“The Liar Paradox is like a salted slug that melts away into scrubable stain once we supplement alethic with coherence logic.”
--Fanebius Perlying, translated from his Germanic Latin

30 June, 2002
Nino, caro,

Thanks for your useful, quick reply to my questions about my correspondence with Kirk Ludwig about Tarski's convention (T). What follows are the results of my thinking about your suggestion that we shift our interpretation of Convention (T) from correspondence truth claims to translation. I may seem over-the-top obsessed about (T), but I think there's a major blindspot incorporated into it from its first pages. It's not just Tarski's, of course, as too many others have the same handicap. Because he's enshrined among the untouchables, his blindspot confirms others in theirs. Here I'm trying to work out a distinction between anemic and robust truth. When Tarski mounts his semantic account of truth he cites Aristotle favorably, which leads us, and maybe him, to suppose his (T) is about robust truth, when actually it's about anemic truth. More is coming up on the distinction, but just to orient you from the beginning, what I'm calling anemic truth is what models yield, unlike robust truth which is what the constituents of states of affairs and events yield when emplaced in sentences with coherent interpretations. Remember my convention:

\[ ^\text{proposition}^ = \models ^\text{statement}^ . \]

*Propositions* are interpretations of a sentence; they have coherence value; some are coherent, others are incoherent; they don't have truth value. Statements may be made only with sentences that we may interpret coherently.

I'm suggesting that axioms in formal systems have coherence value only when they're given model interpretations, which is what \(^\text{anemic truth}\) comes to. Anemic truth is borrowed coherence and should be distinguished from robust truth. I say "borrowed", because axioms borrow their coherence—not robust truth--from the coherence of the models they tap. If the model is arithmetic, the known coherence of, for example, \(^2 > 1\)\(^\text{,}\) lends its coherence to a formal system's axioms. Thus, in place of \(<'s' \text{ true-in-L} \iff p\>\), where this "true-in-L" is anemic, we should write, and this seems consistent with your 'translation' understanding of (T),

\[ <E/s/E \text{ is coherent-in-L} \iff ^p^\] or
\[ <E/s/E \text{ is anemically-true-in-L} \iff ^p^ . \]

\(^p^\) is a formal system's interpreted expression after its model's constants have been emplaced in the formal system's schematic letters, as they’ve been emplaced in
Tarski's p. /s/ indicates a token that has been emplaced in Tarski's 's', /s/ being the object language referent of 's'.

I summarize the several quotation devices I use, p. 4, a recap of my account in "On Emplacing".

I think you may be right there's room for doubt about how serious Tarski was about the correspondence theory--one account of robust truth--as germaine to (T). If as you say:

(a) He's concerned with truth as a "property" of object-language sentences, not speech acts such as statements or assertions. {I don't understand how ^truth^ can be a 'property' of a sentence, unless it just comes down to stating <This sentence is true>, where "true" is taken as a property, however ascertained, just because it's in the adjective/predicate grammatical place, which needs a lot of filling-in if we're to move from such a virtual property to the way loud, wavy, sharp are properties of objects or their disturbances. After all, we don't eyeball token sentences and observe their truth properties as we hear bells' loud ringing, see a flag waving, or feel a knife's sharp edge. Saying it's a 'figurative' property known to be 'present' after a logical process has been completed isn't helpful. What's the ontological status of the truth 'property'? How apart from our process of verifying truth and falsity are we to conceive that a sentence has one of those 'properties'? Loose talk sinks virtual ships.}

(b) Tarski doesn't have anything like states of affairs or events in mind as makers of statements' truth or falsity in his formal excursus. Yet he uses the "snow is white" example in various articles showing how he deals with the Liar, enticing us to conclude that his account of truth is consonant with Aristotle's, where the natural interpretation of Aristotle's "what is" and "what is not" (Metaphysics) is that they're truth makers. Even though Tarski is interested in formal systems, he might think Aristotle's view is consonant with his, if he, like many others, trailed clouds of platonic 'abstract' truth makers behind him. Or if he's thinking of satisfaction of formulas when their free variables are assigned emplacements/extensions--emplacing model elements into axioms--which, it is usually said, make the resultant 'statements' true or false without distinction between anemic and robust truth.

You and I agree that we need 'truth makers' (world states and events) to determine the truth or falsity of our speech act statements, or, as I prefer to say, that entitle us to judge, assert [A, assert], that a token sentence, /S/, with a coherent interpretation, ^I^, is true or false (/S/ + ^I^ + [A] = <statement>, <S> or <-<S>>). A reprom-ise: The various 'quotation' marks, whose use you may have forgotten, are explained two pages below, p. 4.

* * * * *
I augment the standard 'quotation' symbols to help us distinguish different kinds of referents. All appeared in "On Emplacing" except square brackets, [...]. The latter are introduced in its Appendix, forthcoming. In the Appendix, I aim to mature the presently embryonic ^coherence^, which subsumes the values ^coherent^ and ^incoherent^.

'^Incoherent' is used more and more frequently in philosophical literature as a fatal criticism of vaguely identified targets--sometimes a concept, now and then a statement, or a 'position' expressed by several statements. Here's an example from Ernest Sosa's "Skepticism" entry in Audi's The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy:

"I am quite sure that p, but I have no knowledge at all as to whether p. And this seems incoherent."

This is a criticism of R. Nozick's 'tracking' account of truth via the truth of what he believes. What is it that Sosa thinks is incoherent? It's clear his criticism does not charge inconsistency with which incoherence is often confused. ^Inconsistent^ is not identical to ^incoherent^; the former covers truth relations between statements, the latter covers coherence relations between concepts in a proposition, in a sentence's interpretation. You can't make statements if their constituent sentence tokens don't have coherent interpretations. I suppose Sosa thinks its conceptually incoherent to predicate ^sure^ and ^no knowledge^ of one and the same statement <s>, because these concepts are incompatible, somewhat along the lines of G.E. Moore's ^know^ and ^~believe^ from <I know <s>, but don’t believe it>. How is that incoherence charge backed up? What logic can Sosa use to support his criticism? Clearly he can't use truth logic, because he's claimed incoherence rather than inconsistency.

Here's another site where "incoherent" is used as a fatal criticism. We may ask the same questions of it as about Sosa's claim. It's by I. Berlin in the context of determining the relation between the concepts ^liberty^ and ^equality^. "The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution in which all good things coexist seems to me not merely unobtainable--that is a truism--but conceptually incoherent....That is a conceptual truth." Berlin explicitly distinguishes incoherence between concepts from inconsistency between statements. (Quoted from R. Dworkin's essay, "Do Liberal Values Conflict?", in The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, NY Review Books, 2001, p.74.) In that same source, p. 92, Bernard Williams writes sagely, "In fact, my own view is that the question of how we should think about the identity and the structure of such concepts [^liberty^ and ^justice^] is one that philosophy has scarcely even addressed: people have not thought in a very productive way about the ways in which such concepts should be identified, and the ways in which their structure must contribute to this." He then proceeds with a "kind of sketch" that does little to advance philosophy's address to this neglected topic, but he at least knows there's work to be done. He obviously knows nothing of my efforts in that direction, Nino, living in the UC Berkeley bubble just across San Francisco Bay on and off.
And now for coherence populism! It seems that coherence has a positive as well as a negative side that's widely appreciated. Here's an example from the *Int'l Herald-Tribune*, 6/26/02: "Russians admire Putin for returning a sense of order, and even appreciate his ability to field questions at a news conference, replying in sentences that are succinct and COHERENT (my caps) in comparison to almost any recent leader [in Russia]." In the same paper, February 2004, Larisa Kornoukhova says “This is a president (Putin) who at least knows how to talk and how to walk and how to behave—a normal person”. [And as for the USA in the W. Bush era…?]

I showed in "On Emplacing" that coherence can't be reduced to truth, and give a short argument for this below. I sense that people who use "incoherent" acknowledge this irreducibility in some vague way, but their concept of ^coherence^ isn't mature enough to precisely distinguish it from ^inconsistency^. It can't be done without conceptual/coherence logic, which I've been trying to supply (for subject-predicate propositions) since 1963. Buona fortuna, Arturo.

SOME QUOTATION DEVICES

<…>
<...> around sentences indicates STATEMENTS, which are sentence + proposition + truth value claim/assertion;

^...^ around words to indicate CONCEPTS, which are interpretations of words, and around sentences to indicate PROPOSITIONS, which are interpretations of sentences;

/…/ around words and sentences to indicate TOKENS of them;

"..." around words and sentences to indicate TYPES of them; a type is ANY token we may indifferently substitute for another, as I may indifferently substitute /hope/ for /hope/, in a sentence without counting the sentence as a different sentence type; this indifference is about counting physical tokens as ONE type, rather than counting interpretations of tokens as ONE interpretation. "ANY token" allows us to avoid thinking of types as classes of tokens; it enables us to count tokens as ONE type without having to admit the usual suspects, classes and sets, to our ontology. [Any] ranges over chosen ways of counting tokens as ONE type; thus may we swim happily in nominalistic waters (What other kind of waters are there?);

E…E around words and sentences indicate EMPLACEMENTS in tokens (hence, also in types). EgloveE, that is, a glove, is a coherent emplacement in /glove/ and "glove", while EhatE is an incoherent emplacement in both; EredE is a coherent trope
emplacement in /red/ and "red", while EgreenE is not. Thus, objects and tropes are emplacement candidates.

