to propositions’ coherence with emplacement acts. The hero here is the [Emplace] functor advisory whose ground zero enactment is *literally* putting an object and its trope(s) in the places held open by a sooth sentence’s subject and predicate tokens. These tokens are variables.⁶¹ They take *any* coherent emplacements into

⁶⁰ See “Socratic Humor: Understanding the most Important Philosophical Argument”, A. K. Bierman, *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science*; Monash University, Vol 5, No 2, August, 1971. It’s also on his website: http://www.sfsu.edu/~phlsphr/arthur_bierman.

⁶³ I say /rose/ and /wilted/ are variables, because any token is a type under a description. A type is a count term: /rose/, /rose/, ... are tokens counted as ONE type under such a description as “any token written with the same letters in the same order in English”. There is no existing physical word type other than tokens under a ONE count. Tokens, thought of in that way, are variables; they are open place-holders: Further, *any* rose may be coherently emplaced in *any* literally interpreted /rose/ and *any* wilted trope may be emplaced in any literally interpreted /wilted/. Thus, lexical space is occupied by types as “*any* token satisfying a given description”. Types enjoy the democracy of the [any] determiner.. Thus, there is no ontological distinction between types and tokens, hence, none between “rose” and /rose/. Types aren’t substantives, just counts.

them—*any* Erosee @ /rose/, *any* EwiltedE @ /wilted/. Emplacements that conscript truth this way activate sooth statements’ coherence-making power. But the truth power of

<My rose is wilted>


ascertained by

E(my)roseE @ /rose/ & E(my rose)wilted @ /wilted/,
surely isn’t equal to <[.] water H₂O>’s power.

What de jure reasons could we give for bonding [^]rose[^] to [^]wilted[^] equal in power to those our astute chemist had available for bonding [^]water[^] to [^]H₂O[^], thereby altering lexical space? If you stipulated [^][:] rose wilted[^], [^][.] rose fresh[^] would be incoherent by the bond proviso: Recall [^][:] ruby red[^] --} [^][~.] emerald red[^]. Are you prepared to face the wrath of organized rose fanciers and citizens of Portland, Oregon, the Rose City? (Pause) I thought not. After all, there are roses that are fresh, which, if emplaced in the subject and predicate of the token sentence /This rose is fresh/, would make <This rose is fresh> true, which, in turn, would make [^][.] rose fresh[^] coherent. This coherent proposition flips any proposed stipulated bonding of [^]rose[^] and [^]wilted[^] on its kiester.

[Emplace] is a *subsumption* advisory functor; it gives a conceptual logic interpretation to “refer”; so, [^]rose[^] subsumes emplaced roses, [^]wilted[^] subsumes emplaced wilted tropes. I indicated individual objects and individual tropes that have been emplaced with [E...E] quotes; Erosee is the emplaced rose, EwiltedE is the emplaced property trope.

This gives us the subsumption pathways,



Upon emplacement, the rose and its wilted trope are located in lexical space and thereby become conceptual entities, [^]EroseE[^] and [^]EwiltedE[^] become conceptual coin, [^]rose[^] and [^]wilted[^], just as the physical inscriptions /rose/ and /wilted/ do when given locations in lexical space.

Of course, roses and wilted tropes lead lives outside lexical space, and, so, aren’t counted solely as lexical beings. Remember the fist in the face versus the fist subsumed (p.9)? /Rose/ and /wilted/, too, may reside outside lexical space. The token /rose/ may be tiny and blue, /wilted/ may be huge and hard, made of stone or oak. You know how to pronounce /rose/; and you know that you pronounce a rose, Erosee, the same way. We pronounce substantives and tropes in the world; we read the world, because we’ve

learned to pronounce objects and tropes in the same way we pronounce the tokens into which we may coherently emplace them. This is what we do when emplace substantives and tropes into aural/temporal sentence tokens by pronunciation, a variant way of ground zero emplacing them. Lexical space's locations may be occupied by both aural/temporal and visual/spatial tokens. Please try to extend your concept of \wedge pronunciation \wedge and \wedge read \wedge beyond parochial confinements to marks on paper or stone and enter the new age of emplacement/pronunciation.

