Big-Little Logical Ambitions

In the Thirties the Big-Little books were cheap and little--H, 3'' W, 2+'' Th, 2''—graphic comics; "Dick Tracy" with his advanced short-wave watch-phone assured us that the good guy would beat the bad guys. As a Nebraska farm boy, I had less access to them than my town kin and friends did. Some had book-cases filled with their soon acid-ravaged pages. Although little, those books were ambitious imaginative aids that helped we youngsters endure the drought-parched landscape desolating us and our crops day after day of relentless heat.

I felt a similar malaise about the philosophical landscape in the late Fifties, my mid-thirties. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*' fresh contrast with orthodox cant of whatever 'school' offered relief. My small class of brilliant students relished his oracular book. The lilting grace of John Wisdom's poetic style from "across the waste of waters" doled out its welcome deliverance. Both W.s ushered me off a pre-ordained track to an arid, orthodox professional life.

The malaise lifted circa 1960 under a banyan tree on the University of Hawaii, Honolulu Campus, while sitting in a cooling light mist blown off a near, forested mountain. I had been intrigued by Wittgenstein asking after the limits of language, which he kept alive in his *Investigations*. He was, of course, interested in how to draw the line between the street terms 'sense' and 'nonsense'. For that, we need the Honolulu Solution, which began with my inkling of how to uncover a 'conceptual' logic. It turned out to be a deep, connexive logic, the basement logic for all alethic/truth logics. Wittgenstein, like the wardens of my malaise, did not discover the limits of language's sense, because you cannot find the border between 'sense' and 'nonsense with truth logic alone. For that a conceptual logic is needed; with its valid inferences, we can demonstrate which disputed propositions are *coherent* and which are *incoherent*, ^the nail is hard^ versus ^the nail sleeps^. That we immediately know which of these propositions is coherent and which is incoherent shows there's a logic implicit in our languages that we've learned and use readily. I made it rudimentarily explicit in 1965 in *LOGIC: A Dialogue*, Twelflth conversation. Since then I've made logical conceptual structures more explicit and applicable to traditional philosophy's problematic issues, building on a rich history of linguists', especially Germans, accounts of lexical terms' "field" relations. My logic's grammar is trimmed to suit Jean-Louis Gardies' "pure logical grammar" (*Rational Grammar*, p. 20)

The structural logic of sentences' lexical terms (coherence value) differs from the familiar logical structure of statements (truth value). *Both* of these con-

ceptual propositions, ^Meg sleeps^ and ^Meg sleeps not^, are coherent while only *one* of these statements, <Meg sleeps^ and < Meg sleeps not> is true; 2 coherent ^propositions^ =|= 1 true <statement>, because ^2 = 1^ is incoherent. So, neither logic is reducible to the other. Conceptual logic is connexive, truth logic is not. (Laurence Goldstein.) No amount of juggling within alethic logic alone can turn an ^alethic^ logic into a ^connexive^; not even the best 'relevance' nor 'paraconsistent' prestidigitators can. Further, the Coherence Account of Truth requires that emplacements into all of a sentence's terms be coherent, S+P+, as a condition of its interpreted, rewritten' ^proposition^'s coherence and its associated <statement>'s truth. ^The nail is sleeping^ is an incoherent proposition, because a nail can't coherently carry a sleeping trope into /sleeping/ or into /not sleeping|awake/; so, the statement <The nail is sleeping> has no truth value, S+P~. This proves the concept of ^coherence^ is logically prior to the concept of ^truth^.

Now comes the "Big", ambitious part of my lay. It's all about relating.

(i) With conceptual logic we can coherently, knowingly relate lexical terms in any language's sentences, as well as to any other language's lexical terms. We can trans-re-late. I use seven copula functor operators and conceptual negation to structure terms/concepts, ^Meg^ and ^sleeps/sleeps not^. These structures are logically ordered lexical/conceptual spaces in which we may travel coherently on a path between terms in propositions and statements; we may travel coherently from ^Meg^ to ^sleeps^ and from ^Meg^ to ^sleeps not^. To see how this goes, visit "A Precis of 'The Logic of Conceptual Coherence 3.0'".

(ii) With conceptual logic and the [Emplace] operation we can relate any states of affairs presented to our senses, unaided or augmented (telescopes, hearing aids), by inserting them coherently into sentences' subjects and predicates that are lexical/conceptual terms. Here's how we create cognized facts. Because nature has neither logic nor facts, we have to high-jack languages' logic to conceptually organize and discursively cognize the emplaced world. Emplacing puts the sensed world inside sentences' terms. Subject and predicate terms (cloud, white, black) aren't names, they're variables like the letters in /a + b = c/. Just as we coherently emplace numerals into algebraic formulae' variables, so we coherently emplace/assign clouds and their tropes into the variable terms of /The cloud is white/black/. Each variable has a unique place in lexical space. Variables give us generality; there are lots of numerals to emplace; and there are lots of clouds, whites, and blacks that may be coherently emplaced in the variables /cloud/, /white/, and /black/. Anything coherently emplaced within structured lexical

space becomes a concept; this includes physical word variables (/cloud/, /white/) any substantive (cloud) and trope (white) coherently emplaced in them.

The [Emplace] World → Language direction counters the one taken by orthodox analytic philosophers, viz., Language → World. They say we use words to 'name' what it 'represents', 'refers to', 'picks out'-- objects, events, and tropes. But it privatizes thought: In each of our own minds we relate a 'name' that 'represents, 'refers to' their targets. The [Emplace] functor pensions off this endemic list of mis-descriptions of what we actually do when we talk cognitively with others about the world's content. Nominal talk about the world and its lexical/conceptual structure is publically available. You can see, hear, Braille the sentence, /That cloud is white/; your gestured /that cloud/ emplaces seen clouds and their colors into its heard/seen/Brailled physical terms. All is public here. But every term in the analytic philosophers' list leaves the world's truth-making states of affairs outside of, publicly unrelated, to languages' physical tokens and their coherence and truth logics. The list of private relations dumps an unsolvable problem in our laps, viz., the list's privacy barrier makes shared communication inexplicable; thoughts about relations twixt words and world are imprisoned in each person's mind, unheard in the agora, unseen in the library: To each his own belly button. This 'problem' roused Hilary Putnam to asseverate, somewhat enigmatically, "Meaning ain't just in the head". Let us cleanse the analysts' temple. C. I. Lewis showed us how to do this (*Mind and the World Order*, Chapters III and IV). Mutual comprehension relies on public, isomorphic lexical spaces.

(iii) With conceptual logic, its modalities--[Enjoined to say], [Enjoined not to say], and [Allowed to say]--and coherent emplacements, we have the tools to gain any discursive knowledge about any of the world's states or changes, whether they're any of our goings and doings in daily living or developing and integrating our mathematically ordered sciences by the earnest gifted who walk among us. For this, we need and use basement conceptual logic's tools for acquiring any discursive knowledge, both coherent and true.

Now comes the "Little" part of my lay: I've described our conceptual mastery of grandiose, hegelian scale in but three little nutshells, (i) - (iii). Learning the details and my defenses of them is up to curious readers. As Fanebius Perlyng wrote so long ago, "Shur, whee kan lern fram uthers butt naut fer thum". Wittgenstein might have written, "Of what you have not read you must be silent".

A. K. Bierman Website: sfsu arthur bierman 03/10/2017