PROSPECTUS: A Logic for Concepts, the Basement Logic

of all other logics including Alethic/Truth Logic

So far as I know, my conceptual/lexical logic is the first one. It makes explicit a logic in the English language we implicitly know. It enables us to distinguish the coherence of ^This nail is pointed^ and the incoherence of ^This nail is intelligent^. The evaluative terms of this logic are ^coherent^ and ^incoherent^; they replace the street terms ^meaningful^ and ^meaningless^. In contrast, alethic logics’ evaluative terms are ^true^ and ^false^.

The logics are not reducible one to the other; conceptual negation [~] and truth negation [-] function differently: Not both contradictory statements are true, but both are coherent; 1=|= 2.

I call this new logic a **Basement Logic**, because the truth conditions of statements rest on the foundations of coherence conditions. It replaces the incoherent conditions specified by the standard correspondence account for statements’ truth value. I explain this further on.

Terminology alert: I distinguish between /sentences/, ^propositions^, and <statements>. /Sentences/ are inscribed, uttered, signaled, etc. physical tokens. Interpreted /sentence/ tokens are ^propositions^; they are physical token ‘rewrites’ of sentences that, for example, disambiguate sentences. Examples of two rewrite/interpretations of the sentence, /This car is hot/, into rewritten, re-uttered, resignedaled proposition tokens are ^This car is stolen^ and ^This car is popular^. Both propositions are coherent. We may have intended the first interpretation to make the <statement> claim <This car is stolen>, which, you can see is a physical token on your screen or page.

---

1 “basement /.../. The lower or fundamental portion; a base. “Up from its deep reservoirs, from the mysterious basements of the mountain, wells the silent stream”. J. A. Symonds, Italy and Greece; p. 322, Century Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Lexicon of the English Language; William Dwight Whitman, (Ed.), (Rev.) Benjamin E. Smith; New York, 1889 – 1914. My copy is the 1914 edition. (Onion skin pages)

2 /.../, ^...^, <...> are new quotation marks, additions to “...” and ‘...’, which are inadequate for philosophical, and any conceptual work in any cognitive field of study.
Sound tokens available. <Statements>, too, are tokens; they are ^propositions^ plus truth value claims.

Some of my new logic’s components appear in Plato’s corpus. He used conceptual subsumption in his *Sophist* to clarify the concept, ^sophist^; Sophists were Athenian teachers he opposed. In that dialogue, he constructed a subsuming tree structure to clarify the concept ^sophist^, in which he emplaced his opponents. A similar structure clarified ^angler^. Anglers’ aim is to hook fish, Sophists’ game were young men who wanted to learn how to be skilled orators. [Subsumption] is one of eight interpretations of sentences’ *copulas*. It’s often used in “expert” systems, particularly now to organize medical concepts. The genus/species distinction depends on [Subsume].

Plato used conceptual negation to refute Parmenides’ claim that we cannot make false statements. His negation is usually translated as “other”, as in his *Republic*. I use [~] instead of “other” to negate concepts (and propositions) and use [-] to negate statements. ^Rough^’s conceptual negation is ^~rough^, which subsumes the range of concepts {smooth slick silky ...} each of whose concepts are incompatible with ^rough^ and with each other.

Plato used incompatible concepts, ^periphery^ and ^center^, in his *Republic* to show that an apparent truth contradiction, <The top is both at rest and in motion>, is not contradictory: The spinning top’s center is at rest, its periphery rotates with respect to the top’s place on a surface. He also used incompatible concepts to prove the soul and the state have three parts. In his *Phenomenology*, Hegel borrowed Plato’s [Incompatible] conceptual-distinction tactic to show how we dissolve contradictions to forward civilization’s ascent to the contradiction-free, fully cognized Absolute. Hegel and Marx often confused contradictions with oppositions; Kant explicitly did not.

Aristotle didn’t follow up on these promising conceptual logic beginnings especially suited for philosophy whose business is investigating concepts. Socrates wanted definitions of concepts; he knew it was incoherent to
‘define’ statements. Aristotle was more interested in natural science and alethic/truth logic. His syllogistic logic snuffed the development of Plato’s early forays into conceptual logic. My logic resumes from when Plato’s ‘Open Sesame’ to conceptual logic was latched shut.