To identify the means we use to emplace objects and tropes is worthy of its own research project. The means range from Ground Zero physical emplacement, such as the wilted rose to an elaborate theoretical means for emplacing quarks. I remind you of the decades-long explorations of the ontological status of 'theoretical entities', from the 1950s on, which I see as inquiries perusing methods for finding coherent emplacements in sentences with subsumption functors. We don't feel at ease with entities whose existence rests only on theoretical inferences; that's why we spend so much money on 'atom smashers'. We want to see, image, register some energy emitted by a substantive that no other substantives' emit. Applied scientists search for coherent emplacements into theoretical categorematic tokens. "Where's my muon, Fermi?" Discerned substantives and tropes ground us; it's hands-on, like the penny emplaced into /penny/, $E_{\text{penny}} @ /penny/$, whether /penny/ is visual or a pronounced, aural token. /Phlogiston/ turned out not to have an emplacement; its theoretical rivals did. Bye, Phlo.

With the addition of E...E quotes, we have coherent subsumption proposition as, $\wedge [] \text{rose} \text{EroseE} \wedge$ and $\wedge [] \text{wilted} \text{EwiltedE} \wedge$. From these coherent emplacements, we get the coherent sooth proposition

$\wedge [.] \text{EroseE} @ /rose/ \ \& \ \text{E(rose)wiltedE} @ /wilted\wedge$,

which primes us to judge the statement,

$\langle \text{My rose is wilted} \rangle$,

is true just in case $\wedge \text{EroseE} \wedge$ in $\wedge \text{E(rose)wiltedE} \wedge$ carries the trope EwiltedE into the /wilted/ of $\langle [.] \text{rose wilted} \rangle$.⁶²

This verifying procedure for sooth statements provides a logically precise way of identifying 'a posteriori' statements.⁶³ The claim for this precision isn't diminished just

⁶² All emplacements are actually into sentence tokens, not statements, which we use to make statements. I say "into" statements here for brevity.

⁶³ I cited "ground zero" for emplacement, which is the actual physical emplacement of an object and its property trope in the subject and predicate variables of a visual/aural sentence token. Obviously, there are other, more remote emplacements than these. We emplace such diverse entities as the moon, atoms, negative charges, and malignant cells into tokens by the powers of pointing, pronouncing, imagining, inference, and the use of instruments. Don't limit yourself to these methods. But at the end of whatever procedure for emplacement you propose, a substantive and a trope is emplaced. A slant side of the human race is its genius for emplacement capacities.

because we don't know all the ways we may coherently emplace objects and tropes into their proper tokens beyond Ground Zero means. Compare this with: "Yes, I know. If I toss the ball into the jar, I'll win a Kuppie Doll. But that doesn't make it easy."

Further, since de dicto reports are about such physical objects as inscriptions and uttered sounds, and their spatial and/or temporal order, they lay cheek by jowl with sooth statements about wilted roses made true by coherent emplacements. The linguistic 'a priori' mode of determining the truth value of some 'statements' melts away in favor of inscriptional/aural via passiva reports about our via attiva coherent language habits. There are no a priori 'truths'. <Foxes are animals> isn't an a priori truth about foxes; it's a via passive report on a subsumption practice, <^[/, Subsume] animal fox^> is coherent>. <That fox ate my chickens> is an 'a posteriori' true or false sooth statement, depending on what its coherent emplacements are.

If I emplace a *fresh* rose in the subject of /My rose is wilted/, I thereby incoherently emplace E(my-rose)freshE in /wilted/. This does not, however, make ^[.] rose fresh^ incoherent, because ^[Link, *] rose {wilted fresh dried} is coherent, from which it follows that ^[.] rose fresh^ is coherent. But, <My rose is wilted> is *falsified* by this EfreshE emplacement. In his *Sophist*, I use the following conceptual inference to show how Plato in his *Sophist* refuted Parmenides' claim that we can't say what is false. The key is to interpret Plato's "other" in that dialogue as conceptual negation, [~].