Tokens and types may also be emplaced; a token is an object and a type is any token object. In general, E/w/E and E"w"E indicate, respectively, emplaced a token and a any token of a type, /w/ and "w". For example, E"In the beginning was the word"E is a coherent type emplacement for the definite description /w/, /The first sentence in the King James version of the Bible is short/; E/In the beginning was the word/E is a coherent token emplacement for /The first sentence in my copy of the King James version of the Bible". “The" makes a description 'proper' as initial capitals make a name proper, indicating that there is one and only one coherent/proper emplacement for it; thus, we come out with the russellian result less tortuously than Russell did; the sentence /The Golden Mountain is in Vienna/ is conceptually coherent but <The Golden Mountain is in Vienna> is false, because the definite description has no coherent emplacement.

EsnowE and EwhiteE are coherent emplacements for /Snow/ and /white/ in /Snow is white/; EsilkE is an incoherent emplacement in /Snow/ as is EfascistE in /white/. (See "On Emplacing" for a more elaborate account of how to make states of affairs by emplacing objects and tropes in sentences’ subject and predicate tokens.). E^snow is white^E is a coherent emplacement in Convention (T)'s p if your translation claim holds; E"snow is white"E is a coherent emplacement in (T)'s 's' if Tarski intends to refer to sentence types rather than tokens with his "sentence".

[…]

[...] indicate interpretations of the copula. I call them functors. They invite operations, invite us to do something; [not, -] invites us to negate a statement, [not, \sim] to negate a concept; [subsume] invites us to subsume one concept under another; [infer] invites us to draw a conclusion from given premises, versus the passive RimpliesR, which reports a relation between statement premises and conclusion established by a valid inference, as RentailmentR reports a relation between premise and conclusion propositions (sentence interpretations) established by someone's making a valid conceptual inference. First comes the adverb, then the relation: First comes [VALIDLY infer], then comes Rvalid implicationR; first comes [COHERENTLY emplace], then comes Rcoherent emplacementR. "Agents! Front and Center!" is the cri du coeur of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He proposed the via attiva.

[...] indicates a VIA ATTIVA functor, because we use it to invite other agents to perform an act. You've probably divined that R...R, per above, is a VIA PASSIVA relation; it reports on how we've ordered and emplaced. [Infer] is via attiva; Rimp-
lies R is via passive. Functors differ from concepts; the former invite us to manage symbols and other objects and tropes and to travel on coherent routes in lexical space. Notice that I mostly drop the square brackets from [E…E], as in E…E. Although this distinction needs elaboration, I say no more about it until we reach the Appendix.

* * * *

Back to Tarski.

Shouldn't we hold his feet to the fire? How could anyone claim that \(<\langle s' \text{ is true}\rangle \iff p\rangle\) unless he thought the 'translation' \(^{^p}\) heralded a once-removed robust truth maker for /s/, the referent of 's'? I say "once-removed", because \(^{^p}\) identifies a truth-maker, a state of affairs, which, if existing, entitles us to assert \(<\langle s' \text{ is true}\rangle\), or, since E/s/E is a coherent emplacement in (T)'s 's', entitles us to assert \(<\langle s/ \text{ is true}\rangle\). If it's merely translation Tarski's after, leaving robust truth out of it, why not reduce his (T) to

\[
\text{(Tt1) } <\langle s/ \iff ^{^p}\rangle>?
\]

/s/ is the emplacement for Tarski's 's'. \(^{^p}\) should lead you to read (Tt1) as a translation claim, because any expression between carots refers to an interpretation, translation being one kind of interpretation. Eschewing meanings as ontologically vacuous, \(^{^p}\) doesn't tell us what /s/ means; it tells us how to rewrite /s/ as /p/, as I explain later on. So, the final outcome of (Tt1) is

\[
\text{(Tt2) } <\langle s/ \iff /p\rangle>,
\]

where /p/ is the rewrite of /s/ per \(^{^p}\) and may or may not use the same word types in the same order as in Tarski's example,

\[
\text{(T) } <\langle \text{snow is white/ is true} \iff /\text{snow is white}\rangle>.
\]

Here I'm assuming that Tarski intends that the emplacement for 's' in (T) is the token /snow is white/ and true is a 'property' of it. More detail on the relation between interpretations and a possible plurality of rewrites of a sentence comes up later.

/s/, or \(<s>\), will have the same meaning whether it is true or false, so there's no need for "TRUE-in-L". Why drag the truth of \(<s>\) into a translation claim? Unless he has anemic rather than robust truth in mind, the result of a purely symbolic demonstration of truth via translation rather than a 'correspondent' one that requires extra-symbolic states of affairs. His aim of extruding "true" and "false" from the object language betrays nothing of which kind of truth he had in mind. I know he thought he needed it to banish semantic terms from the object language to avoid the Liar, his starting point, which does take true, not true, and false seriously, and so must he to authenticate his worry. Otherwise, what's the problem with a little Liar here and there? Hence, it seems he has to be after more than 'translation'.

Here's a good place to elaborate on the distinction between anemic and robust truth and to give an outline of how it may be possible to relate traditional truth logic to coherence logic. Tell me if you understand what I'm proposing and, if you do, tell me if you think it's a useful distinction. As you'll see, I'm suggesting that truth logic is a sub-branch of coherence logic; ^valid^ and ^derivable^ are coherence not truth evaluations. I know what follows is unorthodox. Although you may resist initially, please be critically generous. It seems a way to repair The Tarski Blindspot without cancelling his 'definition' of formal languages' "truth".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>Propositions</th>
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<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Complex Propositions</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Symbol Emplacements</td>
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<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Modeled Propositions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Anemic Truth</td>
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</tbody>
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1. Think of this array as two (quasi) conceptual subsumption pathways branching off ^proposition^. Propositions have either of two coherence values--coherent or incoherent. This array presumes they're coherent. Note that the left branch of coherent propositions ends up in (4) as anemic truth.

2. Distinguishes COMPLEX propositions, such as ^P --> Q^, whose terms are propositions we relate with the familiar 'logical constants', from SINGLE propositions whose terms are concepts in subject-predicate sentences that we relate with conceptual/lexical relations--[negate (∼), subsume, bond, contrast, identify, link, conger, and predicate,] all of which are distinct conceptual functor interpretations of the copula [to be] and [to have]; do not confuse conceptual with extensional functors; for example, [subsume] =|= [include]. Some of these functors are explained in the appendix and in Bierman & Assali, Part III. Here are some examples of simple propositions. ^[Bond] emerald green^; ^[negate] green^ = ^[~] green^; ^[contrast] green red blue puce...^.

3. Distinguishes between kinds of emplacements we may make in the terms of complex versus single propositions. Consider, first, emplacements into complex propositions.

In constructing so-called 'truth tables', really coherence tables, we emplace the tokens /1/ and /0/, or /T/ and /F/, into schematic letters, /P/ --> /Q/, or into the statements (^lamp is bright^ --> ^lamp is lit^) that we've emplaced into the schematic
letters. These are 'semantic' interpretations, so called because down the road these emplacments are interpreted as "true" and "false", which in (4) is anemic truth. I think of "logical constants" in (2) as via passive reports on via attive functors that invite linguistic acts of conjuncting, implicating, negating, and so forth. [Validly infer] is via attiva, Rvalid implicationR is a via passiva report of the inferential act. We can certify valid inferences (^P --> Q^, ^P^; therefore ^Q^) with symbolic 'semantic' emplacements, "T" and "F", in the same way we can certify complex tautological strings, (--> & -->^P Q^ ^P^ ^Q^), because every valid argument may be transformed into a tautological string whose main functor is [implies] or [entails]. We can certify them in the same way because our habits of using functors [and, if... then, or, not, ...] with those once-removed interpretations (1, T = true, 0, F = false) lead us to our desired outcome, T T T T for both arguments and tautologies. This outcome is the product of a coherent, that is, valid inference and its coherent count-erpart tautological string. Validity and tautology are coherent outcomes of via attiva operations in, respectively, inferences/arguments and their counterpart complex 'propositions'.

We don't say an inference is true; we say it's valid, which obliges us to sub-sume ^valid^ under ^coherent^, and ^invalid^ under ^incoherent^.

The tautological counterparts of valid inferences should likewise be evaluated as coherent rather than as 'true'. See W.'s Tractatus, 4.441; also 4.462: "Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They present no possible facts." The Barbara syllogism is accepted as ground zero coherent/valid, not as true, from which, with other ground zero coherent immediate inferences, we may confidently construct other derived coherent inference forms. Validity is independent of robust truth, but serves it. I've used W.'s 'truth table schemata' as an example of symbolic model emplacements as the ground of coherence/anemic truth. As I understand it, we may use model emplacements also for certifying the coherence/anemic truth of formal systems' axioms and theorems.

As to single propositions, their terms are concepts, illustrated above as ^lamp^ and ^bright^ in ^the lamp is bright^, where [is] is a predication functor. These concepts are drawn from a lexical system more or less mastered by a language's speak-ers. The lexical terms’ emplacements draw their coherence values from our more or less shared emplacement patterns; EredE is a coherent emplacement into /red/ for most English speakers; EgreenE is not; EninoE a la Cocchiarella, son of..., husband of, employed at... is a coherent emplacement into /Nino/. I explained how coherent emplacements into the subjects and predicates of sentences certifies the robust truth of statements in "On Emplacing". If anyone should ask you if they may consult that essay, assure them that I will happily send them a copy (abierman@sfsu.edu). There is more on these themes below, so hold your frowns until you read more.