I was first prompted to extend Plato’s early forays by Wittgenstein’s central worry in his *Tractatus*: What can we say and what can we not say (coherently)? I was sure this couldn’t be answered without a logic to regiment conflicting opinions (Humans have/don’t have free will). Wittgenstein didn’t and couldn’t answer his own question; although adept at alethic logic, he had no conceptual logic. But he did make progress; he pointed out that tautological, <P & P>, and contradictory, <P & ~P>, aren’t statements; so, they have no truth value, although he back-slid at times.

I’ve answered Wittgenstein’s question, led on by my interpretation of C. I. Lewis’s evocative remark in his *Mind and the World-Order* (p. 107):

*All* meaning is relational.

In that sentence’s context, I interpret it as: Don’t look for the meaning of categorematic words, look for their relations to each other.

I’ve detected eight conceptual relations, [Functor] operations of the copula, embedded in English language that we use to relate categorematic words to each other and with which we construct conceptual space. (See p. 11f.) They ride atop a minimal synactic structure after Jean-Louis Gardies’ *Rational Grammar*. With these functors and that grammar, I’ve uncovered a systematically structured conceptual space that Lewis foreordained. He never seems to have realized that a coherent structure of categorematic words along with their coherent semantic ‘relations’ stripped ^meaning^ of philosophical use. He kept using /meaning/ for the rest of his career, even though he claimed by my interpretation of his remark that

*Words don’t have ‘meanings’, they have relations.*

His ‘intensional’ logic is a misnomer; it suggests, but isn’t, a conceptual logic. It’s an alethic/truth logic that replaces Russell’s ^material^ interpretation of [If... , then...] with ^strict implication^. He did not construct a
conceptual logic. He embraced the alethic modalities: Necessary, Impossible, Possible. He knew nothing of conceptual logic’s modalities: [Enjoined to say], [Enjoined not to say], [Allowed to say] that we use to curb our evaluations of proposition’s and statement’s coherence.

Wilfrid Sellars probably knew Lewis didn’t follow through on his relational theory of meaning. In his “Inference and Meaning” essay, he proposed distinguishing between “material” and “formal” inferences. The distinction was intuitive, but he intended it as a wedge between conceptual versus alethic logic. In Making It Explicit and recent essays, Robert B. Brandom advances beyond Sellars' “material-inference” hints, jumping off from Sellars’ observation that humans “give reasons”, parrots do not. Brandom says, “Concepts are essentially inferentially articulated. Grasping them in practice is knowing one’s way around the proprieties of inference and incompatibility they are caught up in.” (Part One, Ch. 2., “Toward an Inferential Semantics”, p. 89.) Brandom’s informal presentation of these “proprieties” are augmented and structured in my conceptual logic; it answers his call for “inferentially articulated” concepts with articulated, valid conceptual inference forms. That logic is most fully articulated in my The Logical Structure of Conceptual Coherence 3.0; a shorter version is “A Precis of Conceptual Logic”. “On Emplacement” and its extension “Assignments & Varieties of Emplacement” are fundamental. The latter is under revision. See them on the internet, sfsu arthur bierman.

Secondly, I was prompted to develop my conceptual basement logic with the [Assign/Emplace] functors to de-mystify the long standing puzzle about how language and mathematics could ‘fit’ reality; that they do seemed miraculous to Kant and a host of others, and still does. (See B130 – B156, Critique of Pure Reason.) “Einstein asked in wonderment, ‘that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality?’ ” He didn’t know why the world’s and our conceptual order were so suited to each other. (Quoted in Jim Holt’s review of Love and Math, by Edward Frenkel; The New York Review of Books, Dec. 5, 2013, p. 29.)
We can free ourselves from Einstein’s puzzled “wonderment” by reversing the standard order of how we connect language and world. The standard order is **Language \(\rightarrow\) World**: Words [Refer to] entities; statements [Correspond to] facts; sentences/theories [Represent] or [Model] reality, and so forth.