<[.] rose fresh>	Assume a true sooth statement
^[!] fresh wilted/~fresh^	^fresh^ and ^~fresh/wilted^ are incompatible
	^~fresh^ is Plato's ^other^
<hr/>	
<-<[.] rose wilted>>	<My rose is wilted> is false

Falsity is never established solely with emplacement as truth is. It is always *inferred from* an emplacement-verified true statement whose predicate is incompatible with the false statement's predicate. <[.] rose wilted> is false, because <[.] rose fresh> is true. I'm sorry, Bertrand; there are no negative facts; nor do we need them, because conceptually incompatible predicate concepts--fresh^ and ^~fresh/wilted^--explain how statements may be judged false. Parmenides' and Russell's logical/metaphysical errors may be blamed for their exclusive reliance on alethic, extensional logic.

ABANDON ALETHIC MODALITIES

An important message of this essay is that the coherence value of propositions, sentence tokens' interpretations, is an epistemological mode as important as but logically prior to statements' truth value.

Leutic modalities replace alethic modalities. [Necessary] is replaced with the [Enjoined to] modality to advise you what lexical routes to take between concepts if you want to abide by the Lexical Imperative:

I want to understand others as they understand themselves and I want them to understand me as I understand myself.

Enjoined functors draw the limits of Wittgenstein’s “what may be said”, the ‘limits’ of language. These limits are not, obviously, tautologies and contradictions as he suggested. [Impossible] is replaced with the [Enjoined not to] modality; it signals that there is no coherent route between \wedge space \wedge and \wedge nutritious \wedge . \wedge [.] Space nutritious \wedge is an incoherent proposition, not an impossible statement, and not a contradiction.

[Sooth] replaces [Possible]. There are no necessary/impossible truths, only sooth truths. When we supplement alethic with conceptual logic, we learn that functor/copulas with enjoined modalities apply to propositions rather than to statements. Possible truths are replaced with the [Allowed] modality, the birth matrix of [Possible]. \wedge [Allowed, .] arm scarred \wedge and \wedge [Allowed, .] arm \sim scarred \wedge are both coherent. Thus, the truth of each is possible but unknown until you determine if

\wedge EarmE @ /arm/ & E(arm)scarred @ /scarred \wedge or

\wedge EarmE @ /arm/ & E(arm) \sim scarred @ / \sim scarred/

is coherently emplaceable, that is, which is true. Truth is up for grabs, but because of

[Incompatible, !] scarred \sim scarred \wedge ,

not both statements may be true. This makes the [Possible] modality explicit: One or the other may be true, but not both may be true. <Does Thelma love you?> Maybe.

Modality investigations should be directed to via attiva advisories. This is the most logically astute turn that pragmatist philosophers should call for in their challenge to traditional via passiva accounts of knowledge, truth, and its modalities. Lexical systems are in constant flux, which puts de jure justified changes in our concepts to work: Conceptual change calls for stipulating sapient choices from among alternatives.

Kant treats moral modalities as via attiva. If we universalize a maxim, will the proposed universal be a coherent way of constructing a lexical moral space? The issue of via passive truth value for universalized maxims’ acts, whether obligatory, forbidden, or permitted goes in the dead-letter box. Trying to verify that maxims are ‘true’ statements is incoherent. Most Kantians misinterpret the Categorical Imperative. The moral modalities of universalized maxims’ acts are part of functors’ advisory task. Appeal to a universalized maxim’s *coherence* value rather than its alethic “contradictory” status or to its self-canceling result to determine the proposed act’s moral modality.⁶⁴ If I were writing a film script for Mae West about Kant’s moral modal theory, I would give her the less scandalous line than one of her related remarks, “Contradiction had nothin’ to do with it”.

⁶⁴ See Bierman and Assali, *The Critical Thinking Handbook*, Ch. 16, pp. 497 – 512.