(4) In this line, the left branch ends with complex propositions’ coherence, or what I have been calling anemic truth. The right branch ends with statements and
robust truth. When we make statements we're claiming there are coherent emplacements into sentences’ object and trope tokens, which is how we construct facts/states-of-affairs. The emplacement act moves objects and tropes inside language. \(^{\text{^Lamp^}}\) subsumes a lamp, like the one on your table; reference is a conceptual subsumption relation. Similarly, \(^{\text{^bright^}}\) subsumes the illumination your lamp throws. If the lamp emplaced in \(/\text{lamp/}\) carries bright illumination as an emplacement in \(/\text{bright/}\), \(<\text{The lamp is bright}>\) is robustly true. Emplacement erases the supposedly irrefrangible, dualistic barrier between the symbolic and the extra-symbolic, between language and the ‘world’: Language tokens are objects in the world; objects in the world become language tokens WHEN and ONLY WHEN coherently emplaced. This is how we make robust truth while dodging dualistically troubled \(^{\text{^picture^}},^{\text{^correspondence^}},^{\text{^representation^}}\), all of which, justifiably, have been prime targets of differing forms of idealism. It's been as difficult to explain the the picture-pictured dualism, and their offspring, as to explain mind-body dualism.

As you say, Tarski may not have been after robust truth, which leaves anemic truth as his quest. Natural language sentences have robust truth, because we emplace space-time objects and tropes into sentence subjects and predicates. If we coherently emplace EroseE in \(/\text{rose/}\) and it carries EredE into \(/\text{red/}\) of \(/\text{the rose is red/}\), \(<\text{The rose is red}>\) is true. Coherent emplacement requires lexical practices and its implicit or explicit logic, being intermediary between grammatical sentences and true/false statements. Formalized or semi-formalized sciences may have robust truth. But none of the required robust emplacements occurs in the body of Tarski's formal 'definition' of \(^{\text{true^}}\). Formal, constructed language schemas, axioms, shown to be ‘true’ by modelling or by arbitrarily designated abstract extensions ("all objects in domain D in world W") bypass the lexical stage in pursuit of truth. Tarski's target may be anemic truth in his Convention (T) essay. This may not be your translation suggestion, but it’s certainly less than the robust truth that a correspondence theory is meant to supply. (A generous interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about truth are enough for Tarski's purpose without any need to interpret it as a robust correspondence theory.)

There may be also a conflation of two satisfiabilities, model satisfiability, which is a conduit only to anemic truth, which is actually a coherence value result; and states-of-affairs satisfiability, which is a conduit to robust truth (I look on token and type names of kinds of objects and of tropes as variables whose coherent emplacements are their subsumed values.)

My recollection is that Carnap used his 'meaning rules' to keep anemic and robust truth distinct. As I recall, Carnap also thought they could be used to give rigorous accounts of states-of-affairs satisfiability for propositions in formalized scientific theories. His meaning rules, however, are ill-suited for natural languages whose words 'meanings' can't be regimented with precise rules, unlike a developed science's terms, which is more easily formalized. J. Katz's attempt to provide inter-
pretations by means of markers just exploits old types of definitions; it supplies no 'system' on which to erect a logic of concepts. Hemple's account of systems of concepts also fails natural languages and is too closely tied to a system of statements' relations to provide a conceptual logic liberated from truth conditions. Sorry I can't give you the Hemple reference; it's an essay in a collection.

Carnap must not have had a totally tin ear in English. He surely appreciated that "large" has at least two interpretations: \(^{\text{large(i)}}\) individual, \(^{\text{large(n)}}\) number. \(^{\text{Pyramid large(i)}}\) is coherent, but \(^{\text{pyramid large(n)}}\) is not. <The pyramid is large(i)> may be true or may be false; <The pyramid is large(n)> is neither. If wff rules don't distinguish the differing coherence values of these grammatical combinations, he knew it needs lexical help; hence, the 'meaning rules'. This was emphasized by Chomsky in his Syntactic Structures. The syntax of natural languages doesn't provide sufficient grounds for lexical evaluations, a view shared by such Germans as Porzig, Trier, and Weisgerber working in "field" lexics. All were motivated by the bromide: Not every grammatical combination of interpreted terms is coherent; in old speak, there are 'meaningless'/sinnlos grammatical sentences. Conceptual logic is a tool we can use to determine the coherence value of combinations of subjects and predicates that does not depend on arbitrary meaning rules, but does depend upon lexical practices. As with all logical canons, its usefulness depends upon our capacity to provide acceptable premises, in this case coherent premises. (I think conceptual logic’s most important use is to help us to draw out and elaborate our unexamined, implicit conceptual practices; when there aren't any, it suggests where we need to add some; when there are clashing practices, it provides a guide to reason mutually with common means about changes or to expunge, rationally, happily, logically inexplicable lexical practices. Think of the surface of conceptual space as restless liquid on which we bob to and fro, not as stable rock to which we’re immovably fixed.)

Model satisfiability is often asked to do the impossible--to provide both coherence/anemic truth and semantic robust truth, a Mitteleuropa conflation that was the ur source of the positivists' variants of the "truth condition" theory of meaning. As you know, I've shed my reliance on the hopelessly embryonic ^meaning^, which I propose to replace with a more mature, logical concept of ^coherence^ value.

Coherent \(\models\) True (Robust)

Here's the short argument that \(^{\text{coherent}}\) (^anemic truth^) is logically independent of \(^{\text{robust truth}}\), as \(^{\text{incoherent}}\) is independent of robust \(^{\text{false}}\).

\(<S>\) and \(-<S>\) may not both be true nor both false. [Nor may either be both true and false; if the Liar violates this requirement, it's incoherent to call it a statement.]
However, both <S> and -<S> may be coherent (meaningful, in old speak), because both ^S^ and ^~S^ are coherent. (<Jack is blond> and <Jack is not blond> can’t both be true nor false; but both are coherent.)

Also both <S> and -<S> may be incoherent (meaningless, in old speak), because either ^S^ and ^~S^ is incoherent.

^S^ and ^~S^'s coherence values rise and fall together.

This gives us 2 coherences versus 1 true, and 2 incoherences versus 1 false. 2 is not identical to 1; hence, ^coherent^ is not identical to ^true^ nor is ^incoherent^ identical to ^false^; thus, coherence conditions can't be identical to truth value conditions--as grammatical conditions can't be identical to coherence conditions.

This argument shows that lexics and truth semantics are as logically distinct as syntax and lexics, and that the truth-conditions theory of sentence meaning must be refined to near extinction. I do, however, save a small but important and surprisingly powerful portion:

If a statement is true or false, the interpretation of the sentence used to make the statement is coherent.

For example, if <The heart is muscle> is true or false, ^[Predication] heart muscle^ is a coherent interpretation of /the heart is muscle/. This shouldn’t surprise us. The statement could be true only if EheartE is a coherent emplacement in /heart/ and that it carries the trope EmuscleE coherently into /muscle/, which are conceptual logic’s conditions for statements’ truth; hence, ^[Predication] heart muscle^ is coherent.

The logical distinction between coherence and truth logic is important for "On Emplacing". There I show the Liar is not a semantic paradox, because it's incoherent, and, so, isn't a candidate for either anemic or robust falsity or truth. It's not anemically true, because it's incoherent. It's not robustly true, because no time-space objects or trope emplacements may ever be supplied for <This statement is false> or <This statement is not true>. The Liar ballet is empty word play, where "false", "true", and "not true" are semantic ‘pieces’ that are never cashed in with an emplaced Object/Trope pas de deux. The Appendix develops the coherence logic needed to give regimented arguments for this claimed incoherence.

Frege's Monotheistic Negation

Frege's focus on the single, truth use of [not] was shared by Mitteleuropa philosophers. They didn't, and few now, add a conceptual use, [~, not], as I do. I distinguish the act of negating statements, [-, not], from the act of negating concepts, [~not]. Fred Sommers and his loyal band embrace the importance of [~, not]. If you stick to a truth use of [not], you get only complementary relations between predicate concepts/functions. If <S is P> is true, then <S is Q> ...<S is Z> are false, where ^Q^
...^Z^ are complements of ^P^. The result of excluding conceptual negation and embracing its complementary outcome by dumping incoherent sentences into the False bin erroneously commits you to holding there are no incoherent sentences. You're committed to holding that one may coherently combine any predicate concept/function, ^Q^...^Z^, with ^S^.

Suppose ^S^ is ^tongue^, ^P^ is ^red^, ^Q^ is ^green^, and ^Z^ is ^italicized^.

<His tongue is red>
<His tongue is green>
<His tongue is italicized>.

The first two are coherent and it's possible that either is true; the third is incoherent, hence, can be neither true nor false. This is because ^green^ is a proper contrary of ^red^ but ^italicized^ is not, being only complementary. (This is harder to show than you might think.) Frege takes the simplifying viper by its tail and holds that statements, <S is Q>...<S is Z>--same subject and complementary predicates of ^P^, the predicate of the true <S is P>--are FALSE even though ^tongue italicized^ is INCOHERENT. Frege doesn't grant that incoherent/non-sense statements can't be true or false. He can't but get bit by using only viperous truth negation, [,-,not]; he's committed to holding there are no incoherent propositions. Strange, coming from a man who is a storied champion of ^sense^, which must have a contrary, namely, ^nonsense^, as every concept does, except one at a presumed singular apex. By confining himself to truth negation alone he can't use conceptual negation to distinguish the lexical relations between ^red^ and ^green^ from ^red^ and ^italicized^, which we need in order to isolate the sense of words. ^Green/~red^, is a contrary of ^red^; ^italicized^ is not. Thus, Frege, by sticking to his single truth interpretation of [not], hampered his conceptual program. Contrary relations' contributions to systems of concepts are under appreciated by English lexicographers, unlike the Italian and French who write books of contraries as well synonyms; I don't know about German lexicographers, but, if Frege is a bellwether, they may be as inattentive to contraries as English and Americans are, despite Segner, and despite Porzig and other German lexical field theorists.