Reverse that order to **World \(\rightarrow\) Language**. I do it with the [Emplace] and [Assign] functors. These functors are neglected by most philosophers steeped in decades of academicians ‘referring to’, ‘modeling of’, ‘representing’, and the *hoi polloi*’s ‘applying’. Persons who use these terms think we cognize the world by ‘applying’ labels to it. This Augustinian shibboleth was challenged at the opening of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*.

Other philosophers have suggested we reverse this direction: **We cognize the world by carrying it into our existing conceptual systems**.\(^3\) Einstein should have noted this, because he fitted his new concepts of space and time into pure, uninterpreted G. Riemann’s geometry, an alternative to Newton’s use of Euclid’s conceptual system. Einstein assigned/emplaced his new concepts of measured space, time, and gravity into Riemannian geometry, **World \(\rightarrow\) Language**, rather than “applying” it, **Language \(\rightarrow\) World**.

Napoleon didn’t make quite the same mistake as Einstein; he came closer to my view than Einstein did. Talleyrand urged him to “try to make

---

\(^3\) I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition “Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high.”
--Bertrand Russell (Letter to Gottlob Frege)

Russell’s analysis of the proposition expressed by “John is tall” provides us with two components: the property expressed by the predicate is tall, and the individual John. That’s right, John himself right there, trapped in a proposition. [I prefer “emplaced in” to “trapped in”.]
--David Kaplan (“Dthat”)

It is rather the object designated by such a [singular] term that counts as a value of the variable; and the objects stay on as values of variables though the singular terms be swept away.
--W. V. O. Quine
those conquered learn to love France”. Napoleon replied: “Amer: I don’t really know what this means when applied to politics”. He did not think the concept ^love^ had a coherent relation to ^political^ concepts. He could have said EloveE of France can’t coherently be emplaced into sentences whose other concepts are ^political^ or related to ^political^ concepts.4

Our sensory responses are way stations in energy transmissions of world events to lexical conceptual systems in our brains, World → Language. This is the cognitive route. Kant, however, backed the standard order of connecting words ‘to’ world; he says concepts are “applied to” objects of experience”, Language → World, B146f, first Critique. His way of describing discursive cognition—language /applies to/ the world—hinders acceptance of the reverse direction I advocate. We discursively cognize from the world into language, which is our logical conceptual space, by coherently emplacing substantives and tropes into subjects and predicates as Russell, D. Kaplan, and Quine did.

Quine suggested it back-handedly. He endorsed emplacement of values into variables; but he used [Designated] instead of [Emplaced] to misdescribe “values” entry into variables, whether logical or mathematical variables. He was entrapped in the standard Word → World direction. Categorematic tokens, except for proper names, are variables awaiting multiple value emplacements of substantives and tropes. Quine kept to the ‘referring’ Zeitgeist; he didn’t realize that when we literally emplace a value into a variable token that this is a World → Language act.

My elaboration of Russell and Kaplan’s unorthodox stance is the logical and epistemological Second Copernican Revolution, scion of Kant’s First Copernican Revolution: Our cognized, emplaced/assigned world revolves within our conceptual systems. This alters past approaches to classical controversies that rely solely on an alethic logic canon going in the wrong direction, Word → World, with unremittingly inconclusive results.

4 Quoted from Duncan Kelly’s review of Andrew Roberts’ Napoleon, a Life; NY Times Book Review, 11/16/2014.
See p. 13f for a list of essays where I use conceptual logic to heal ancient, alethically originated traumas. The listed essays are on my website, sfsu arthur bierman.

A consequence of the World → Language order of connecting the two is that states of affairs are not ‘given’ but constructed via assignment and emplacement of substantives and tropes, respectively, into sentences’ subject and predicate tokens. Facts don’t exist outside of conceptual space. Here’s an example. There’s a deep division between those who think it’s wrong for doctors to help terminally ill persons to die and those who think it’s right. Dr. Judy Neall Epstein thinks it’s right. She distinguishes three concepts into which people may emplace these acts. She says, “It’s not suicide, it’s not euthanasia. It’s medical aid in dying.”