Wiedersehen Frege

INQUIRING SIDE NOTE

The distinction between model vs. states-of-affairs satisfiability conduits, respectively, to anemic vs. robust truth value may affect Goedel's first incompleteness theorem. Some people doubt that it invalidates Hilbert's program. Think of this possibility: If Hilbert's program were interpreted as a search for coherence rather than robust truth, and since Goedel's claim relies on the truth of a proposition that proves its
own unprovability, we get a 'true' without benefit of robust truth makers. So, the claim that we can't derive all 'true' propositions from a formal system's axioms (good enough for arithmetic) fails if Goedel's platonist fervor leads him to make a Faustian pact with robust truth, which no purely symbolic manipulation can provide. Thus, he hasn't shown there is a robust truth that escapes Hilbert's anemic truth/coherence program. Does Hilbert live?

After all, there are at least twice as many coherent propositions as statement truths; \(^P^\) and \(^\sim P^\) and both coherent, but not both \(<P>_1\) and \(<P>_2\) are true. That is, both sentences we use to state contradictions/contraries may have coherent interpretations. It's another matter, outside the symbolic transformations, whether formally coherent expressions may be true or false; or whether they may be consistent when none is robustly true.

A statement that proves its own unprovability is incoherent tout court. It's the upside-down version of the Liar's self-proving paradoxicality. Label this the Tarski-Goedel Eclipse; robust truth obscures anemic truth; coherent light is concealed behind robust truth’s dark matter. If Goedel thinks his late, rationalistic unprovability and states-of-affairs deliver the 'same' truth, he commits the same error as those who think the Liar is a paradox: They're floating in faery balloons, logically manipulating statements to reach conclusions about robust 'truth' value without ever providing the coherent emplacements that yield states-of-affairs' truth value. Goedel, and Liar paradox lovers, make the same mistake: Without emplacement truth, they multiply symbols that have no relation to the space-time world. (May Goedel sleep in peace in his beloved 'third' world and not disturb mine, or yours.).

But what if we didn’t aspire to Goedel’s robust truth claim? What if his argument applied to a system’s anemic incompleteness: No system can prove the coherence of all coherent propositions? This question assumes the rigidity of ‘objective’ truth, which systems of lexical coherence don’t share. Lexical coherence is based on intersubjective linguistic habits. They change; hence, it’s incoherent to suppose there are ‘axioms’ for lexical systems. Today’s shared coherences may be tomorrow’s dissonances. Underlying lexical routes—subsumption, bonding, …--may abide, but their coherent emplacement payoffs mostly drift on unpredictable tides.

END OF SIDE NOTE INQUIRY

Natural languages have three evaluation schemes: Syntax, lexics, semantics. I'm trying to supply lexics with a logic we can use when we evaluate lexical interpretations' coherence value and/or adjudicate disagreements about them. In formal languages we have only a double evaluation: Syntax (well-formedness) and model satisfiability or provability, from which we get coherence value only, unlike the robust truth value we get from object-tropes’ emplacements. The syntax that makes the commutative 

\[(a + b) = (b + a)\]

a wff, plus the lexical rule that we may emplace
equals-for-equals (emplacing, say, a /1/ in both "a"s and a /2/ in both "b"s), gives us a model interpretation whose acknowledged coherence derives from the coherence conferred by well-rooted practices for manipulating numerals in arithmetic—borrowing school coherence from Peter Arithmetic to pay Paul Algebra.

I'm no expert on model literature, but I venture that it relies on propositions’ coherence value rather than on statements’ robust truth values. If ^Fido is a dog^, then ^Fido is a ~horse^ may be part of an established lexical model. The Fido-mod-el's 'semantic' virtues rest on coherent conceptual combinations and emplacements of tokens in tokens (emplacing, say, /1/ in all tokens of “a” in /a + a = 2a/) rather than on robust predication truths. Object – Property predication is the only form in which emplacements produce robust truth, as in /[Predicate] Fido wet/; emplace Fido in /Fido/; if he carries his wet hide into /wet/, that token sentence becomes <[Predicate] Fido wet> True. This doesn’t hold for any other copula functor. Since no model test duplicates this Fido example, it doesn’t produce statements, let alone true or false statements. We’re left with a coherence evaluation of propositions only.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[Subsume]} & \quad ^\text{Fido} [\text{under}] ^\text{dog} \\
\text{[Contrast]} & \quad ^\text{dog} \ ^\text{horse} (\text{contrary concepts})
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[~Subsume]} & \quad ^\text{Fido} [\text{under}] ^\text{horse}
\end{align*}
\]

That is, conceptually, Fido is [not, ~] a horse: ^[Subsume] ^\text{Fido} [under] ^\text{horse}^ is incoherent. That’s why this conclusion shouldn’t be read as <Fido is a horse> is false, but as ^[Subsume] ^\text{Fido} [under] ^\text{horse}^ is:

- IF we apply the axioms and theorems of a coherent system to some space-time subject matter, via coherent emplacement, THEN we may conclude that any statements robustly true are consistently true.

Thus, robust truth and semantic evaluation, emplacement of world entities into well-formed, coherent expressions, are logically interdependent. Wittgenstein drilled arithmetical practices into his young charges in an Austrian country school:

"Was? Ein und zwei ist nicht gleich zwei und ein?"

Smack alongside the head for doubting the coherence of that commutative switch. An enquiry about the smack, not the coherence, followed. These functorial arithmetrical practices stand good for our induced belief that ^(1 + 2) = (2 + 1)^ is coherent, after which we may sail outward, assured of the coherence of any proper numerical emplacements in the commutative algebraic wff, a compass we may use to guide us toward other coherent, numerically commutative islands. We can't, however, conclude that ^(1 + 2) = (2 + 1)^ is robustly true, since it's only an emplacement of one pair of tokens (/1/ & /1/ and /2/ & /2/), respectively, in another pair (/a/ & /a/ and /b/ & /b/) within a grammatical wff; this token-for-token emplacement doesn’t turn a coherent ^1 + 2^ = ^2 + 1^ into a true statement, <(1 + 2) = (2 + 1)>.

Numerals, although they’re as much space-time entities as tongues and colors are, have their con-
ceptual being only within a symbolic system; they aren’t extra-symbolic for us while we’re traveling in the lexical system in which numerals "breathe, and move, and have their being". That's why such models can't confer robust semantic value. Thought, following its own rules, doesn't bake truth cakes, even for those tempted to accept Leibniz's (Germany's Pythagoras) theosophy as their Weltanschauung. I'm continually amazed, as you must be, how many philosophers still lean on European rationalism even though they've jettisoned its necessary theological support.

Wittgenstein's "t"s and "f"s in his ‘Truth Tables’ are model token emplace-ments, EtE and EfE, in "p" and "q"'s tokens; his schemata (tables) are coherence tests for complex propositions (in my sense) when propositions are emplaced in such schematic tokens as /p/, /q/, and /r/. One end-use of truth table schemas is to determine the coherence value of the complex propositions—tautological/enjoined coherence, contradictory/enjoined incoherence, contingent/allowed coherence.¹

Another use is to determine the validity of a conceptual inference. "Every sentence in logic is a symbolic presentation of a modus ponens. (And the modus ponens cannot be expressed by a sentence.)” (6.1264, Tractatus.) What a philosophical disaster that Wittgenstein’s arrays passed as "TRUTH Tables"; we can't let Ludwig W. off the hook for this. It mesmerized sincere Mitteleuropa truth seekers bobbing on high seas whipped up by irrational tempests; they were desperately looking for firm ground. Better for them to have booked passage on Neurath's barque, which never finds port and is saved from sinking by its dedicated occupants' unceasing repairs. Cultures aren't rooted, Nino, they're afloat on watery waves.

Do you think philosophy professors can be weaned from that unfortunate misnomer, “truth tables”, Nino? Will it help if they say to themselves five minutes every day for a week, "COHERENCE Tables", "COHERENCE Tables", ..., or crossing out "TRUTH" (Tables) wherever it appears in their logic texts (tanti, including mine)? Or should we forbid them to use "T" and "F", and "1=T" and "0=F"? How about replacing them with "pug" and "mug"?

Coherent inferences in formal systems, normally thought of as valid truth inferences, must be distinguished from coherent inferences in natural languages; the latter import robust truth into their statement premises, the former do not, per your doubts about Tarski's (T). Lexics is usually confused with semantics, even by our betters (at least by my betters), which is forgivable since no lexical logics were available nor invented by my betters, except for Segner, a late 18th Century German logician and physician, who did invent a conceptual version of Aristotelian logic.

¹ [Enjoined to], [Enjoined not to], and [Allowed to] are modal lexical functors. We may be enjoined to travel from one concept to another in lexical space on a copula’s advised route, or be enjoined not to travel on such a route, or be allowed to do so. The routes include, among others, subsumption, bonded, and predication routes. They are agent-oriented modalities for coherence value and replace, respectively, truth value’s [Necessary], [Impossible], and [Possible]. Truth value has but one modality, [Possible]/[Contingent], which is a corrupt version of [Allowed to].
I'm nowhere near formulating coherence logic for 1-place predicates as an axiom system. I'm not a good enough technician to do that, unlike you, in whom both technical and philosophical facility find a happy marriage. Nor am I motivated to do so; it's too soon to get any profit by axiomatizing such a fledgling logic. I do know, however, that most lexical treatises are overly tied for my logical purposes to syntactical refinements; they import more distinctions than we need for coherence inferences pertinent to many philosophical issues, although the lexical work of John Austin and some ordinary language movement workers did exploit grammatical clues well and relevantly. Pick your logic to suit your goals. Carnapian tolerance? Right?

Models show only the coherence of each axiom rather than its robust truth, and nothing about axioms' truth consistency. From the coherence of each axiom, no conclusion may be drawn about the truth of any axiom, nor about the truth consistency of the set of axioms. Axioms can be neither true nor false. Praise coherence! From a set of coherent axioms, with valid, coherent inferences, we may infer coherent theorems, which is blessing enough in our or anyone's time. They provide a way of reasoning about world states and events when they're emplaced coherently in valid schemata of coherent inferences. However, don't conclude that truths can't alter propositions' coherence value. They may, and often do, with the discovery of hitherto unobserved or uninferred states of affairs. However, our conceptual system isn't altered in the simplistic way heretofore proposed by positivists and their progeny who don't know conceptual logic, nor in the wholesale way envisioned in Umberto Eco's *Kant and the Platypus* by partisans of 'conceptual incommensurability'. Eco's is a popularized attempt to show how new factual discoveries lead to conceptual changes, which is the right way to go, but without benefit of conceptual logic it remains at an intuitive level. As Cary Grant might have said to Mae West, "Hand me my pants! You're twisting the truth out of my troth."

As you see, I provisionally think of formal systems sans object-trope emplacements as coherence rather than robust truth systems, contrary to Platonists, Goedel, and Tarski (in his truth interpretation). The valid inference patterns we use may be grounded in the functorial practices that get reported as "logical constants". Isn't the difference between

\[ ^\rightarrow \& \rightarrow PQ P \land Q \land \text{ and } \rightarrow \& \rightarrow PQ -P -Q \land ^\rightarrow \]

a matter of detecting coherent and incoherent arrangements of our logical functors, consonant with the way we deploy [if...then] and other functors, and our acts of affirming and denying? We detect valid and 'tautological’ coherence and invalid and ‘contradictory’ incoherence without robust truth-makers, as per Wittgenstein's vacant model coherence tables. The *coherent* validity of modus ponens assures us that with the coherent emplacement of objects and tropes in an inference's sentential premises, making them robustly true, we're entitled to believe its conclusion is also robustly true. That’s what the coherence tables show: If the premises are coherent and if there are
coherent emplacements in them that deliver robust truths, the premises truth is preserved in the conclusion. It’s time to reread J. S. Mill in a new, less simp-listically empirical vein.²

READ THE FOLLOWING SKETCH AT YOUR DISCRETION

REVISED INTERPRETATIONS OF STATEMENT DETERMINERS

I treat so-called relations as functorial operations—agents ordering objects and tropes by coherent emplacements into their token terms, /Jack [left of] Jill/ vs. /Jill [left of] Jack/, /white [brighter than] black/. I replace determiners [all] with [any of every] and [some] with [one, two, n-1 of any], to discourage confused ontologists from straying off the nominalistic reservation. These quantification replacements enjoin us to make the appropriate coherent emplacements in tokens, which I explain further below. In this way, I turn the 'truth-conditions' account of meaning on its head: Coherent emplacements that contribute to the 'meanings' of sentences also account for the robust truth of statements, rather than vice versa. Intension fast ueber alles. 1+-place predicate statements' truth derives from (i) coherent emplacements in their token terms (ii) in a coherent order.

Below, I explain how to treat <S is P> when determiners are added. For the more elaborate account you'll have to consult "On Emplacing", particularly for the occasions when there is no emplacement for /S/, the point of contention twixt Strawson vs. Russell".³ "Is true" and "is false" abbreviate "entitled to claim is true" and "entitled to claim is false"; when we're not entitled to claim either, our entitlement is "unknown". Entitled is three-valued.⁴

The determiner [any] may be used in at least two ways. You may choose between a singular and plural operation:

SINGULAR, [ONE OF ANY] from among coherent emplacements for a subject /S (rather than [SOME MEMBER OF S]),
PLURAL, [ANY OF EVERY] from among coherent emplacements for /S/ (rather than [ALL MEMBERS OF S]).

These versions of [any] allow us dispense with "class", "set", "some member", and "all members" for categorical statement forms, A, E, I, O.

² See “On Emplacing”, p. 82, an unpublished essay in which I revise and correct Russell’s On Denoting” and Strawson’s “On Referring”.
³ See p. 77, Section II, where I introduce the Omnitude determiner and propose a view of the Square of Opposition that follows neither Russell nor Strawson, thanks to conceptual negation. Remember “On Emplacing” is the Son of Sams [Same I = “On Denoting” and Sam II = “On Referring].
⁴ Again, see “On Emplacing, Section II, especially pp. 49 and 63 for the substitution chart.
**SINGULAR** - [One of any] coherent emplacement in /S/ of /S is P/ or /S is ~P/. ^~P^ may be either the contradictory of ^P^ or one of its contraries.

[One of any] /nose is long/ (an I form); [One of any] /nose is ~long/ (an O form). This use is suited to I and O categorical statements.

**PLURAL** - [Any of every] coherent emplacement in /S/ of /S is P/ or /S is ~P/.

[Any of every] /coin is hard/ (an A form);
[Any of every] /coin is ~hard/, (an E form). This use is suited to A and E categorical statements.

I include under the singular use [two ones of any], [three ones of any] ..., any numeral less than or equal to n-1 of the unlimited, plural, [any of every], coherent emplacements for /S/.

Introducing negation into the plural use, [Not any of every] negates [one, two, ..., n-1 of any] but does not entail, by the OMNITUDE requirements, that there is/are any. Negating statements with plural uses of [any] is equivalent to introducing negation into the quantifier functor, which produces its equivalent singular use. Not-A is equivalent to O: This both preserves Aristotle's original formulation, the first O form below, and suits the OMNITUDE requirements, the second O form below. A singular O use contradicts its plural A use.

Negated A Form          O Form          O Form
-<[Any of every] S is P>  <--->  <[~any of every] S is P>  <--->  <[One two, … of any] S is ~P>

Similar equivalences result from negating E form statements
Negated E Form          I Form          I Form
-<[Any of every] S is ~P>  <--->  <[~any of every] S is ~P>  <--->  <[One, two, … of any] S is P

Negating statements with a plural use of [any] is equivalent to introducing negation into the quantifier functor. Not-E is equivalent to I. A singular I use

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5 “On Emplacing”, p. 76f.
6 In *On Interpretation*, 17b, 17–26, Aristotle formulates an O statement as “Not every S is P”. This doesn’t require the existence of an S. See “On Emplacing”, p. 41. The Omnitude requirement for universal sentences, A and E, requires listing as a conjunction all the statements, <S is P> that would make A, <All Ss are P>, true and all the statements, <S is ~P>, that would make E, <No Ss are P>, true; and listing at least one statement, <S is P>, that would make I true; and at least one statement, <S is ~P> that would make O true. There is no way to support truth value claims about categorical statements without satisfying these Omnitude requirements. See “On Emplacing”, p. 66.
contradicts its plural E use. Keep the Omnitude and Aristotelian references per above in mind.

Also, negating statements with a singular use of [any] is equivalent to introducing negation into the quantifier functor. Not-O is equivalent to A, and Not-I is equivalent to E. A plural A use contradicts its singular O use, and a plural E use contradicts its singular I use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negated O form</th>
<th>A Form</th>
<th>A Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-&lt; [One of any] S is ~P&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;--&gt; &lt;[~one of any] S is ~P&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;--&gt; &lt;[Any of every] S is P&gt;</td>
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<th>Negated I form</th>
<th>E Form</th>
<th>E Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-&lt; [One of any] S is P&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;--&gt; &lt;[~one of any] S is P&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;--&gt; &lt;[Any of every] S is ~P&gt;</td>
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It's important to note that these negations of both singular and plural determiners alter functorial requirements and reveal the logical substratum that supports statement negation. Also, they are friendly to an agent-oriented account of language and logic, although, like [all] and [some], they place conditions on the truth value of the statements they determine. Better, they alter the procedures we should follow to determine with what truth value we're entitled to bless or curse their appointed categoricals. This accords with my conceptual treatment of the Square of Opposition. Distinguish the conceptual negation, [~,], of determiners, from that of concepts, [~], and negations of statements, [-]. By using conceptual determiner and concept negation, [~], instead of relying solely on statement negations, [-], and the nebulous “non-“, as in “non-dog”, to symbolize categorical statements, I show that both Russell's and Strawson's treatment of the Square of Opposition are mistaken; their limited neg-tion armory forces them into a motiveless standoff.

Also, conceptual negation, [~,], replaces the extensionally favored [non-p], as in "No dogs are non-animals" with "[any of every] dog is an ~animal", which, in turn is replaced by "[Any of every] dog is an animal". Mathematically oriented logicians resort to [non-] to hold onto the exclusive truth interpretation of [not]. Thus, conceptually negated determiners and concepts deepen the superficial state-ment negation in the traditional Square of Opposition, which was designed to portray the coherence of immediate inferences between categorical forms of statements.

These determiner + conceptual negations maintain the contradictory relations between A and O and between E and I forms, the contrary relations between A and E forms, and the sub-contrary relations between I and O forms PROVIDED they sat-isfy

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7 “On Emplacing”, p. 77f.
the reference conditions I specified in "On Emplacing", pp. 77 - 81, in conjunction with the Substitution Chart, p. 63; see especially Thelma's long speech on p. 80 where she explains the Omnitude Determiner and the relations it establishes in the Square of Opposition.