These three concepts are incompatible, because each has different coherent relations to other incompatible concepts. Euthanasia, for example, doesn’t require consent, aid in dying does. Our cognition and evaluation of an indeterminate ‘act’ depends on which term we choose to emplace it. When you choose one of Epstein’s determinate concepts, it engages associated attitudes, sentiments, memories, religious disapproval, which differ from those you would have had if you’d chosen a different emplacement.

In his Tractatus, 1.13, Wittgenstein missed getting the status of facts right. My bracketed words correct him: 1.13* “The facts in [conceptual] logical space are the world [conceived].”

I explain. Distinguish grammatic from semantic subjects and predicates. The former are linguistic tokens, the latter are coherently assigned/emplaced substantives (objects, persons, acts, events, processes) and their respective coherent tropes (tasty, kind, intended, rare, slow). At ground

---

5 Melody Gutierrez, San Francisco Chronicle; 10/13/14.
6 Brevity drives a hard bargain. Wittgenstein paid a high price for it. Conceptual, Basement Logic, shapes our cognition of the world. Truth logic is distinct from it and is legitimatized by coherence logic.
7 I use ^trope^ in place of the usual ^property^ or ^attribute^ that are too loaded with ontologies that rely on ‘universals’ that no self-respecting nominalist can accept. ^Trope^ sidesteps that history. Tropes are sensed features collocated with the substantives that carry them. They exist at one-place/one-time span. ^Property^ concepts cede tropes’ existence in many places/at many
zero, we connect the world and its languages by literal, coherent emplace-
ment. If you emplace your finger in /finger/ and it carries a pink trope into
/pink/ of /My fingernail is pink/, we have two coherent emplacements,
S+P+, in that sentence. This is the Gold Standard for the truth of the state-
ment <My fingernail is pink>. You’ve put a substantive, your finger nail,
and its pink trope into your conceptual, cognitive space.

A more complex example is emplacing a metal Euro coin into /Euro/,
the grammatical subject in the token sentence, /The Euro is the European
Union’s (EU) legitimate money unit/, and emplacing the EU’s token doc-
uments as the semantic trope for /legitimate money unit/, the sentence’s
grammatical predicate. Once substantives and tropes are coherently em-
placed into sentences’ grammatic subject and predicate tokens that have a
place in the structure of conceptual space, they themselves become semantic
subjects and predicates, and concepts, just as tokens become words and con-
cepts when given places in a language’s conceptual logical structure. /Mulp/
doesn’t occupy a place in English’s conceptual space; so, it’s neither an Eng-
lish word nor a concept, whereas /plum/ is.

We also [Assign] the world’s substantives and tropes into sentences’
grammatical subject and predicate tokens: ^[Assign] AaristotleA @ /Aris-
totle/>. Although he’s not now available for emplacement as he once was,

---

*8* If there’s a dispute about the legitimacy of a Euro’s coin being considered as money, there’s
naught but EU documents, their token existence, to which one can appeal to settle the disagree-
ment. Of course, token /sentences/ are subject to interpretation, which leads to the next stage,
disagreement about which rewrite ^proposition^ tokens are the correct interpretation of the
documents. We can use our conceptual logic inferences to help us reason to an agreement. In
cases of socially constructed substantives, such as the Euro, there are always language tropes we
use to identify tropes at some stage of emplacement in contrast to causally produced tropes, such
as the color of your tongue or the odor of a ripe peach. Lawyers cite tokens of statutes and deci-
sions and the tokens that help us locate them in printed volumes shelved in law libraries.
Plato emplaced him when he gestured toward Aristotle and said <Aristotle’s my best student>. When Plato did that, there was Aristotle “himself right there, trapped in a proposition”, as Kaplan put it. Plato made Aristotle the semantic subject of his sentence. We can’t do that; we and they exist in different eras, unlike your fingernail and pink emplacements into /fingernail/ and /pink/ tokens that exist simultaneously now. There’s no time gap in your case, unlike the assignment of Aristotle to /Aristotle/.