An agent-oriented approach to alethic relations between categorical statement forms ushers in the reminder that often agents aren't entitled to judge a statement true nor false; epistemological modesty walzes a three-step: "Entitled to say is true", "entitled to say is false", and "not entitled to say either, UNKNOWN". Since Strawson clings to two-valued alethic evaluations, he has to hold that false statements aren't statements if they haven't satisfied the presupposition that sentences' subjects have referents. Recall that <All my children are asleep>, according to him, isn't a statement if the speaker has no children. Lines 5 - 8 in the three-valued Substitution Chart, p. 63, corrects his oversimplified but well motivated attempt to torpedo the Boolean mode of presenting immediate relations between categorical statements. Those lines in the Chart introduce a condition in which the non-existence of a subject's intended referent entitles us to judge that <S is P> is false. There is 'subject' as well as 'predicate' falsity. This will offend 'saturated' Fregeans, but they can regroup once they recognize that Frege's zealous anti-psychologism in matters logical and mathematical, a zeal I share, is quite distinct from agent oriented logic. Frege might be the last person to acknowledge that anemic truth is not and never can be robust truth. He relied on Platonic ontology to underwrite logical 'truth, recognized by a suspect 'intuition' instead of acknowledging the epistemological, often tentative, hard work agents do to sustain or abandon intuitions.

Adding conceptual and determiner negations to statement negation isn't a mere trifle that shows we can give an account of the Square of Opposition with [any] and [every] and their negations, my touted tickets to nominalism. These additions are essential for a satisfying answer to Parmenides' claim that we can't make false statements, a solution that eluded the great Russell who resorted to "negative facts".\(^8\) I use Plato's reply to Parmenides' claim, as reported in The Sophist and Parmenides' fragments (subject to seven translations/interpretations per Giovanni Reale). VERY briefly: Plato's "other" (in most translations) is a conceptually negated concept. The "other" of ^hot^ is ^~hot^. We show a statement is false if one with the same subject but a contrary or contradictory predicate concept, [~P], an "other", is true. Behind every false statement is an incompatible true one; one of them has a predicate that is the conceptual negation [not, ~] of the other's. Thus, we may deduce the falsity of <S is ~P> from the truth of <S is P> and the falsity of <S is P> from the truth of <S is ~P>):

<Mary is awake>. Assume this is true.

^Awake^ and ^asleep^ are incompatible.

^Awake^ is the contradictory of ^asleep^ (= ^~awake^). If you want to accomodate ^doze^, {^awake^, ^doze^, ^asleep^}, it makes contraries of ^awake^ and ^asleep^ rather than contradictories.

Not<Mary is asleep>.
You may read this conclusion as <Mary is asleep> is false, which is how <Mary is ~awake> may also be read, providing you don't think [not] is equivalent to false. A statement negation is not a truth-value judgment. The conceptual negations entitle you to conclude, pace Parmenides, <Mary is asleep>, or <Mary is ~awake>, is false (because <Mary is awake> is true and because we know that ^asleep^ and ^awake^ are incompatible.

In short: A statement is false because a statement with the same subject and a conceptually incompatible predicate is true. We don't need 'negative facts', nor their cousins, nor even their in-laws.

In what follows, I use "carries" to indicate that an object, O, carries a trope that is to be emplaced in O's alleged property token, /P/; properties aren't free floaters; they're lashed to objects. Frege used the metaphor of "unsaturated functions", awaiting their object porters, to characterize properties/functions. For this reason a coin emplaced in /coin/ of /this coin is copper colored/ has to be emplaced also in the predicate /copper colored/. If it carries a copper color into /copper colored/, it's a coherent emplacement in both /coin/ and /copper colored/, which makes <The coin is copper colored> true. Thus are facts made without the suspect dualism of 'pictures', 'representation' (the most vacant dualism of them all), or 'correspondence', without conceding to idealists' theory of coherence truth. Once ^coherence^ is freed from a truth interpretation, it's at liberty to serve a conceptual interpretation. Aufgehebt, Herr Hegel! It makes me wonder, Nino, if the advocates of a 'coherence' theory of truth conflated coherence as anemic and robust truth? Ridding our theories of contradictions requires making conceptual distinctions with the use of [~] thereby turning a statement contradiction into a conceptual "other". Plato used the example of the top that is both at rest and in motion in his Republic. The distinction that tamed the contradiction was to distinguish between the spinning circumference of the top from the axis that rested in its place.

I use the hypothetical [if] in explaining categorical statements here as a stop-gap hedge against problems posed by the non-existence of coherent emplacements for a sentence's subject, but I treat this differently, correctly, and at more length in the second dialogue of "On Emplacing" (pp. 42 - 95). I use [if] here to abbreviate my [any, every] way of replacing [all, some]. That's why [if] portends no surrender to material implication interpretations of categorical statements: (x) (Fx --> Gx). Recall, in that section I deal also with the non-existence of tropes for a sentence's predicate.
The Substitution Charts sum up the effects that the non-existence of objects and tropes have on our truth value entitlements (pp. 49 and 63).

\[
\text{/All S is P/} = \text{IF any of every coherent emplacement in /S/ carries a coherent emplacement into /P/, <all S is P> is true; if any of every EcrowE carries EblackE into /all crows are black/, <All crows are black> is true; if one of any EcrowE carries EwhiteE into /black/, <All crows are black> is false.}
\]

This stopgap hypothetical avoids Strawson's demand that Russell have some children should he claim <All my children are asleep> if it is to rank as a statement.

\[
\text{/No S is P/} = \text{IF not any of every coherent emplacement in /S/ carries a coherent emplacement into /P/, <No S is P> is true; if not any of every coherent emplacement in /crow/ carries a coherent emplacement into /black/, <All crows are black> is true. Nothing is implied about the non-existence of black crows (They're all pink!), accommodating the "so far as we know" bail-out that should be respected for universal statements; the "unexamined" crow is worth considering: if one of any coherent emplacement for /crow/ carries a coherent emplacement into /black/, <No crow is black> is false}
\]

\[
\text{/some S is P/} = \text{IF there is one of any coherent emplacement in /S/ that carries a coherent emplacement into /P/, <some S is P> is true; (this is neutral about existents; it specifies a hypothetical emplacement, which concurs with the correct translation of Aristotle's account of <Some S is not P>, <[Not every] S is P>\textsuperscript{9}, which in my determiner revision is <[Not: One of every} S is P>; IF one of any coherently emplaced crow carries black into /black/, <Some crows are black> is true; by replacing any count numeral for "one"; we may accomo-date any numeral determiner as in <Two crows are black> if two coherent EcrowEs carry EblackE into /black/, up to n-1;}
\]

\[
\text{/some S is not P/} = \text{IF one of any coherent emplacement in /S/ carries a contrary or contradictory emplacement, E~PE, into /P/, <Some is not P> is true, and <all S is P> is false; IF any two coherently emplaced crows carries a ~black trope into /black/, <Some crows are not black> is true.}
\]

Statements with determiners have coherence emplacement requirements in accord with which we're entitled to say they're true, false, or unknown. [One of any] differs from [any of every]'s emplacement requirements, as do their negations per above.

\textsuperscript{9} “On Emplacing”, p. 75.
Part of my project should show that truth logic's inference validity also rests on coherent combinations of its truth functors/logical constants and their terms just as coherent interpretations of natural languages' sentences rests on coherent combinations of subject and predicate concepts. Both ride on our practices of arranging tokens within functors' reach; the first rides on statements in truth inference patterns and the other rides on concepts in conceptual inference patterns. I'm trying to supply useful, precise coherence inference patterns for subject/predicate lexics to supplement those we have for truth logic's constants and determiners. Conceptual logic, too, has its logical constants, identified and explained in the Appendix; it was presented earlier in simpler form for didactic purposes, and because of its embryonic state, in LOGIC: A Dialogue (1965) and in The Critical Thinking Handbook (1996) co-authored with Robin Assali.

END OF DISCRETIONARY TEXT (BUT NOT OF DISCRETION)

ANEW

You can't use an incoherent interpretation of a sentence to make a statement; /my tongue is italicized/ has no truth- or false-making emplacements. This can be supported with conceptual logic's inference patterns and widely shared conceptual practices--believe me. Statements' robust truth value depends on object and trope emplacements. On the other hand, formal systems' 'sentences', stated per Peano, if you want, are coherent only--anemic truth--because we accept them without appeal to objects and tropes; incoherent ones are extruded without appeal to such emplace-emplacements. ("He doesn't know our numeral system, Leslie. Teach him what we do with [+] and [=].") In my modal system, so-called 'true' propositions (^blue is a color^) have ENJOINED coherence; so-called 'false' ones (^weight is a storm^) coherence is NOT ALLOWED, cast into limbo where they keep company with such insensate truth-makers as the 'intuited' abstract entities dear to Frege and Goedel's shades. Thus may we rid ourselves of the "a priori true" mixed metaphor. You may have picked up that [Enjoined] and [Not Allowed] are operation/act modalities, hypothetical/advisories of how and how not to combine concepts, whose strictures are accepted if you wish to understand others' sentences as they do, and to have others understand your sentences as you do. I replace 'truth' modalities with coherent acts' modalities (enjoined for necessary, allowed for possible, not allowed for impossible). [Allowed/possible] is retained as in truth logic, although [Allowed] =|= [Possible]; necessity and impossibility are retired to rest homes for the infirm and aged. Acting agents, front and center! Lest we forget! However obvious, banal, and how often acclaimed it is, it’s more oft ignored than honored.
You agree with Ludwig's point that $p$ in

\[
(T) \ 's' \text{ is true-in-L iff } p
\]
is a schematic letter to be replaced by a metalanguage sentence. Then you say that what $p$, the right hand part of the (T) biconditional, "is really up to is a 'translation' of an object-language sentence into a metalanguage sentence". I take it that for Tarski the object language sentence is designated by 's', which is /s/, the emplacement for 's'. Since 's' 'mentions' an object language sentence, it has to be in the meta-language; /is true-in-L/ probably is not intended to be part of the translation; he needs it to be part of the meta-language, otherwise he won't have 'lifted' truth value asservations out of the object language and thereby have side-stepped the Liar's alleged anomaly.

I asked you if your translation interpretation takes (1) the sentence emplaced in (T)'s $p$ to be the translation, or (2) whether it's the whole of (T) save for 's', or (3) whether it's the whole of (T) except for [iff]. Your answer was it's (1).

If /s/’s translation, ^p^, is the emplacement for $p$, per option (1), why should we conclude ^p^ is in the meta-language? ^p^ doesn't stand stead for the referent of 's', namely, /s/, which is in the object language, but tells us that we may rewrite /s/ as /p/ in the object language. A disquotationalist might argue that /p/ is in the meta-language, because it's not a rewrite solely of /s/ but of '/s' is true-in-L/; since the latter is in the meta-language, so must its rewrite, /p/, be. This is akin but not identical to option (3) above.

There are two ways to go from here.

(i) The schematic $p$'s emplacement is a proposition, an interpretation, identified as such by ^p^ (|^p^ = |= <p>); it may be claimed ^p^ is in the meta-language because its an interpretation of the mentioned /s/. Since I eschew meanings as part of the "world's furniture", ^p^ doesn't tell us the 'meaning' of /s/, but tells us how to rewrite /s/ without loss of coherence anywhere in the object language's lexical space. So, what's happening in (T) is that one object language token sentence, /p/, is a re-write of another object language token sentence, /s/; ^p^ indicates /p/ is a rewrite/translation/interpretation by ^p^; /p/-^p^ may be either similar or different from /s/, depending on how /s/ is to be translated, of which more below.

(ii) We could simply emplace an object language token sentence /p/ instead of ^p^ in the schematic $p$. The truth of (T)'s [iff] translation claim would then depend on /s/ and /p/ having the same 'meaning'.

I prefer (i). My notation <^s^ = ^p^> says /s/ and /p/ are rewrites of each other. I like the economy of (i) and dislike (ii)’s reliance on "meaning"; so, I'll stick with (i) in what follows.

Given that Tarski touts 'correspondence', perhaps misleadingly, because, by the usual account of that school, it requires 'facts', states of affairs truth-makers that are germaine to natural but not to Tarski's formalized language claims. Davidson's
A proposal to extend (T) to natural languages has taken advantage of "correspond-ence"'s double interpretation, which franchises constructing two different kinds of truth makers, Tarski's anemic and Aristotle's robust one.

A dissent: I don't for a moment think there are stand-alone 'truth-makers'; I'm using the expression to connect with those who have more orthodox views. Persons are truth makers; they MAKE translation/rewrites, particularly as explained in "On Emplacing" with a more definitive account coming up in it's Appendix. Persons MAKE verifying facts by coherently emplacing entities into the subjects and predicates of sentences. How they MAKE DISverifying facts requires a detour to The Sophist for Plato's answer to Parmenides, explained briefly in the "Discretionary" section above.10

We make anemic and robust truth-makers, per, respectively, the translation and ‘correspondence’ interpretation of (T) below. I put /correspondence/ in scare quotes, because I reject this account of what makes statements true; what makes them true are coherent emplacements into their categorematic terms.

Anemic: We translate /s/ as ^p^. If ^p^ is the correct translation/interpretation of /s/, its directed rewrite /p/ identifies what emplacements will make (T) true. Note that /p/ doesn't make <<s> is true> (nor Tarski's '/s' is true/) robustly true. A translation is too anemic for that. Anemic truth might be achieved formally for an artificial language. ^S is P^ is but a prelude to truth value; it identifies the coherent emplacements into /S is P/ that would entitle us to claim <S is P> true, failing which its truth value is false or unknown.

Robust: On this interpretation of (T), a translation identifies the emplacements that, if coherently emplaceable in the object language /s/'s rewrite, enables us to construct the truth-maker that makes <<s> is true> AND (T) true. A translation, ^p^, by itself isn't a robust truth-making state of affairs, but serves only to identify one.

A translation ^p^ of /s/ may use words of the same type in the same order as the translated/interpreted sentence. You note this re /snow is white/, whose translation is ^snow is white^. However, ^snow is white^ shouldn't be identified with /snow is white/, because a translation may use different words, as in ^la neve e' bianco^, which is not identical to /snow is white/. The object language sentence, /snow is white/, translated/interpreted as ^snow is white^ and as ^la neve e' bianco^ indicates it has (at least) two different rewrites that take identical coherent emplace-ments, (EsnowE = EneveE) and (EwhiteE = EbiancoE). If they didn't have such emplacements, they wouldn't be each other's rewrite. With those emplacements, we can construct one and only one truth-maker, one fact.

I distinguish facts from states of affairs; the latter are the source of our emplacements into the sentence structures as I described the procedure in "On Emplacing". Facts are constructed from predicative lexical combinations and their

coherent object and trope emplacements. Wittgenstein’s talk about the logical structure of facts (2.15, 2.16, 2.2) still employs a dualism entailed by "representation", whereas my account of facts takes them as mono-constructions; his "logical form of representation" (2.2) is just the logical form of coherent lexical combinations into which we may coherently emplace objects and tropes. ‘Facts’ don’t have logical form before emplacements into grammatical sentences with lexically coherent interpretations. Facts are entitled truths, states of affairs are not.

Since Tarski’s 'semantic' truth-makers aren't robust, as a coherently emplaced Esnow is whiteE is, his interpretations of a formal system's primitive constants be-long to the anemic tribe. His so-called 'semantic' concept of truth is really a theory of how to establish the coherence of formal language sentences--a consequent of your translation view of (T)--and as such quite useful for my purposes. As Quine was delighted to note, the (T) schema shows we don't need modal necessity to ac-count for valid consequences; syntactic and interpretative specifications are enough. Thus, necessarily and impossibly true propositions in all possible worlds may join the detritus of Nietzsche's discarded God. Tarski opened the gate through which the lexical act modality [Enjoined] may drive. [Enjoined] is not another form of deontic nor alethic categorical necessity; it falls under the hypothetical Lexical Imperative "If you want to understand others as they understand themselves and if you wish to be understood by others as you understand yourself, then you are enjoined/not allowed to....". I elaborate on this imperative in the Appendix of "On Emplacing".

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SUMMING UP

Suppose we've emplaced /s/ in 's' and its translation/interpretation, ^p^, in p. This fitted-out (T) may state either a translation or a 'correspondence'--Tarski's term, not mine--between its terms. Writing schematically for abbreviation purposes, (T) is either

(a) a meta-language claim that ^p^ is a translation interpretation of (T): /s/‘s translation is ^p^ and identifies the rewrite /p/. If /p/ is /s/‘s rewrite, /p/ makes (T) true. This gives us anemic truth.

Or (T) is

(b) a meta-language claim that the object-tropes coherently emplaceable in /s/, is identified by ^p^: /p/‘s coherently emplaced objects and tropes makes <s> and (T) true. This cradles robust truth, which is germaine to Davidson's pro-posed extension of the (T) schema to natural languages.

If I have this right, "is true-in-L" in (T) has two interpretations, one for formal languages and the other for natural languages. I think my enriched 'quotation' de-vices force more precision in discourse about truth, coherence, reference, interpreta-tion, correspondence, and meaning than the anorexic ("...") and ('...') do, which is illustrated here with the (T) schema. Whether I'm right or wrong in the readings above, the richer quotation devices should make it easier to spot and state where I went wrong or right. Criticism restricted to the use of ("....") and ('.') is too gross. I hate multiplying distinctions and their accompanying symbols beyond easy useful-ness, whether inside or outside the academy, but one person's need is another's ex-cess. Allora! Where do we cut the cheese? Exposing Tarski’s confusion has need of a finer-grained quotation array.

HOW TO REWRITE (Ta) AND (Tr)

(Ta) for "anemic T"

(Ta) <s> is true-in-L iff ^p^ is the interpretation/translation of /s/.

Here I've replaced ‘s’ in (T) with it's object language statement, <s>, in which the object language token sentence /s/ plays its part. ^p^ is a proposition, an interpreta-tion of /s/. Sentences are interpreted; statements are not: Statements presup-pose coherently interpreted sentences + making an alethic claim:

<statement> = /sentence/ + ^interpretation^ + [alethic claim] (Frege's turnstile: |--).

(Ta) is true iff the interpretation goes through, however that’s determined, including Tarski’s mode of translation.

As I remarked above, a translation/interpretation isn't a robust truth-maker. For anyone who subscribes to robust truth only, the anemic (Ta) rewrite of (T)’s "is true-in-L" is like counterfeit money. Who wants that?
It could be countered that (Ta) doesn't jilt robust truth, because "is true" is superfluous. What's there to be robust about? The rewrite sentence identified by $^p^$ when used to rewrite a statement, $<$s$>$, is equivalent to <<s> is true>. We can file this under a disquotational view of "is true"; it drops "is true" and the outer statement quotation marks from <<s> is true> in favor of $<$s$>$ per Strawson. But, which "true" has been dropped, anemic or robust truth? If anemic "is true" has been shorn, we have jilted robust "is true".