For us to make Aristotle the semantic subject, we have to jump the gap between then and now with some identifying means, such as definite descriptions. We can use the truth of <Aristotle was the author of Nicomachean Ethics> to assign Aristotle to /Aristotle/. He was the emplaced semantic subject of Plato’s sentence, and he, the author of the Nicomachean Ethics, was the same man, S+. So, we have coherently assigned Aristotle as the semantic subject of, say, <Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great>. Plato’s emplaced and our assigned man are one and the same, [=]. Both Plato’s emplacement and our assignment are coherent and their allied statements are true if and only if the count of their semantic subjects equals one, one and the same Aristotle. Of course, a person ignorant of what Aristotle wrote can’t jump the gap in this way, nor make these identifications. To know one thing we may have to know something else. For example, knowing that a photo is of Monte Blanc is as good as knowing its longitude-latitude coordinates and altitude for identifying that mountain as the semantic subject of Russell’s revelation in his letter to Frege.

I caution against saying we ‘refer’ to entities that no longer exist; it’s better to say we /infer/ they were once semantic subjects, as Aristotle was. We infer it from inscriptions on marble busts, from his contemporaries’ existing scripts him, and from his emplaced writings.

Imagine yourself as if you were present in Athens these many centuries ago when Plato coherently emplaced Aristotle as he gestured toward Aristotle while uttering his sentence. We can coherently assign the identical person to /Aristotle/, as the Ethics’ author, just as if we were in Athens where Plato coherently emplaced Aristotle. The [as if] we were in Athens allows us to jump from Plato’s emplacement to our pre-
sent *assignment* of \(^\text{AaristotleA} @ \text{/Aristotle}^/\). We can now, centuries later, assign Aristotle to be the semantic subject of \(/\text{Aristotle taught Alexander the Great}^/\).

\[^{\text{Assign} \text{AaristotleA} @ \text{/Aristotle}^/}, \text{[as if]} \text{you were in Athens emplacing Aristotle as Plato did}^/\.

The world’s substantives and tropes, past and present, must be *coherently emplaced in or assigned to sentences as semantic subjects and predicates*, S+P+, because only they make propositions coherent, which, in turn, make statements true. They’re *world*, not *mental*, content, Putnam’s “outside the head”, as Aristotle and his authorship of his *Ethics* were.

\(<\text{Batman is courageous}>\) is not true: It has no S+ emplacement. The sentence’s purported semantic subject, EBatmanE, never existed; so, there’s no semantic subject to carry ‘his’ courageous trope into the grammatical predicate. Although Aristotle no longer exists, but, since he once did, we can rely on an \([\text{as if} \text{we were in Xtime at Xwhere}]\) to coherently emplace such substantives into a token.

Fictional sentences have no coherent emplacements into or assignments to their grammatical subjects. \(/\text{Batman}/, /\text{God}/, /\text{angels}/, /\text{Papa Bear}/, /\text{Santa Claus} /\) are fictional; hence, they aren’t semantic subjects; they don’t qualify for an \([\text{as if}]\) assignment status, because Aristotle once existed but Batman never did. Like pure mathematic propositions, they have no truth, only coherence value. We can imagine, however, that these “once upon a time” grammatic subjects could have been semantic subjects. That’s why we lend our care to the fate of characters in Dickens’ novels.

**Functors with which to construct conceptual space**
I construct conceptual space with eight functor operations, which are eight interpretations of the copula of subject-predicate sentences (SP). I have constructed valid conceptual inferences in this structured space. The functors are:

[Subsume, /]    [Bond, :)    [Conger, :+]
[Assign/Emplace]
[Identify, =]    [Link, *]    [Sooth, .]
[A...A] @ /.../
[Counter, ~]/[Incompatible, !]

A structural account of concepts doesn’t grant the ‘meaning’ of a word to the mind of a language speaker. Concepts are categorematic, physical lexical tokens as are any coherent assignments and emplacements into them, because both are located in conceptual logic’s space. That space must be distinguished from our functorial construction of it and our coherent travels in it just as a chair must be distinguished from its joiner’s work and sitters grateful ease. I’m presenting a logic ‘chair’ not cognitive psychology. Frege would approve.

Propositions and statements harbor concepts. How should we conceive the eight copula relations between substantive/substantive, trope/trope, and substantive/trope concepts in propositions? How do two concepts become one proposition? The dominant, current metaphor is composition: The meanings of propositions are composed of/from the meaning of their terms. No one has satisfactorily explained to me how two terms’ meanings can ‘meld’ into one sentence meaning. Some like a chemical model of fusing or ‘melding’. Is it like Haggis that ‘melts’ the tastes of its ingredients? Well, since propositions aren’t stews, I wouldn’t bet my life or fortune on it.

---

9 I have underway a conceptual logic for so-called relational sentences: /Jill loves Jack/, /Jill is smarter than Julie/, /1 is the successor of 0/. They are quite different from subject/predicate sentences. They are used to order their terms, transitive ....
10 For explanations of these functors, see The Logical Structure of Conceptual Coherence, pp. 11-34, accompanied by examples of conceptual inferences on my website, sfu arthur bierman,
My “Precis” is a shorter version to the same purposes for those who are interested but lead overburdened lives.
11 Countering a concept ^C^ is making a new concept ^~C^. ^C^ and ^~C^ are [Incompatible].
12 I count [Assign] and [Emplace] as one functor.
I prefer the metaphor of travelling in conceptual space to explain the relations between a unitary proposition and its multiple concepts. A ^trip^ is described by saying, for example, “I drove from San Francisco to Los Angeles”. That specifies two places and one trip. That’s analogous to traveling coherently from ^nail^’s place to ^hard^’s place in conceptual space. It specifies two places and one trip in conceptual space. This relieves philosophers’ agonies for failing to provide a plausible compositional unity of propositions and statements. Their failure stems not from their philosophical incapacity, but from their clinging to the part/concept-whole/proposition compositional approach to the ‘meaning’ of sentences. Once you give up ‘a meaning’ for sentences, as if there were such an animal, the composition-induced agony gives way to adventuresome travelers’ bliss. Compositional ‘meaning’ of sentences is useless for explaining communicative success; it’s the cause of the unity-problem, not its solution.

For communicative success, according to a structural account of concepts, we need not ‘share’ private mental ‘meanings’ of words and propositions. If in discourse or reading we continue travelling on the same routes between tokens in functor-etched conceptual space without discernible anomalies, we likely understand each other. Shared travels are successful communications, as C. I. Lewis pointed out.

There are coherent and incoherent paths between concepts under the aegis of eight different functors. An example: Travelling from /nail/ to /pointed/, guided by the predication/[Sooth] functor, as in ^the nail is pointed^, is a coherent propositional unit. But travelling from /nail/ to /intelligent/, as in ^the nail is intelligent^, guided by the same functor is incoherent; you’re enjoined not[not allowed] to trek from /nail/ to /intelligent/. It’s not a trip you can coherently take, because other functors come into play that entail you’re [Enjoined not] to so travel. For example, ^intelligent^ and ^brain^ are [Bonded]; so, you’re [Enjoined to] travel between them. But ^intelligent^ and ^nail^ are not [Bonded]; so, you’re [Enjoined not] to take that trip. You can’t get ‘there’ coherently from ‘here’.
Some applications of conceptual logic to familiar philosophical controversies

You may have gathered that conceptual logic leaves few orthodoxies unscathed. Philosophers need new beginnings—now! In this section, I list some traditional philosophical controversies in which my use of conceptual logic helps us initiate needed changes in the Twenty-First century’s philosophic architecture.

Conceptual logic enriches our logical canon. It supplies a new way of thinking and reasoning about perennial philosophical ‘problems’ that have resisted amelioration or resolution, because, heretofore, philosophers could not have done better: Analethic logic designed for statements is an inadequate canon for doing philosophy’s conceptual work.

Here’s a partial list of ‘controversial problems’ I’ve addressed with my conceptual logic to deliver other, more satisfactory, results. Most reside on my website. Google --sfsu arthur bierman--to enter.

In “On Emplacement” and “Convention (T)”, Tarski’s stab at the Liar, I show the truth accounts of the Liar Paradox are incoherent. There is no paradox, nor can there be one.