I am not a fan of the disquotational view; you can't extirpate "is true". No matter how disquotational you are, you've still disquotted "is true", whether anemic or robust, and as long as you're an avowed disquotationalist, "is true" sticks to you like epoxy: "What did you disavow?" is always at the ready to pull some skin from your corpus. "Is true" is the via passiva report of the outcome of interpreting, emplacing, and asserting; of course you can drop the “is true” as redundant if you’ve recognized the outcome of those via attiva acts. Even if not verbally expressed as the passive “is true”, it sticks as a via attiva truth value claim to sensitive synapses.

On to (Tr), where robust truth is honored.

(Tr) for "robust T"

(Tr) $<$s$>$ is true-in-L iff /s/’s translation $^p^$ identifies the objects and tropes that may be coherently emplaced in /p/, which make $<$s$>$ true.

(Tr) is an ecumenical version that incorporates the translation/interpretation $^p^$ of $<$s$>$ in (T) without stiffing robust truth. It's not disquotational even though "is true" doesn't appear on the right side of (Tr); it need not be once we've introduced the mediating $^p^$ that identifies $<$s$>$’s subject and predicate emplacements. The interpretation $^p^$ of /s/ need not be correct. Whatever $^p^$ is, $<$s$>$’s truth-value fate is determined by it. Thus, (Tr)'s truth value isn't dependent on (Ta)'s truth value.

Tarski thinks we have to deflect the Liar bullet. He begins by claiming that the Liar shows natural languages suffer from antinomies. This is wrong; natural languages don't contain statements. Their grammars guide prudent sentence making, including poets’ license to innovate. We may coherently interpret some sentences, others no. It's languages' speakers who make statements and 'commit antimonies' when they attempt to make statements with sentences, including the Liar, that can't be given coherent interpretations. That was a major point in "On Emplacing". Thus, neither the Liar nor any other via passiva 'paradox', can convict natural languages of having antinomous faultlines.

Language users, not languages, create paradoxes because they have an inadequate conceptual coherence culture. After Tarksi' opening melancholy, he hurries on to formal language 'truth', abandoning natural language speakers to their fate.

We, however, may claim <<s> is true> without fear of paradox and without prohibiting the use of "is true" in an ‘object’ language, because coherent emplace-
ments for p in (T), under cover of your 'translation' interpretation of it, are propo-
sitions, not statements, hence neither true nor false. They're either an anemic ^p^ or
identify robust objects and tropes coherently emplaceable in /s/’s rewrite, /p/.
The coherence of ^p^ shields us from so-called semantic paradoxes, such as the Liar.
Thus, a careful restating of Convention (T) with sufficient distinctions shows we can avoid
debilitating paradox without resort to language levels, whether ^truth^ is con-ceived
anemically or robustly. The Liar paradox is like a salted slug that melts away into
scrutable stain once we supplement alethic with coherence logic.

Given the prior explanations, we can trim down (Ta) and (Tr) as follows:

(Ta)  <s> is anemically true-in-L  iff  the model emplacements in /p/
produce a coherent proposition, ^p^;

(Tr)  <s> is true-in-L  iff  ^p^ identifies objects and tropes that, when
coherently emplaced in /p/, make <s> robustly true.

It may be useful to go back to the case where an object language sentence isn't
its own translation (same word types, same order), as it often isn't in natural languages
due to words' multivocality and sentences' grammatical ductility. I earlier gave an
Italian rewrite of /snow is white/, but the same issue comes up if we stick to English
examples.

Tarski's "snow is white" exemplar doesn't deal with this case, nor need he; /p/ is
just a serviceably labile rewrite of /s/ for a formal language, whatever it may be. In his
exemplar, he relies on two tokens of "snow is white", one as the referent of 's', /snow is
white/1, and another as p, /snow is white/2. This gives us the following, where the
left-hand side is a sentence token rather than a statement per Tarski's choice:

/snow is white/1 is true-in-L  iff  /snow is white/2.

Even if we make <snow is white> the left-hand choice as in (Tr), this requires incor-
porating /snow is white/1. This version of (T) tells us that the right-hand /snow is
white/2 is a sentence, because the interpretation, ^snow is white^, in

/snow is white/ is true-in-L  iff  ^snow is white^,
indicates that we may rewrite /snow is white/1 as /snow is white/2. From this we may
fork to an anemic (Ta) or a robust (Tr) route. The problematic, interesting route is
(Tr); for those on the (Ta) route, p in (T) may be arbitrarily assigned a rewrite to suit
the logician/translator's choice of models whereas those on the (Tr) route have to deal
with refractory natural languages not liege to logicians' arbitrary choices. Trav-elsers
on (Tr) must cope with the possibility that the right-hand side can't always use token
words of the same type in the same order to provide ^p^.

(N)  /Nino's car is hot/.

This sentence has several non-identical interpretations from which we may
choose the appropriate rewrite in some given situation. We will probably require
information about the situation in order to choose appropriately. The choice will
depend on which other sentences have coherent emplacements from diverse loca-
tions in lexical space in a given situation. Consider four interpretations of (N) and the
diverse locations of "hot" in lexical space:

(N1)  "Nino's car is stolen" ("property"),
(N2)  "Nino's car is fast" ("speed"),
(N3)  "Nino's car is overheated" ("temperature"),
(N4)  "Nino's car is popular ("selling like hotcakes")">

These interpretations provide four possible rewrites of /Nino's car is hot/ and four
possible (Tr)s, each with the appropriately rewritten /p/ sentences used to make
statements:

(N1)  <Nino's car is hot> is true-in-L  iff  <Nino's car is stolen> is
true-in-L,
and so forth for the other three interpretations. The right hand statements have buried
children. (N1)'s buried child is the proposition

"Nino's car is stolen",
the proposition that directs us to the rewrite of /Nino's car is hot/, which governs the
coherent emplacement of Enino's carE @ /Nino's car/ and E(Nino's car)stolenE @ 
stolen/, which, if satisfied, makes both <Nino's car is stolen> and, given (N1), <Nino's
car is hot> true.

Think of translation/interpretation of a sentence as a rewrite. Once we rid
ourselves of bootless meanings, we may turn with enlightened minds to the literal
rewrite. Italian and French usually don't ask for the meaning of a word or sentence. In
Italian, instead of asking "What do you mean?" or "What does what you said mean?",
you ask "Che vuol dire?"--What do you want to SAY? That is, what token rewrite has
the same coherence conditions. If you simply repeat what you said, as tourists do in a
louder voice, it's not helpful, for that's the problematic sentence. What's wanted,
literally, is that you say a different sentence. In French, one asks "Que veut dire?" or
"Que voulez-vous dire?" Our comparable English device is "in other words". Instead
of asking for a sentence's or a word's meaning, we should ask for a rewrite. And, of
course, what we literally do in translating is rewrite, replace one sentence with a
different one. Thus, an interpretation of a sentence, /s/, always turns out to be a
sentence rewritten, either a similar or different one.\(^{12}\) We can justify the rewrites
without recourse to "same meaning", as Quine and Goodman claimed. I explain how
we can do this in the Appendix where I extol conceptual logic's utility in the service of
nominalism.

My nominalism suits anemic truth and your translation understanding of (T). A
sentence's coherence depends on the coherence of at least one of its interpreta-
tion/rewrites; from this we get an equivalent version of (Ta) where "COHERENT-in-
L" replaces anemic "true-in-L", (Ta/c):

\(^{12}\) For rewrites, see my translation of La Murata, Sealed in Stone, City Lights, San Francisco, 2002.
(Ta/c) /s/ is COHERENT-in-L iff /s/ may be rewritten as the coherent ^p^.

But I wonder if Tarski would agree, wedded to robust truth as he expressly seems to be, as in his Aristotelian citations, like so many logicians and mathematicians from antiquity to now. I take it, Nino, that you, like me, don't think there are any robust true or false logical and mathematical statements, because you hold that concepts are cognitive capacities of agents, and, so, when we exercise these capacities by combining concepts into a proposition we may be enjoined or not allowed to so exercise them, as the case may be, because existing lexical habits of our co-speakers forces us to foster some capacities and expunge others.

IF we want to understand (coherently) others as they would be understood and if we want others to understand (coherently) us as we would be understood. Did you catch the flavor of St. Paul's "Epistles" style there, as conveyed by the St. James’ version rewrite? One person's capacity, after all, may go adrift of another's. You're agent oriented, and know agents correct each other, rightly or wrongly, insistently or tentatively, authoritatively or officiously, intuitively or inferentially (via coherence logic or its inadequate surrogate, truth logic), which suggest we accept the aphorism: "Adverbs (via attiva ^coherently) precede relations (via pas-siva ^coherent^)."

So, it comes down to this. We need not seek recourse in meta-languages to avoid the Liar. A rewritten /p/ is just another physical sentence, an object in the world like cups and saucers that we talk about without summoning metalanguages. Once we make enough finite distinctions in our reference resources ("...", /.../,^...^, <...>, E...E, [...] ), we don't need an infinite number of metalanguages to frustrate Eubulides and rescue Aristotle. All to the good, I say. And thanks to your "trans-lation" interpretation of Convention (T).

I would appreciate other fruitful suggestions in full gratitude with respondent but hopefully shorter revisions, particularly about Tarski's recursively provable 'truth' of 'statements' in formal languages.

A presto,

Caio,   Art

In defense of my quotation devices none except E...E is new; the others have established names you use to speak of them. They're speaker-friendly, at least for some philosophers.

"...
/...
^...
<...
E...E
[...]
= type sentence
= token sentence
= concept or proposition
= statement
= emplacement/referent
= functor, operation