Kant’s Categorical Imperative loses his contradiction and others praxis (if not all can do, no one can do) interpretations. They’re replaced by my incoherence reading. See Chapter 16, The Critical Thinking Handbook, A. Bierman and R. Assali, Prentice-Hall, for my best version, sharper than my earlier one in Life and Morals, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

A coherence-emplacement account of truth and falsity supplants the correspondence account. Falsity is explained via the incompatibility of the “other” as Plato does contra Parmenides in his Sophist without recourse to Russell’s negative ‘facts’. Consider,

<John is ill>

^^ill^ is incompatible with ^well/~ill^^
Hence, <<John is well>> is false;

if the first premise is true and the second is coherent, you’re entitled to believe the conclusion. This is treated in more detail in The Logical Structure of Conceptual Coherence 3.0.

[Assign] and [Emplace] functors enable us to bid fare-thee-well to private ‘referring’ and unshareable mental ‘content’. These functors supply the world’s substances and tropes as publicly shareable evidence of propositions’ coherence values and, thus, of statements’ truth values.

The ‘correspondence’ account of truth value is incoherent, because nature has no logical components; statements do, negations, for example, [¬] and [¬]; hence, ‘facts’ do not and never can correspond to propositions nor to statements. See “Assign & Emplace”, again --12/15/14, St. Lucie’s Day-- under revision. Language supplies the logic we need to judge whether or not a proposition is coherent and, hence, whether or not a statement is true.

“On Emplacing” is the successor of Russell’s “On Denoting” and Strawson’s “On Referring” in which they’re modified and corrected. Conceptual logic helps us judge Russell and Strawson’s views and disagreements more precisely and equitably.

The role of conventionalism, in “Stipulating and Conceiving” gets a favorable, more conclusive resolution, with the use of a detailed conceptual logic than it’s had with alethic logic alone.

**Some of my Background Stances**

I have a constructivist, structural account of concepts and how they’re coherently related in propositions.

Logical studies should be oriented toward the via attiva (active voice), saving the via passive (passive voice) as the reporting mode only. Humans have built lexical space for via attiva speech, not for the results of logical studies. They’ve elaborated the via attiva functors I’ve uncovered in our languages’ lexical patterns. However, most logic and mathematic studies are oriented toward the via passiva. This begets pseudo problems, such as
allegedly invalid inferences with oblique-reference premises, (1) "Jake believes <Frege was German> is true". This via passiva, third person statement excludes the knowledge that Jake, first-person, has. So, when Jake says (2) "I believe Frege was German is true" he implicitly includes in his inference, his first person knowledge that makes valid his inference to the conclusion, (3) "So, he probably wrote in German", even though it has an ‘oblique-reference’ belief premise, (2). (1) and (2) are not identical.

I advocate a nominalistic account of languages and their logic for humans that everyone grants to computers. Although these machines have no mind, they do your calculating to your satisfactions. Our linguistic ‘objects’ are token words and sentences as /0/ and /1/ are for computers. Interpretations of sentences are token propositional rewrites\textsuperscript{13} that may or may not be coherent; we use token proposition rewrites to make true or false statements, also tokens (I say, you heard) whose truth value may or may not be known.

I distinguish two negation/counter functors: Alethic, [-], and conceptual, [~]; neither is reducible to the other. Only one of two contradictory or contrary statements, <Adam sinned> <Adam did [not, -] sin>, may be true. But both of their contradictory under-writing propositions are coherent, ^Adam sinned^ ^Adam did [not, ~] sin^. One true statement =|= two coherent propositions; 1 =|= 2; so, coherence value and its conceptual/ lexical logic may not be reduced to alethic value and its logic, nor vice versa.

I forswear using [Refer] as relevant to coherence or any logic, because it’s not a public, logical functorial act. Referring is a private way “inside the head” to “pick out” an item “outside the head” by uttering a word in the Word \rightarrow World direction. This doesn’t transform grammatical subjects or predicates into semantic ones without which there are no coherent S+P+ propositions nor true statements. Re-think ostensive definition. By saying /That’s a dog/ and pointing at a dog, we indicate a substantive outside our head. From this public act, we’ve started to learn what other substantives we may coherently emplace into /dog/ and its simulacrums. To earn a dog +,

\textsuperscript{13} ^The car is popular^ is a propositional rewrite of the sentence /The car is hot/. Both are tokens. ^The car is fast^ is another rewrite; ^boiling^ is another rewrite of /hot/.
we need world constituents in our propositions to satisfy coherence and truth conditions.

Truth value rests on basement, coherence value; no statement is true or false without coherent emplacement/assignments, S+P+. I propose a coherent emplace/assign theory of truth value. It’s logically distinct from the traditional ‘absolute’ idealists’ so-called ‘coherence/consistent’ theory; my ^coherent^ =|= ^consistent^. ^Consistent^ holds between statements’ truth values, whereas ^coherent^ holds (1) for travel between concepts in conceptual space under the constraints of the eight functors listed above and their modal logic, and (2) for assignments to and emplacements of substantives and tropes, respectively, into sentences’ subjects and predicates.

My coherence account of truth differs from the incoherent correspondence theory as well. Nature, sans humans and other conceiving organisms, lacks logical negation; thusly impoverished, it has no logic. So, it’s incoherent to say there can be a ‘correspondence’ between negationless worldly ‘facts’ and negation-loaded propositions, [~], and statements, [-]. Propositions’ coherence has three grounds--de dicto, de facto, and de jure. Each ground contains a two valued negation functor, either [~] or [-].

Pure logic and mathematics with variables, ^a + b = c^, are conceptual systems that have no emplacements or assignments; hence, they’re propositions that have coherence but no truth value, unlike statements. The fog of ‘intuited’ logical and mathematical ‘truths’ melts away under coherence’s burn-off. Mathematical equations with emplacements are statements; they have truth value, because we assign/emplace substantives and their unmeasured and measured tropes’ numerical values into their terms. ^2 apples/ inches + 3 apples/inches = 5 apples/inches^ are coherent and their companion statements true. Emplacing/assigning apples and inches enrich the purity of ^2 + 3 = 5^. Emplacing apples and inches into pure arithmetical variables hitches world’s items, which yields statements. The habit of saying such statements are ‘applied’ arithmetic is better expunged from discourse. Try emplaced/assigned arithmetic instead.14

14 The direction of the world into language, World  Language, obviates the use of /applied/ and /referring/, which go from language to world, Language  World;
[Any], [A/An], and [The] are the only quantifier functors in conceptual logic. It buttresses nominalism, because it inoculates us against the temptation to believe classes and sets exist as substantives do.\textsuperscript{15} It relieves ‘abstract’ realists of an embarrassing retreat to the transcendental shelter of ‘numbers’ versus numerals in order to satisfy the incoherent correspondence theory of truth with its trailing [All], [None], and [Some] determiners for categorial statements seated at the corners of the Square of Opposition. These extensional determiners have [Any]/[All], [A/An]/[Some], and [The]/[Singular] equivalents in conceptual logic, minus their useless ontological freight. See “Any versus Other Quantifiers”, soon, I hope, to be on my website (12/23/2014).

Website:  http://philosophy.sfsu.edu/philosophy/page/arthur-bierman

For a quicker access to my website, google: sfsu arthur bierman.

1936 Leavenworth Street, San Francisco, CA, 94133

\textsuperscript{15} Borrowing from common parlance, in my lingo it’s coherent to say you’re [Enjoined to] [Bond] ^substantive^ to ^exists at one place/ at one time^; it can’t be in two places at the same time. It’s also coherent to say you’re [Enjoined not] to bond ^class/ g g 2`5set^ to ^exists at one place/at one time^, because classes and sets are alleged to be timeless and don’t occupy space. Hence, it’s incoherent to subsume ^class/set^ under a material ^substantive^. Other than being subsumed under Plato’s Forms, which he himself found incomprehensible in his \textit{Parmenides}, in what other Third realm is there a concept that coherently subsumes ^class/set^?

There are missing intermediate inferences in this argument, but these are its main bones; it may be evaluated safely as valid without providing all the missing conceptual premises and inferences.
415.673.6361 (Tel – Fax)

abierman@sfsu.edu